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Dedication

This project is written in the memory of all the men and women who have left (and will
leave) their homelands with the hope of making a better life for themselves and their families. In
general, it is my hope that this project sheds a little more light on the legacy that migrants have
left in this world. Still, although this project reflects the dreams of many men, it is motived by
the memory of one man, Pedro Ortiz.
Pedro and I occasionally worked together on construction sites near Telluride, Colorado
between 2001 and 2005. At the time I was an undergraduate student at the University of
Colorado Boulder but every summer I returned to my hometown to earn money for the school
year. Pedro and I only worked together on several occasions, and while we were unable to
communicate well, I recall finding myself strongly moved by what I was able to make out of his
personal story. At the time, all Pedro and I were able to exchange were the basics. Through
gestures and broken English, Pedro explained to me that he left his native Mexico for the first
time in the 1980s to work in the southwestern U.S. When I asked him where he was from he
responded “León, Guanajuato”. I recall partially capturing the first word he pronounced and
completely ignoring the second word due to the fact that I was unable to pronounce more than
the first syllable! My face must have revealed my confusion because he promptly responded with
“You know, like a lion,” which he followed up with a trained gesture in which he brought his
hands above his head and let out a loud “RAAAAAA”. With such primitive communication, we
would often go hours without uttering a word but through occasional hand motions and
laborious conversations, we each got to know a little about one another.
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For more than fifteen years Pedro would leave his hometown in Mexico and head north
for six months, during which time he worked on construction sites for a local company in and
around Telluride. Finally, in the early 2000s, he was able to solicit permanent residency in the
U.S., at which point he petitioned to bring his wife and children to live with him. By this time,
Pedro and I had lost contact. However, in the fall of 2006, while home on a break from graduate
school, I tracked down Pedro’s number and gave him a call. By this time I spoke rather fluid
Spanish and so I was quite excited to talk with the man I had worked side by side with for so
many hours without exchanging much more than an occasional phrase or pantomime. Pedro’s
wife answered the phone and after we briefly introduced ourselves, she passed me on to her
husband. Pedro and I spoke for roughly half an hour, in which time he told me a bit more about
himself. As it turned out, Pedro was from a town called Valle de Santiago, which is located in the
state of Guanajuato, Mexico. Coincidently, my girlfriend at the time, who is now my wife, is also
from Guanajuato. As a result, we unexpectedly had a great deal to talk about. We discussed
different places we had visited in Guanajuato and before we hung up, Pedro invited me to visit
him and his family the next time they were back home. Like many immigrants, Pedro had built a
house in his hometown, which he went back to visit once or twice a year. Unfortunately, Pedro
and I we were never able to meet up in his native Mexico. A week after we talked on the phone,
Pedro passed away suddenly from a brain aneurysm. To be sure, there are many men and
women like Pedro that have fought for their dreams only to fall tragically short of seeing them
reach fruition. A great deal more, however, continue to fight for their dreams day in and day out.
The goal of this project is to shed light on the legacy of these men and women.
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ABSTRACT
In the present study I analyze the relationship between migrant remittances,
development and political transformation across 46 municipios located in the state of Guanajuato,
Mexico. Using Guanajuato as a case study, my research addresses fundamental questions
regarding the impact of remittances in Mexico: How, if at all, do migrants influence economic
development and political change across the state? How does the impact of direct remittances to
individual families compare to the impact of remittances channeled through collective
structures? The crux of this study lies at the intersection of these inquires, and although my
analysis is limited in scope, the results outlined in Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6 point to one overarching
theme: Remittances alone do not drive long-term development. Rather, in the long run
meaningful remittance-led economic development and democratic change—measured by gains
in health care, education, economic growth, and civic participation and transparency—require a
deep and authentic partnership between economic actors, members of civic society and local
government. As the results outlined in this study reveal, the program 3x1 para migrantes has the
potential to underpin this type of relationship.
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Chapter 1: Brief Introduction to Study
One of the things that Mexico had never acknowledged about my father –I insist that
you at least entertain this idea- is the possibility that my father and others like him were
the great revolutionaries of Mexico. Pocho pioneers. They, not Pancho Villa, not Zapata,
were heralds of the modern age in Mexico. They left for the United States and then they
came back to Mexico. And they changed it forever. (Richard Rodriguez 2009:210)
As we advance further into the 21st century it is becoming more and more evident that
migration is a defining feature of current international affairs. At present just over 3 percent of
all individuals around the world resides in a country other than the one in which he or she was
born (Migration Policy Institute). This trend is without precedent. At no other time in human
history have so many people lived beyond their homeland. As a result, migration currently plays
a fundamental role in shaping social, political and economic conditions in countries around the
globe.
In large part recent immigration trends in the U.S. as well as other developed countries
are a direct result of unequal development trends across rich countries and poor countries. The
massive income and wealth disparities currently evident between nations around the world have
created a structural situation in which marginalized individuals have come to see immigration as
a way of improving their life chances.1 This situation finds its origins at the dawn of 20th century
when rapid industrialization in the Western Hemisphere gave way to an oppressive arrangement
in which the owners of production (the bourgeoisie) profited from the cheap labor of poor
masses pouring in from the countryside (the proletariat). Still, despite polarized inequalities

It is worth noting that income and wealth differences between countries also help explain emigration levels
following seemingly unrelated events such as warfare and natural disasters. For example, when relatively wealthy
countries are hit by natural disasters a larger percentage of the country’s basic infrastructure survives and as areas of
need emerge the government is more capable of responding adequately. The opposite is true in poor countries.
This scenario played out in 2010 when strong earthquakes hit Haiti and Chile, respectively. Despite stronger seismic
activity, Chile emerged with less damage and quickly moved towards recovery. Haiti, on the other hand, is still
recovering from the devastation. As a result, the earthquake in Haiti has led to the exodus of far more refugees than
its Chilean counterpart.
1

1

within developed nations, the ratio of mean income between rich countries and poor countries
at the time was a modest 4 to 1. In contrast, at the onset of the 21st century, while social classes
are clearly more diverse within countries than in years past, the income gap between rich nations
and poor nations now stands at an astounding 100 to 1 (Milanovic 2011: 11). Given this
structural arrangement international migration clearly represents a very powerful form of social
mobility for citizens of developing countries (Korzeniewicz 2009: 108; Portes and Hoffman
2003: 70). It is therefore not surprising that around the world unprecedented numbers of rural
peasants and marginalized urban workers have come to see emigration to developed countries as
a road to progress. This is particular evident in the case of the United States (U.S.) and Mexico.
At present 13 percent of the U.S. population, or roughly 40 million people, is composed
of immigrants. More than half of these individuals were born in Latin America, and almost onethird are native citizens of Mexico. It is perhaps for this reason that every year the U.S.
government spends millions of dollars addressing the short-run symptoms of immigration, such
as “uncontrollable” borders and undocumented workers, while only tangentially addressing the
root causes of emigration, such as global inequalities, political repression and dire poverty. This
trend is particularly evident in recent decades.
Historically high migration patterns combined with the rise of a security-minded state in
the post-9/11 era has led to unprecedented spending on immigration enforcement in the U.S.
According to a recent report by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI):
[T]he US government spends more on its immigration enforcement agencies than on all
its other principal criminal federal law enforcement agencies combined. In FY 2012,
spending for CBP, ICE, and US-VISIT reached nearly $18 billion. This amount exceeds
by approximately 24 percent total spending for the FBI, Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), Secret Service, US Marshals Service, and Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), which stood at $14.4 billion in FY 2012.
(2013:9)
2

This report goes on to point out that the push for greater immigration enforcement
began with the passing of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986. IRCA provided
a pathway towards legalization for millions of undocumented immigrants but also, for the first
time in U.S. history, made it against the law to higher “illegal” immigrants and authorized the
fortification of the U.S.-Mexico border (Meissner et al. 2012).
Lawmakers could not have known it at the time but the largest wave of immigrants was
yet to come. Favorable economic conditions in the U.S. coupled with stark inequalities in
Mexico and other developing countries fueled one of the largest waves of immigration in U.S.
history.2 In the face of rising immigration and recalcitrant constituents U.S. legislators have time
and again reaffirmed their blind faith in the recommendations outlined in IRCA by committing
more and more taxpayers dollars to immigration enforcement. Far less attention, however, has
been lent to a now obscure report titled Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response.
The report, which was ordered by congress after the passing of IRCA, was published in 1990 by
the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic
Development. The commission was assigned two principle goals: “a) to examine conditions in
Mexico and other migrant-sending countries in the Western Hemisphere which contribute to
unauthorized migration to the United States; and b) to explore “mutually beneficial, reciprocal
trade and investment programs to alleviate such conditions” (Congress 1990: E-1). In the official
write-up the commission noted that the best long-term solution for migration was meaningful
development in migrant-sending nations and specifically, Mexico. The final report came to the
following conclusion:

Note: In the U.S. immigration as a percentage of the total population peaked in 1910 at roughly 14.7 percent.
However, in terms of total immigrants admitted the post-1965 era has been witness to the largest wave of
immigration in U.S. history (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).
2
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There are no short-term solutions to the problem of undocumented migration.
Regardless of our efforts and those of the countries themselves, the United States will
continue to be a magnet so long as our wages are many times more attractive than theirs.
Moreover, the major paradox of our study is the conclusion that economic development
in the short term stimulates migration by raising expectations and enhancing people’s
ability to migrate. It takes many years—even generations—for sustained growth to
achieve the desired results. (1990:4)
Today, more than two decades after the aforementioned report was published,
immigration from Mexico is on the decline. In fact, over the course of the last ten years Mexican
immigration has hit a net zero for the first time since the 1960s (Pew Center 2012). Caught up
amidst the fanfare of partisan politics legislators on both sides of the aisle have quickly credited
the U.S. government’s draconian policies with the decrease in immigration from Mexico. A more
sober account of the issue, however, points to a quite different cause: Mexico is developing.
Since the passing of IRCA nearly three decades ago the quality of life enjoyed by most
Mexicans has improved. Over the course of the last thirty years Mexico has experienced a
number a fundamental social, economic and political shifts. In recent decades, for example,
human development indices have improved throughout the country, revealing the successful
expansion of education, healthcare and employment to marginalized populations. As a result,
today citizens of Mexico have better access to health care and education and across the country
fertility rates have fallen. To be clear, poverty and inequality are hardly a thing of the past in
Mexico, but in general, Mexicans are better off today than they were three or four decades ago.
In addition, since the late 1980s Mexico has experienced an unprecedented opening of the
political sphere. Across the country parties now compete for political posts in relatively
transparent elections. Moreover, the decentralization of decision making and resource allocation
from the federal government to state and municipal authorities has opened up avenues of
political participation to previously excluded groups. As a consequence of these changes fewer
4

people feel the need to migrate to the U.S. These shifts, coupled with a slow economic recovery
in the U.S. following the 2008 recession, have led social scientists to the conclusion that Mexican
migration as we have known it may well be over (Massey and Castañeda: 2012). Our
understanding of its legacy, however, has just begun.
In recent years researchers have dedicated a great deal of energy to the study of both the
catalysts of Mexican migration as well as the impact that Mexican immigrants have on receiving
communities in the U.S. Less attention, however, has been lent to the analysis of factors that
have the potential to ameliorate the very conditions that drive migration in the first place. With
that in mind, the rise and fall of Mexican migration over the last several decades provides a
unique opportunity to empirically assess the recommendations made in the aforementioned
report, Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response. In the present study I address a
small part of the commission’s original report by focusing on the relationship between migrant
remittances, development and political change in migrant-sending communities in central
Mexico.
Remittance-Led Development in Context
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) development is the
process through which individuals gain access to "an enabling environment” that allows them
“to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives." In short, by improving community access to
education, healthcare and income, development provides individuals with additional leverage
over the factors that condition their lives. As the ensuing quote from Unauthorized Migration
reveals, migrant remittances share a potential relationship with local development in migrant
hometown communities:
It is generally agreed that remittances have the potential as an investment resource,
particularly in the migrant-sending communities to which they are sent. Millions of legal
5

residents in the United States have close ties to areas where undocumented migrants
originate and have a strong commitment to assisting their families and communities. If
remittances are channeled into productive small business investments and these small
businesses succeed in generating jobs and higher incomes, emigration pressures should
eventually abate in such areas. (1990:91)
Although pinpointing any one “catalyst” of development is impossible, within migrant
sending communities one of the most important factors underpinning local progress is the inflow of migrant remittances from abroad. Remittances reflect the fact that individuals not only
see migration as a means through which to directly improve their own lot in life but also as a
way of contributing to the betterment of those that they leave behind. This point is corroborated
by the fact that migrant remittances currently constitute a significant portion of capital flows for
developing countries throughout the southern hemisphere. As Table 1.1 reveals, migrant
remittances make up less than 1 percent of world GDP. However, in developing countries cash
transfers from abroad contribute a much more significant percentage of capital flows. In
Tajikistan, for example, remittances account for an astounding 35 percent of GDP. In middleincome countries, such as India, China and Mexico, remittances form a much smaller percentage
of GDP but total remittances flowing in these countries reach well into the billions. In both
India and China remittances topped the 50 billion dollar mark in 2010. Similarly, over the last
ten years Mexican diaspora communities have sent back an average of roughly 20 billion dollars
per year.3 During this same period total remittances around the world have averaged 400 billion
dollars per year.

It is necessary to keep in mind that remittance levels are affected in large part by differing levels of human capital
within diaspora communities. In the case of China and India, for example, overall remittances flows benefit from
the fact that migrants often work within sectors that require high levels of human capital.
3
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Table 1.1 Remittance Flows Around The World (In Millions of Dollars)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Total Remittances (2010e)
India
53,131
China
51,300
Mexico
21,997
Philippines
21,373
Bangladesh
10,804
Nigeria
10,045
Pakistan
9,683
Lebanon
8,409
Vietnam
8,000
Egypt, Arab Rep.
7,725
Indonesia
7,250
Morocco
6,452
Ukraine
5,595
Russian Federation
5,477
Serbia
4,896
World
440,077

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

As a percentage of GDP (2009)
Tajikistan
35.1%
Tonga
30.3%
Samoa
26.5%
Lesotho
26.2%
Nepal
23.8%
Moldova
22.4%
Lebanon
21.9%
Kyrgyz Republic
21.7%
Haiti
21.2%
Honduras
17.6%
El Salvador
16.5%
Jamaica
15.8%
Jordan
14.3%
Guyana
13.7%
Serbia
12.6%
World
0.7%

Source: Remittances data, Development Prospects Group, World Bank, 2011.

Migrant remittances are clearly an important source of income for many developing
countries; still, how remittances affect migrant-sending regions on the ground is not entirely
clear. For many years researchers argued that cash transfers reinforced a vicious cycle of
dependency in which migrants and their families wasted away precious savings on superfluous
consumption within their hometowns and nearby urban centers (Reichert 1981; Stuart and
Kearney 1981; Wiest 1979). More recently researchers have uncovered evidence that
demonstrates that under the right conditions remittances have the ability to stimulate
employment, local investments and higher per capita income (Adelman, Taylor and Vogel 1988;
Adelman and Taylor 1992; Durand, Parrado and Massey 1996). This research signals the
potential for migrants to foster communal growth in hometown communities via remittance-leddevelopment (RLD). Still, the practice of RLD and its subsequent effects remain largely
understudied (Goldring 2002; Cohen 2005).
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A basic question emerges from this discussion: What role do migrants play in
conditioning the quality of life of those that they have left behind? Moreover, how do migrant
remittances affect measures of human development in regions experiencing high levels of
emigration? My aim in the present study is to clarify a small part of this puzzle by addressing the
relationship between migrant remittances and development in migrant-sending regions located
in central Mexico. Specifically, I evaluate the potential for remittances to stimulate development
and political change through an in-depth study of the state of Guanajuato, Mexico. In my study I
analyze the role migrant remittances in promoting community development across Guanajuato’s
46 municipios during the period 2001-2011.4 Over the next several pages I briefly outline of the
individual chapters that make up this study.
Outline of Study
In this project I address the relationship between migration and human development
across the state of Guanajuato. In particular, I compare the development outcomes of
household remittances (i.e., raw cash transfers between migrants and their families) with those of
investments made through the state-sponsored program 3x1 para migrants, which pools
remittances with state funds in an effort to increase the development effects of migrant
remittances. In my analysis, as a means of wedding general trends with specific cases, I employ
both qualitative and quantitative methods.
I begin my study in Chapter 2 with a brief review of extant research concerning RLD in
Mexico. I then outline the methodological approach used in the data analysis presented in the
subsequent three chapters. In Chapter 3 I introduce the reader to three Mexican villages. Each

4Municipio

is the rough equivalent of “county” in English. Still, throughout this manuscript I use “municipio” in
place of the English translation “county” or “municipality.” I do this consciously in order to preserve the
jurisdictional connotation this particular term carries through the Spanish-speaking world.
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case study provides an ethnographic glimpse of the relationship between remittances and
development in practice in the state of Guanajuato. It is my belief that these vignettes leave the
reader with a more tangible understanding of the causal mechanisms that underpin RLD. For
this reason I ask that the reader keep these cases in mind as he or she begins reading through the
statistical output reviewed in latter chapters. In Chapter 4 I empirically evaluate the relationship
between local political factors and RLD projects. As this analysis reveals, at least in the case of
Guanajuato, there is a great deal of overlap between remittances, development and local politics.
This is particularly true in so much as the program 3x1 para migrantes is concerned. Chapter 5
places specific focus on the relationship between remittances and human development.
Regression results indicate that household remittances alone repress municipal development
levels. This analysis also demonstrates, however, that under the right conditions investments
made through the program 3x1 para migrantes stimulate human development, thus improving
the quality of life enjoyed by migrant-sending communities. These findings highlight the
importance of state-sponsored investments in underpinning effective development projects. In
turn, Chapter 6 provides a tentative evaluation of the potential relationship between the program
3x1 para migrantes and good governance. The results of this analysis demonstrate that during
the period 2002-2011 3x1 investments acted as a catalyst for both improved human
development and better governance. Finally, in Chapter 7 I reflect on the study as a whole and
offer several tentative conclusions for wider audiences. Specifically, I highlight a point that is
brought up time and again throughout this study: Remittances alone do not appear to drive
long-term development. Rather, in the long run meaningful remittance-led development—
measured by gains in health care, education and economic growth—requires a genuine
partnership between economic actors, members of civic society and local government. As the
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results outlined in this study reveal, the program 3x1 para migrantes has the potential to
underpin this type of relationship. Eventually, additional research will help tease out the nuances
of this potential. In the meantime, however, this study makes a strong case for bringing the state
back into local development initiatives.
Taken as a whole I believe that this study adds clarity to our understanding of how
immigrants impact their homelands. In the most basic sense people risk leaving the comforting
confines of the land in which they were born when they are no longer able to adequately control
the factors that condition their lives. Related to this, the results outlined in this study have
important implications for migrant sending communities in Mexico as well as other parts of the
developing world. In particular, this study provides insight into how migrant-sending
communities in Mexico can leverage remittances in their favor, thus contributing to a better
quality of life for migrants and their families. In general, research concerning the relationship
between migration and development has the potential to improve the wellbeing of migrantsending communities and in turn reduce the pressure upon individuals to migrate. To this end, I
hope that this study contributes to a better understanding of how migrants can participate in the
meaningful development of their homelands; the degree to which it does will ultimately define
its success.
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Chapter 2: Exit, Voice and Remittance-led Development in Modern Mexico
Indeed, we need to analyze democratic politics in the context of state-society relations by
evaluating the reach of state institutions and assessing the broader social forces that
surround, support, and oppose the terms of democracies' new institutions. (Deborah J.
Yashar 1999:79)

Few examples in recent history reveal the dynamics between remittances and
development better than the case of modern Mexico, which shares a nearly 2,000 mile land
border with the most affluent country in the world. This point is at least partially related to the
immense economic disparity evident between the U.S. and Mexico. In 2011, for example, the
U.S. reported a GDP per capita of $48,100, whereas Mexico recorded a GDP per capita of just
$15,100 (The World Factbook 2013). Put simply, for a poor Mexican farmer or a
disenfranchised urban worker, few options contain as much potential for upward mobility as
crossing into the U.S. Given this, it is not surprising that Mexican migrants, originally bound to
sojourner agriculture networks in the Southwestern region of the U.S., are now working in a
wide variety of employment sectors and communities across the U.S. In fact, the states with the
fastest growing Mexican migrant populations include: Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina,
Georgia and New York (Migration Policy Institute). The sheer depth and magnitude of Mexican
migration to the U.S. over the last twenty years has garnered a great deal of scholarly and public
attention. As a result, much has been written on the effects of immigration within receiving
communities across the U.S.5 Less emphasis, however, has been placed on the profound and
lasting impacts of emigration on Mexico.

A thorough review of this literature is beyond the scope of this study but a brief summary is warranted. The basic
catalysts of migration can be categorized as “push” factors and “pull” factors. The former include both
environmental factors, like famines and droughts, as well as issues conditioned by humans such as political
repression, war and economic disparities. In turn, the latter refer to external factors that attract individuals to
migrate such as strong labor markets, family members already living abroad, relatively more stable social conditions
5
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In Mexico, few factors affect local communities more than emigration. Jonathan Fox,
borrowing from Albert Hirschman’s classic analysis (1970), describes the potential influence of
migrants on their communities as a distinct process of exit and voice. Specifically, Fox (2007;
2008) argues that Mexican citizens faced with entrenched poverty and lack of access to political
voice frequently opt to migrate or “exit” due to an inability to influence the conditions that
structure their lives. However, as Fox points out, in recent decades Mexican migrants living in
the U.S. have begun to exercise their “voice” in their communities of origin in the form of
remittances and communal development initiatives. Fox’s work implies that unsatisfied citizens
have four basic options: remain faithful to the status quo (loyalty), stay and take action in an
effort to improve social conditions (voice without exit), permanently withdraw (exit without
voice) or withdraw with the intention of improving social conditions through migration (exit
with voice). Given this, migration appears to have a potential dual effect on Mexican society,
such that it first reduces social pressure on politicians and then fosters the potential for social
and political change as migrants begin to remit money and ideas back to hometown
communities. This relationship is depicted in Table 2.1.

and other forms of opportunity. For a more in-depth review of these issues as they relate to the present study please
see: Massey and Durand’s work on Mexican migration (2004). In addition, a great deal of research addresses the
effects of immigrants on receiving communities. Researchers working within this vein place specific emphasis on
questions of immigrant assimilation. A good point of departure for those interested in this line of research is
Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut’s book Legacies (2001). Other authors of interest include Martin (2006), Ngai
(2004), Sánchez (1993), Tuan (2003) and Zolberg (2006).
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Table 2.1 Exit, Voice and Loyalty In Mexican Migrant Communities
Silence

Voice

Stay

Loyalty
-Compliance, Clientelism

Voice
Mass Protest, Electoral
Opposition

Migrate

Exit without voice
-Migraiton only

Exit with voice
-Remittances, Human Capital,
Political Capital

Source: Adopted from Jonathan Fox (2007: 297).

Extant research supports the tenants of Fox’s theoretical framework. Early research, for
example, found that emigration drained local communities of their most productive citizens and
workers, thus having an overall detremintal effect on local development. This body of literature
depicted migration as an irrevocable form of exit that trapped communities in a vicious cycle of
dependency in which migrants and their families wasted away precious savings on superfluous
consumption (Reichert 1981; Stuart and Kearney 1981; Wiest 1979). Subsequent research,
however, found that remittances have multiplier effects within local economies, thus directly and
indirectly stimulating employment, investment and income (Adelman, Taylor and Vogel 1988;
Adelman and Taylor 1992; Durand, Parrado and Massey 1996; Calderón 2008). This line of
research illustrates the potential for a migrant “voice” in communal development and refutes
notions suggesting that “exit” necessarily mean that migrants irretrievably lose positive influence
within their hometown communities. This notion is supported by recent findings that
demonstrate that remittances provide migrants and their communities with the ability to leverage
local politics (Burgess 2005; Fox and Bada 2008; Goldring 2002; Goodman and Hiskey 2008;
Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008; M. P. Smith 2003; R. Smith 2006). Related to this, a growing body
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of literature reveals that migrants that return to their hometowns have the potential to improve
local governance by transfering democratic practices and norms learned abroad to their
hometown communities (Batista and Vicente 2010; Careja and Emmenegger 2012; Chauvet and
Mercier 2011; Marcelli and Cornelius, 2005; Pérez-Armendáriz and David Crow 2010; Rother,
2009).
Taken together, the aforementioned research demonstrates that migrants have the
potential to underpin local development within migrant-sending regions across Mexico. Given
this, it is not surprising that since the late 1990s the Mexican state has sought to rein in its
diaspora community via a series of policies ranging from migrant insurance to remittance-led
development programs. Anecdotal evidence of this process is found in the high profile visits that
Mexican politicians routinely make to regions of the U.S. in which large populations of Mexican
migrants reside. For example, on September 18th, 2007, less than one year removed from his
presidency, Vicente Fox visited Chicago to meet with leaders of the Mexican-American
community. During his stay he emphasized the role of the “migrant ethic” in the development
of contemporary Mexico:
The immigrants are the real heroes, they are an example worthy of following. They are a
different caste of human beings that is always fighting for the unattainable. This energy is
why they are on their feet, they are of great pride to their families in Mexico and the
country widely benefits from their work. Mexico is proud of its migrants because they
did not sit down and wait for something to happen, they worked responsibly to get
ahead, demonstrating that there is no other road to development other than through
sacrifice and work. (Fox 2007)
Fox’s high acclaim for the Mexican migrant community is emblematic of the country’s calculated
effort to bring migrants back into the national fold as transnational citizens. In particular, Fox’s
words resonate with the neoliberal logic of modern Mexico in which individual “sacrifice”
represents a key factor along the road to economic development. In subtle terms, he recognizes
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the crucial role of migrants in the stability of Mexico’s macro-economy. Finally, Fox depicts
migrants as hardworking pragmatists, and both in the aforementioned quote and throughout his
presidency, he presents los paisanos as heroic vanguards “worthy of following.” As president,
Vicente Fox wove this narrative of migrants as heroic members of modern Mexico and catalysts
for development into the political fiber of statesmen and institutions throughout the country. As
a result, migrants, who were once depicted as national turncoats, are now portrayed as important
actors in the nation’s effort to stimulate economic growth and expand the country’s transition to
democracy into the realm of everyday politics.
Politicians are particularly interested in capturing a share of the billions of dollars in
remittances that Mexican migrants send back to their hometowns each year. The effect of
remittances on Mexico and the rest of Latin America is not to be underestimated. As Salvadoran
sociologist Raul Ramos remarked at a conference for the Latin America School for Social
Sciences, “emigration and remittances are the real economic adjustment program of the poor in
Latin America” (quoted from Portes 2003; Ramos 2002). Nowhere is this more evident than in
Mexico. For decades, migrant remittances from the U.S. have played a decisive role in
hometown development and the stability of local economies throughout the country (Durand et
al. 1996; Taylor et al. 1996; Guarnizo 2003). Indeed, as Table 2.2 reveals, in seven of the last ten
years remittances have outpaced or equaled foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico,
contributing billions of dollars annually to household income, local and regional consumption
patterns and communal development. Moreover, even in moments of economic crisis, which
often depress overall remittance flows, cash transfers from the U.S. remain an important source
of capital for Mexico. In fact, despite reduced remittance flows since the onset of the economic
crisis in 2008, the importance of remittances as a percentage of GDP has remained relatively
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stable throughout the first part of the new millennium. For example, although remittance flows
in Mexico decreased by nearly $4 billion dollars from 2008 to 2009, they continued to outpace
FDI, making up more than 2 percent of the nation’s GDP. To the non-expert this may seem like
a relatively low figure but it is important to keep in mind that with a GDP of $1.7 trillion Mexico
has the 12th largest economic output in the world (World Factbook 2013).
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Table 2.2 Remittance Flows to Mexico 2000-2010 (in Millions of Dollars)
30,000

4.5
4

25,000
3.5
20,000

3
2.5

15,000
2
10,000

1.5
1

5,000
0.5
0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Remittances
6,572 8,895 9,814 13,396 16,730 20,284 25,567 26,069 25,137 21,181 21,271
FDI
14,190 25,334 14,432 11,373 18,244 19,643 19,225 27,167 23,170 15,206 17,726
(Remittances as a % of GDP) 1.44
1.44
1.5
2.1
2.4
2.6
2.7
2.5
2.3
2.4
2
(FDI as a % of GDP)
2.3
4
2.2
1.8
2.4
2.6
2.3
2.7
1.7
1.7
1.7

0

Source: Author; data from Informe Anual 1997-2009. Mexico City: Banco de México.
1It is worth noting that the 2001 entry for FDI includes the 12,447 billion dollars that correspond to the purchase of Banamex by Citigroup.
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Although it is clear that remittances affect local communities, the outcome of their
influence often depends a great deal on the type of transfer that migrants partake in. As Table
2.3 illustrates, there are a number of different types of exchanges that occur between migrants
and their communities. The most common exchange comes in the form of cash transfers, often
sent through private institutions such as Western Union or Xoom. The majority of these
transfers are spent on consumption within local communities and regional economies. There are
a number of ways to measure the impact of such transfers but the most common include
calculating remittances as a percentage of household incomes (micro impact) and measuring
remittances as a percentage of exports or foreign direct investment (macro impact). Remittances
are also spent, although to a lesser degree, on family and community development. In theory,
investments of this nature have the potential to develop the social and economic capital of
families and their social networks. The measurable impact of these transfers are made evident by
the percentage of remittances spent on housing, durable goods and education. Finally,
remittances can also take on the form of community aid. Investments of this type are most
commonly made through a Hometown Association (HTA), such as the ones I outline in the case
studies presented in Chapter 3. As these cases reveal, communal remittances can leverage social
progress within local communities by making relatively large investments in infrastructure and
small businesses ventures. The impact of community investments can be estimated at the micro
and macro levels by measuring the total amount of contributions made in a given community,
municipio or state. However, as Table 2.3 indicates, community-wide investments can also
potentially affect local and regional political norms, and while these types of impacts more
difficult to document, they are potentially just as important as economic transfers. Nonetheless,
as this study will demonstrate, measuring this particular impact is far from straightforward.
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Table 2.3 A Typology of Remittances
Agent(s)

Type of Exchange

→
Individual
Migrants

↕
Individual
Migrants,
Families and
Networks

Household
Remittances
→
Family/Community
Investment

Descriptive Impact

→

Measurable Impact
Micro

Macro

Relatives, social
networks

Family
consumption,
subsistence

Remittance as a
% of household
income

Remittance as %
of exports and
FDI

Relatives, social
networks

Dev. of social and
economic capital in
family/social
networks

Remittance as %
of family
investment in
housing, durable
goods and
education

Migrants'
participation in
the housing
market and dev.
of human capital

Community,
Government, NGOs.

Development
projects:
infrastructure,
business ventures

Contributions to
local
infrastructure
projects, business
ventures and
effect on local
political norms

Aggregate
contributions to
regional
economies and
potential impact
on democratic
norms

→

Community Aid
↕

Beneficiary

HTAs
→

Note: Table is based on Table 1 in Guarnizo (2003). Alterations made by author.
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Over the course of the last decade different levels of the Mexican government have
supported community-wide investments initiated by HTAs. The state began courting migrants
and their remittances as early as the late 1980s, but it was not until 2002, through the program
3x1 para migrantes, that RLD was officially incorporated into the state’s economic platform.
The 3x1 program clearly illustrates the intersection of migration, development and politics in
modern Mexico. The program was spearheaded by then-President Vicente Fox (PAN, 20002006) and has expanded significantly under outgoing President Felipe Calderón (PAN, 20062012). All signs indicate that the program will continue to receive strong federal government
support under current President Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI, 2012-2018). According to the
Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL), which administers the program throughout
Mexico, the 3x1 program is designed to:
…aid the initiatives of Mexicans that live in the exterior and to provide them with the
opportunity to channel resources to Mexico in the form of projects with social impact
that directly benefit migrant hometowns. The program is funded by contributions from
migrant clubs or federations operating in the exterior, the federal government via
SEDESOL, and state and municipal governments. For each peso that the migrants
contribute, the federal, state and municipal branches of government contribute 3 pesos
and for that reason, the program is called 3x1. (SEDESOL 2011)
The 3x1 program was designed by state officials to channel remittances towards community
development projects, including: bridges, roads, electricity grids, drainage systems, community
centers and occasionally, businesses (See Figure 2.1). State and municipal representatives
promote the program at the local level and consulate officials promote it among diaspora
communities abroad. The 3x1 program is structured such that each respective branch of
government matches migrant contributions towards community development projects. For their
part, migrants contribute to projects by remitting money communally through HTAs located in
the U.S. In turn, the government matches migrant contributions with funds allotted by the
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federal government for local development initiatives. Specifically, the federal government diverts
funds from SEDESOL to approved 3x1 projects across the country. Still, the federal
government plays a very minimal role in the actual approval and implementation of 3x1 projects.
The state and municipal governments, on the other hand, match migrant contributions with
funds from their respective budgets and both entities play a hands-on role in designing projects
alongside migrants and their communities. The 3x1 process is outlined in Figure 2.1.
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Project Approval

Project Funding Source

• 25%

Types of Projects Funded

• 25%

-Roads
-Electricity Grids
-Bridges

COVAM

Migrant
Club

Federal
Gov.

-Community Centers
-Schools
-Health Care Facilities

Mun.
Gov.

State
Gov.

• 25%

-Small Businesses

• 25%

Source: Author.

Figure 2.1 3x1 Para Migrantes Investment Structure
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As the case studies in the ensuing chapter will reveal, in many instances migrants have
been aiding their hometowns for years, often through the auspices of HTAs. Mexican HTAs
have a deep history of participating in local development projects. HTAs emerged for the first
time in the 1920s when Mexican migrants began to settle in large U.S. cities, particularly Los
Angeles and Chicago. It was in this setting that the first migrant clubs, known as mutualistas,
began to appear. Most mutualistas shared a common goal in their desire to preserve cultural
traditions and defend their rights as workers and residents of the U.S. During the 20th century
mutualistas were the most active Mexican community organizations and, most important for this
discussion, they laid the foundation for Mexican HTAs (Gutiérrez 1999).
HTAs began to take root across the southwestern U.S. in the 1960s. A typical HTA
consisted of anywhere from 5 to 500 Mexican migrants, generally from the same community in
Mexico, who were interested in pooling a percentage of their remittances in the form of
communal aid for their hometowns. Initially, HTAs funded infrastructure projects, including the
construction of roads, community centers, churches, sidewalks and drainage systems. In time,
however, some HTAs have turned towards profitable investments, including the construction of
small businesses and in some cases, maquilas and small factories. It was not until the late 1980s
and early 1990s that municipal and state government began to show interest in working with
HTAs on local development projects. It was at this juncture that states with large diaspora
populations, such as Zacatecas, Jalisco, Michoacán and Guanajuato, began to work with HTAs
in an effort to improve living conditions in hometown communities. In some cases, local
governments even began to match migrant contributions towards public works projects, creating
a 1x1 relationship (municipal support) and occasionally 2x1 relationship (municipal and state
support) with migrants. These initial arrangements set the foundation for federal participation in
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migrant projects. Finally, as explained above, in 2002 the federal government, led by ex-president
Vicente Fox, institutionalized government participation in HTA projects under the program 3x1
para migrantes.
Today, a typical 3x1 project begins when a group of migrants takes a trip home and
reaches out to local officials about the potential of working together on a development project in
his or her hometown. The first step authorities take is to register the migrants as a HTA with the
Mexican consulate. Subsequently, the HTA establishes a connection with municipal authorities
in order to propose a particular project. At this point, local representatives or delegates take on a
crucial role. Delegates serve as a liaison between communities and municipal governments.
These representatives are elected or appointed every three years ensuing municipal elections.6
Delegates frequently relay information between communities and the municipal government.
Concerning the 3x1 program, delegates play a particularly crucial role due to the fact that HTA
leaders reside in the exterior and therefore are often not well versed in the burdensome
bureaucratic requirements of programs like 3x1.
Once a project is proposed the municipal government submits it for state approval. All
project applications include a technical evaluation, which outlines the project’s viability and
includes copies of any necessary permits and budget estimates. If a project is deemed viable and
is in accordance with the rules of operation stipulated by the 3x1 program, the file is submitted
for final evaluation to the Committee of Validation and Attention to Migrants (COVAM). Each
state has its own COVAM, which consists of twelve representatives: three migrants, three
municipal officials, three state officials and three federal officials. Each year, the COVAM votes

6In

Guanajuato delegates are appointed by the municipal government. For more information concerning the role of
delegates in the 3x1 program see Aparicio and Meseguer (2011: 6,7). For actual copies of individual state laws of
municipal governance see http://www.e-local.gob.mx/.
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on which projects to approve for funding. If a project is approved, funds are allocated for the
following fiscal year and all parties involved are given a green light to move forward with the
project. If, on the other hand, a project does not receive a majority vote, it is returned to the
municipio, and in most cases, the municipal government re-submits the project the following year
(Aparicio and Meseguer 2011:7). It is important to note that a majority vote is necessary for
project approval and thus government representatives share a comparative advantage over
migrants in determining which projects will ultimately be funded. This of course presents the
possibility for government officials to act in coalitions and vote for those projects that most
behoove them or their respective parties. This scenario is particular easy to imagine in those
cases in which committee members come from the same party due to the fact that lower-level
officials can be subjected to pressure from their party superiors. At the very least this
arrangement is worrisome. Still, additional research is necessary to determine the degree to
which this plays out in reality.
At face value the 3x1 program is clearly reflective of the nation’s effort to court migrants
as transnational citizens and vanguards of local development. However, the program is also a
clear outgrowth of Mexico’s aim to create focused social programs geared at improving the lot
of Mexico’s most marginalized communities. Related to this, an important element of the 3x1
program is the fact that it allows migrants and their communities to directly partake in the
planning and implementation of development projects across the country. In this sense, as I
explain below, the program is representative of the government’s effort to decentralize resource
allocation to the state and municipal level and in this manner directly involve local communities
in the redistribution and investment of public resources.
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The relative freedom that state and municipal governments have in approving, funding
and implementing 3x1 projects is a direct result of Mexico’s effort over the last two decades to
decentralize economic and political decision making to local governments. This process began in
the late 1980s when ex-President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (PRI, 1988-1994) created el Programa
Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL), which aimed to channel funding for public works projects
to the country’s most marginalized communities. The program targeted several basic areas,
including: healthcare, education, social services, public infrastructure and small businesses. In
this sense, PRONASOL represented an effort to combat poverty through direct intervention
and increased local participation in development initiatives. Funding for PRONASOL projects
came from Ramo 26, which was implemented in 1983 as a means of consolidating government
funding for programs directed towards combating poverty and promoting social development.
Still, throughout its existence PRONASOL remained highly centralized within the executive
branch and suffered from issues of transparency and accountability. Moreover, the program
lacked a systematic approach to identify potential recipients, and as a result, program
disbursements were highly discretional. In fact, it is now evident that the program did not
necessarily benefit the country’s most marginalized communities but rather operated at the whim
of politicians and their cronies (Weldon and Molinar 1994).
Early in his presidency Ernesto Zedillo (PRI, 1994-2000), having taken note of
PRONASOL’s shortcomings, replaced the program with Ramo 33 and el Programa de Educación,
Salud y Alimentación (Progresa). Ramo 33 absorbed the majority of the funds previously
channeled through Ramo 26, and for the first time in Mexican history, created a decentralized
funding source for local governments. Progresa was later renamed Oportunidades by President
Vicente Fox but it remained very similar to its predecessor from a policy standpoint. Together,
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Oportunidades and Ramo 33 continue to promote fiscal decentralization and fund social welfare
programs aimed at combating poverty across Mexico. In turn, Ramo 26 now operates as a
flexible fund through which the federal government directs limited resources towards Mexico’s
most marginalized municipios.
The use of Ramo 33 funds is limited to the areas outlined in Table 2.4. As the reader will
note, Ramo 33 provides local governments with the necessary funding to play an instrumental
role in all of the major aspects of local development, including healthcare, education and public
security. Most relevant to the present study, the use of Ramo 33 funds for public works projects
(see gray area in Table 2.4) plays a fundamental role in allowing local governments to support
programs like 3x1 para migrantes. The use of Ramo 33 funds for public infrastructure projects is
outlined in Article 33 of the Law of Fiscal Coordination:
Federal contributions that are transferred to States and municipios through the Fondo de
Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social (FAIS), are to be used exclusively to finance public
works projects, basic social initiatives and investments that directly benefit sectors of the
population that are in conditions of social marginalization and extreme poverty
according to the following schema:
a) Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social Municipal: potable water, sewage,
drainage and latrines, municipal urbanization, electricity grids for rural areas and
poor urban neighborhoods, basic healthcare infrastructure, basic education
infrastructure, residential development, rural roads and rural business initiatives, and
b) Fondo de Infraestructura Social Estatal: public works projects and initiatives with regional
or inter-municipal impact.
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Table 2.4 List Of Funds Housed Under Ramo 33
Fund

Funding Type

Program

Delegation

Fund for Contributions to Basic
Education (FAEB)

Basic Education

National
Agreement
for
the
Modernization of Basic Education

Secretary of Public Education (SEP)

Fund for Contributions
Healthcare (FASSA)

Healthcare Services for the General
Population

National
Agreement
for
the
Decentralization
of
Healthcare
Services
Ramo 26 and Ramo 33 (previously
PRONASOL)

Secretary of Public Health (SALUD)

to

Fund for Contributions to Social
Infrastructure (FAIS)

Basic Social Infrastructure

Fund for Contributions for the
Support of municipios and the
Federal District (FAFM)

Financial Obligations and Municipal
Development

Municipal Development Funds

Secretary of Treasury and Public Credit
(SHCP)

Multiple Contribution Fund (FAM)

School Lunches and
Social
Assistance
Construction,
equipment
and
reconstruction of basic and superior
education infrastructure.
Education Technology and Adult
Education

School Lunches

Secretary of Public Health (SALUD)

Federal Program for the Construction
of Schools (CAPCE)

Secretary of Public Education (SEP)

CONALEP and INEA

Secretary of Public Education (SEP)

Public Security

Agreement
Security

Fund for Contributions to
Education Technology and Adults
(FAETA)
Fund for Contributions for Public
Security of States and the Federal
District (FASP)

to

Coordinate

Public

Ministry of
(SEDESOL)

Social

Development

Secretary of Public Security (SSP)

Fund for Contributions for the Physical
Infrastructure
and Ramo 23
Secretary of Treasury and Public Credit
Support of Federal Entities Financial Wellbeing
(SHCP)
(FAFEF)
Source: Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL). El Ramo 33 en el desarrollo social en México: evaluación de ocho fondos de
política pública, México, D.F. CONEVAL, 2010.
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The increased decentralization of federal resources in recent decades has allowed local
governments to expand the number of social programs that they support. 3x1 para migrantes is
one example of this shift. As Table 2.5 reveals, total expenditure for Ramo 33 has more than
tripled since 2000 and spending within FAIS has more than quadrupled. Historically, the federal
government would allocate resources to states through social agreements or convenios sociales,
which tended to be highly discretionary in nature and favored political jockeying over social
development. In contrast, Ramo 33 funds are distributed by the federal government to state and
municipal governments in accordance with a predictable formula. This system emphasizes
transparency and predictability and assures that state and municipal governments receive funds
from the federal government based on population size and socio-economic indicators of
marginalization and poverty (Menocal 2008:10). Ramo 33 has had a particularly large impact at
the municipal level due to the fact that it has facilitated the fiscal independence of local
governments, which in turn has provided municipios with the freedom to contribute to programs
such as 3x1 para migrantes.7
The 3x1 program is both an innovative development strategy aimed at channeling
migrant remittances towards Mexico’s most marginalized communities and a unique attempt to
include migrants and their communities in the nation’s effort to consolidate democratic practices
beyond the electoral booth. In practice the program provides migrants, their communities and
local government the opportunity to plan and implement development projects that directly
affect hometown communities. Still, despite the extolling rhetoric of the Mexican state, the

It is important to keep in mind that while decentralization does in fact bring more resources to the local level, it
does not necessarily imply a more equitable distribution of resources within localities. As Table 2.4 illustrates,
federal funds are most often “tagged” for certain types of projects. Local demand for these funds, however, almost
always outpaces supply, and as a consequence, local officials retain a great deal of discretion in determining which
projects actually get funded.
7
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actual impact of the 3x1 program–and decentralization more broadly speaking–on modern
Mexico is poorly understood. Given this, the program provides a unique opportunity to analyze
the impact of migrant remittances on municipios within the context of fiscal decentralization and
democratic transition in Mexico.
Table 2.5 Ramo 33 Expenditure: 2000-2009 (millions of pesos)

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

FAIS

Total Ramo 33

$13,422.14
$17,301.08
$20,715.58
$22,332.70
$24,499.44
$29,019.91
$32,251.86
$37,646.60
$46,757.89
$54,251.02

$152,447.94
$190,050.66
$215,055.93
$247,728.00
$269,705.71
$315,653.29
$353,192.35
$421,193.76
$484,315.83
$529,441.15

Source: Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL).
Although a variety of political and economic impacts might imaginably result from
remittance flows and 3x1 investments, two overall patterns can be inferred concerning the most
likely impacts of remittances on Mexico’s political economy. These general patters, which are
investigated at length in this study, can be summarized in the following manner:
(1) High inflows of migrant remittances lower the burden placed upon local politicians to
provide for the public good, thus reducing social pressure from constituents and
facilitating the stability of elections while concurrently allowing politicians to go about
business as usual within Mexico’s traditional patron-client system (i.e., economic stability
without meaningful political change).
(2) High inflows of migrant remittances remove pressure from politicians to provide for the
public good but also contribute to local economic development (lower inequality, higher
education attainment, improved access to health care, increased GDP per capita,
strengthened financial sectors, etc.) while at the same time stimulating a more
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competitive political environment (i.e., competitive elections and relatively more
democratic political practices and norms).
The present study is an attempt to determine the degree to which the aforementioned
scenarios play out in practice in Guanajuato, Mexico. As implemented in Guanajuato, the
program 3x1 para migrantes represents a unique policy experiment crafted by neoliberal
politicians and rooted in the theoretical tenets of participatory governance. The latter point is
reflected by the Guanajuato Office for Government Accountability, which claims that:
In the present, one cannot deny that in the case of Mexico there has been an impressive
jump towards democracy; however, the country has advanced towards a minimalist sense
of democracy. That is to say, there is an electoral system in place, there exists a division
of powers and citizens can exercise their right to vote and yet democracy in this sense
does not assure rational decision making or that decision makers meet their constituents’
demands and even less, does it assure an equal distribution of wealth. (Government
Accountability Office of Guanajuato 2011:7)
At the very least, this quote reveals the fact that Guanajuato’s state government is aware of
Mexico’s fragile democracy. However, as the ensuing quote demonstrates, the government is
also quite conscious of the need to cultivate different forms of social accountability as a means
of consolidating the quality of democracy in both Guanajuato specifically and Mexico more
generally:
In these three forms of transparency, state actors as well as those within civil society play
crucial roles. The mechanisms of “vertical accountability”, such as plebiscites and
referendums, require not only the support of the legislative branch but also the
participation of a vigorous civil society that is willing to deliver votes. The mechanisms
of “horizontal accountability from civil society”, for example, the role of ombudsmen,
demand social pressure and encourage bureaucratic action. These mechanisms…also
depend on the government’s disposition to open its accounts to the scrutiny of
independent actors and to members of civil society that want to dedicate time to the
review and evaluation of these accounts. (Government Accountability Office of
Guanajuato 2011:17)
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The aforementioned quotes are particular interesting due to the fact that they are crafted
by local government officials who frequently quote the leading scholars researching democratic
governance in the region, including: Guillermo O’Donnell (1998) and Anne Marie Goetz and
Rob Jenkins (2001). These citations reflect the government’s growing awareness of the factors
that influence the quality of democracy. Moreover, the aforementioned quotes help situate the
3x1 para migrantes program within the state’s general vision for democratic governance in
Guanajuato. The program, for example, in conjunction with SEDESOL and the Office for
Government Accountability, opens its accounts to public scrutiny by publishing regular reports
regarding project investments. (It is worth noting that without these reports the present research
would have been impossible.) Moreover, the program directly involves migrants and their fellow
citizens in the direction, planning and construction of public works projects, and more recently,
private businesses. Given this, the degree to which the program’s goals are met in practice serves
as a type of measuring stick for the depth of democratic consolidation made in recent years in
Guanajuato.
Still, legal norms and institutional arrangements alone, as the Italian philosopher
Norberto Bobbio contends, “are not by themselves rules of the game: they are preliminary rules
that permit for the development of the game” (Bobbio 2005:26). In this respect, democratic
consolidation, or the extension of democratic norms and practices beyond the electoral booth,
depends as much on the players that take the field as on the preliminary rules that outline the
game. Adopted from Schedler (2001), Table 2.6 suggests that the consolidation of democracy
depends on the relationship between three main factors: (1) structural foundations, (2) the
behavior of actors within institutions and (3) the attitudes of individuals engaged in the process.8

8

Here and henceforth when I reference “democratic consolidation” I do so within the limits outlined in Table 2.5.
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The table also suggests the kinds of observations appropriate for assessing each of these factors,
as well as the assumptions regarding causal dynamics underlying this level of analysis. In the case
of modern Mexico, unprecedented migration to the U.S. has had profound effects on each of
these factors, impacting the country’s economy, society and its institutions.
Table 2.6 Measuring Democratic Consolidation
Level
of Object of Observation
Measurement

Causal Assumption

Structural
foundations

Structural
contexts: Contexts (incentives and
economic,
social,
and shape actors and attitudes.
institutional.

constraints)

Behavioral
foundations

Observable behavior: factual Institutions depend on actors. Past
and counter-factual.
behavior (under stress) is predictive of
future behavior and indicative of political
attitudes.

Attitudinal
foundations

Participant
perspectives: Political behavior shaped by meaningful
strategies,
norms,
and commitments of actors, which are
perceptions.
reflected in attitudes.

Source: Adopted from Schedler (2001:69).

The 3x1 program clearly sets the structural foundation for a more participatory form of
local development and while it is unclear whether or not behavioral and attitudinal changes have
followed these advances, the short vignettes outlined in the ensuing chapter provide initial
evidence for such a possibility. As the reader will come to see, in each of the three cases–Ojo de
Agua (Jerécuaro, Guanajuato), El Timbinal (Yuriría, Guanajuato) and Ojo de Agua (Huanímaro,
Guanajuato)–migrants have played a fundamental role in communal development. Taken
together, these cases demonstrate that at least in some instances remittances have the potential
to act as a catalyst for communal development and open up previously closed off political
avenues; and that they do so most successfully when linked to the coordinating capacity and
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authority of the State. Still, it is clear that further research is necessary to determine the degree to
which these case studies can be generalized to the whole. With that in mind, in the section that
follows I outline the methodological approach used in this study.
Research Design
A nascent literature addresses the relationship between migration, development and
political change. Concerning migration and development, initially researchers argued that
migrant remittances create a cycle of dependency in which the recipients of remittances become
reliant on cash transfers from abroad. Moreover, it was argued that the large majority of
remittances are spent on everyday living expenses and conspicuous consumption within in urban
centers. This finding led researchers to conclude that remittances have little potential to foster
long-term development (Reichert 1981; Stuart and Kearney 1981; Wiest 1979). Subsequent
research depicts a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between remittances and
local development. Adelman, Taylor and Vogel (1988), for example, were among the first
document the multiplier effects of remittances in local Mexican economies. Their work revealed
the potential for remittances to stimulate employment, investments and income in local and
regional economies. Recent research confirms this notion, indicating that migrants have the
ability to leverage local development (Adelman and Taylor 1992; Durand, Parrado and Massey
1996) and in some cases stimulate national and regional development (Birdsall et al. 2011). This
is particularly evident in Latin America where it has been demonstrated that in recent decades
“higher remittances inflows tend to be associated with lower poverty levels and improvements in
human capital indicators (education and health) of the recipient countries” and “remittances also
appear to contribute to higher growth and investment rates, and lower output volatility” (Perry
2008:xix). Related to this, Acosta and colleagues (2008) find that remittances have a “positive
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and significant impact on growth,” thus insulating migrant-sending regions from the troughs of
economic downturns and guarding against poverty by improving per-capita income in
remittance-receiving communities (2008:128). This line of research illustrates the emerging
potential for a migrant “voice” in communal development in areas experiencing high emigration
and refutes notions suggesting that “exit” necessarily mean that migrants irretrievably lose
positive influence within their hometown communities.
Thus, under the right conditions remittances stimulate economic development in
migrant-sending regions. Extant research also demonstrates, however, that migration has the
potential to influence local belief systems (Pérez-Armendáriz and David Crow 2010; Levitt 2011;
Smith 2006) and political norms (Goldring 2002; Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Itzigsohn and
Villacrés 2008; Pfutze 2012). This line of research demonstrates that while migrants physically
exit their hometowns, they frequently retain a great deal of transnational links with their friends
and families. In addition to sending remittances, migrants communicate with their loved ones by
phone and Internet and they regularly return to their hometown communities, bringing with
them gifts from abroad as well as new ideas and ways of envisioning the world. In this respect
migrants often plant seeds of change within their communities by relaying stories from abroad
to their friends and family members. Migrant anecdotes play a fundamental role in promoting
future waves of migration within hometown communities but they also help locals who have
never left the region envision alternatives ways of living. It is for this reason that migrantsending communities begin to mirror the communities that migrants settle in abroad. In rural
villages across Mexico, for example, it is not uncommon to see paved roads with sidewalks,
occasional parks with playgrounds and clothing stores that feature American brands. In these
same towns the observant visitor will notice two car garages and homes filled with American
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appliances, including flat screen televisions and game consoles for children. Finally, anyone that
takes the time to spend a few days in a migrant-sending region will begin to notice that a great
deal of small talk concerns the way in which things are done in the los Estados.9
Given the above, it is not surprising that recent research has begun to note the effect of
migration on local and national politics in migrant-sending countries (Burgess 2005; Fitzgerald
2000; Fox and Bada 2008; Goldring 2002; Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Marcelli and Cornelius
2005; Rivera Salgado, 1999; M. P. Smith 2003; R. Smith 2006). This body of work implies that
migrants have a certain degree of leverage in matters of local resource allocation, thus suggesting
that diaspora communities influence local political outcome and patterns of development within
hometown communities.10 The goal of this study is to develop a better understanding of this
process via a case study of Guanajuato, Mexico. To this end, I analyze the impact of household
remittances and investments made through the program 3x1 para migrantes on development
and political outcomes across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios.
The 3x1 program provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the role of RLD in shaping
development trends within the context of democratic consolidation in Mexico. Still, this task is
complicated by the fact that the 3x1 program is more active in some states than others. For that
reason, while the program is institutionalized in all 31 states, I focus my study on Guanajuato.
This central Mexican state is an excellent site for this study for several reasons. First, Guanajuato
has made consistently large investments through the 3x1 program since its inauguration in 2002.
Thus, any impact of 3x1 projects would be expected to be especially measurable in Guanajuato.
Second, Guanajuato has experienced a wide variation in 3x1 investments across municipios over

A colloquial term frequently used by migrants in Mexico and other parts of Latin America to refer to the United
States.
10 It is important to note that a more in-depth review of relevant literature is provided at outset of Chapters 4, 5 and
6, respectively.
9
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the last ten years. Given this, the state lends itself to quantitative analysis, permitting the
empirical comparison of municipios that have made significant investments through the program
with municipios that have made more modest investments. Third, Guanajuato has a deep history
of early transition towards democratic competition at the electoral booth. For example, as early
as the 1980s parvenu parties began to compete for mayorship posts in municipios traditionally
governed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and most importantly, occasionally they
won. Still, just as significant, there is a good deal of variation in terms of electoral competition at
the municipal level in Guanajuato. For example, in the municipio of Atarjea PRI did not lose its
first election until 2006. In comparison, in the municipio of San Francisco del Rincón the National
Action Party (PAN) won its first election in 1985 and since then the party has competed in close
elections with PRI for this particular municipio’s main office. Thus, not only do levels of 3x1
investments differed across municipios in Guanajuato, but in addition patterns of political change
have varied widely. Finally, Guanajuato has historically received high levels of household
remittances. This is important for two reasons. First, while household remittances do not
necessarily share a one-to-one relationship with 3x1 investment, participation in the 3x1
program is more prevalent in Mexican states that receive consistently high inflows of household
remittances, such as Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Jalisco and Michoacán. Second, variation across
municipios in terms of both 3x1 investments and household remittance levels permits for a
potentially informative comparison of the effects of household remittances and 3x1 investments
on local development and politics. To be clear, there would be great value in investigating these
issues beyond the state of Guanajuato; however, such as a comparison is beyond the scope of
this dissertation. Nonetheless, it is important to note that by focusing on Guanajuato this study
lays the analytic groundwork for future work on this terrain.
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Figure 2.2 displays a flow chart of potential development paths within the 3x1 para
migrantes program in Guanajuato. Although tentative in nature, this depiction of specific
developmental paths provides a way to visualize the impact of the 3x1 program on Guanajuato.
Boxes enclosed by hard lines represent defined procedures inherent to the 3x1 program, whereas
boxes enclosed by dotted lines represent potential development outcomes. As the figure
illustrates, five principal actors are involved in 3x1 projects in Guanajuato, including: (1)
registered HTAs, (2) migrant communities, (3) the state government under the Ministry of
Human and Social Development (SEDESHU), (4) civil society associations, like MIDE A.C.,
that assist migrants in their development initiatives and (5) private sector groups such as Western
Union and the IDB, which occasionally provide migrants with private funding for development
projects. In turn, two possible kinds of remittance-funded projects define the 3x1 program: (1)
public works projects (bridges, roads, the expansion of electricity grids, community centers,
public spaces, etc.) and (2) entrepreneurial projects such as textile factories, dairy farms and shoe
factories.11
Figure 2.2 also reveals several potential development outcomes. Under the best
conditions, for example, one might expect to find that 3x1 investments cultivate improved social
conditions; thus increasing access to education and health care and improving income per capita.
In turn, improved social conditions would be expected to be foster democratic consolidation.12

11It

is worth noting that while public works projects remain far more common within the 3x1 framework, since
2007 Guanajuato’s state government has made a strong push to promote more entrepreneurial projects. On that
note, while migrants and the government are involved in all 3x1 para migrantes projects, organizations from civil
society, such as MIDE A.C. and the private sphere, such as Western Union, typically are only involved in RLD
projects that focus on small businesses.
12The relationship between economic development and governance is addressed at length in Chapter 5 and 6 of this
study. For readers interested in a more in-depth review of extant research concerning this topic please see the
literature review provided at the beginning of Chapter 5. As it pertains to the discussion at hand it is sufficient to
note that researchers have documented a positive relationship between economic growth and the emergence of
stable democracies.
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In the best of cases, this process could lead to informative feedback loops following the
completion of projects in which migrants and government officials engage in dialogue
concerning future projects. Related to this, it is worth mentioning that the government, in
conjunction with Mexican HTAs in the U.S., does organize RLD conferences in cities such as
Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston and Dallas. These forums provide the government and migrants
with the opportunity to discuss the outcomes of RLD in the state of Guanajuato, and most
importantly, they allow for both parties to learn from past experiences. Still, one might just as
well expect to find that 3x1 projects reinforce non-democratic norms by supporting traditional
patron-client politics. It is important to note that this outcome could result even if 3x1
investments are found to stimulate economic development and better social conditions.
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Outcome (RLD)

Principal Actors
Migrants (HTA)

Infrastructure

-Monetary remittances

-Bridges
-Roads

Feedback
-Legislation
-Conferences
-Research
-Dialogues

Migrant Community
-Project committee

-Sewage
-Electricity grids

Government
-Economic resources
-Professional assessment

Businesses
-Farms
-Factory

Civil Society
-Bridge between migrants and
government

Reinforcement of nonDemocratic Norms
-Patron-client politics
-Lack of transparency
-Limited political spaces

Growth of Democratic Norms
-Competitive elections
-Government transparency
-Expansion of political spaces

Improved Social Conditions
-Improved education
-Improved Healthcare
-Increased income per capita

Source: Author.

Figure 2.2 Potential Development Paths Within the 3x1 para Migrantes Program
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In general, Figure 2.2 addresses several potential scenarios:
Scenario 1: Household remittances and remittances channeled through the 3x1 program
have important economic multiplier effects within local communities in Guanajuato.
Thus, 3x1 investments share a positive relationship with other predictors of democracy
such as education, competitive elections and economic production, and a negative
relationship with inequality. Moreover, the political spaces created by the 3x1 program
incite democratic political practices and norms.

Scenario 2: Household remittances and remittances channeled through the 3x1 program
have important economic multiplier effects within local communities. However, while
3x1 investments share a positive relationship with other predictors of democracy, such as
education and economic production, they share a negative or insignificant relationship
with political competition. In this scenario, 3x1 investments would be expected to
contribute to the establishment of economic and social conditions that favor the
emergence of democracy without directly sharing a relationship with improved democratic
practices and norms.

Scenario 3: Household remittances contribute to economic growth but investments
through the 3x1 program do not lead to economic expansion. Rather, 3x1 investments
share a negative correlation with growth and a negative correlation with political
competition. Moreover, 3x1 investments share a positive relationship with the dominant
political party (PAN) and a negative relationship with other political parties. In this
scenario, 3x1 investments are best thought of as a clever political patronage system in
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which politicians of a particular stripe provide communities with token support in
exchange, presumably, for electoral backing. Thus, in practice, the political spaces
created by the 3x1 program reinforce client-patron relationships of the past.
The aforementioned scenarios distinguish between potential development paths within
the context of RLD in Guanajuato. Still, as the reader will note, these scenarios are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, as Figure 2.2 indicates, it is quite possible that all three
scenarios play out in practice to varying degrees. Thus, progress should be measured by the
degree to which the first two scenarios occur in relation to the latter. Here it is important to
point out that it is unlikely that improved social conditions in and of themselves stimulate
democratic consolidation. Rather, it is expected that over time the specific dynamics of the struggle to
improve social conditions within the 3x1 framework may potentially—at the community level:
through skills learned, political orientations developed, the “habits of the heart” that people
learn by working together; at the level of political leadership: via accountability structures; new
forms of transparency—foster a gradual transition in which democratic practices and norms
slowly erode non-democratic structures and behavior.
While the scenarios outlined above by no means exhaust the potential array of ways that
RLD may shape the political economy of Guanajuato and, by extension, all of Mexico, they
begin to suggest the important variations in how such impact may be playing out. Thus, they
argue for the importance of a deeper analytical understanding of how these dynamics have
played out in recent decades. In the ensuing chapters, as a means of contributing to such an
understanding, I analyze the impact of 3x1 investments on social, political and economic
conditions across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios. Through this analysis, I strive to contribute to our
understanding of how migrant voice has leveraged local development in modern Mexico.
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Chapter 3: Three Cases of Remittance-led Development in Guanajuato, Mexico
“How could anything be worse? Indeed it could –the times disaster struck, broke in
upon the even tenor of these plowmen’s ways. Within the rigid, improvident system of
production, no reserve absorbed the shock of crop failures. No savings tided him over
whose roots rotted in the hostile ground. The very idea was a mockery; if he had had
those coins, to what market would he turn? Trade took food from the village, never
brought it back. When the parched earth yielded only the withered leaves of famine,
then, alas, conditions were somewhat equalized. Farmer and cottier look to their larders,
already depleted since the last year’s harvest, and, reconciled, delayed the day the last
measured morsel would disappear. Many then reached in vain, found starvation in the
empty barrels. No power could help them.” (Oscar Handlin 1951:22)
In this chapter I provide an ethnographic snapshot of RLD in practice. Each village
depicted in the space below represents a real town located in the state of Guanajuato. In each
case, although the events described are grounded in reality, pseudonyms are used to protect the
individual protagonists. The only exception to this is in the case of government officials, who, as
a result of their public positions, are identified by their real names. Each case study presents the
reader with distinct facets of RLD as evident on the ground in Guanajuato. The cases were
purposefully selected as broadly representative of the main patterns of RLD evident at the time
the research was being undertaken. In particular, the cases help the reader visualize the depth of
RLD in typical migrant-sending communities in the state of Guanajuato. Each case study is
constructed from ethnographic data that I gathered during the summers of 2010 and 2011, as
well as during shorter trips to Mexico during the period 2009-2012. (For a full list of interviews
conducted please see Appendix 12.) During these periods, semi-structured, in-depth interviews
were conducted with migrants and government officials. In addition, documents were collected
at official events and occasional speeches by migrants and public officials were recorded and
later transcribed. It is important to note that meaningful interpretation of the statistical output
presented in chapters 4, 5 and 6 would have been virtually impossible without this extended
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exposure to RLD in action. On that note, I invite the reader to revisit this chapter as he or she
ventures into the subsequent chapters of this study.
Ojo de Agua de Mendoza, Jerécuaro, Guanajuato
Ojo de Agua de Mendoza, population 1,083, is situated in southern Guanajuato, one of
Mexico’s traditional migrant sending states. Today, Ojo de Agua’s economy is largely reliant on
remittances sent by migrants living in states across the U.S., including: Arizona, Colorado,
Georgia, Illinois, New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana and Nebraska. It was not always this way,
however. Like many rural towns in the Bajío region of Mexico, Ojo de Agua’s first migrants left
for the U.S. as early as the 1910s. Prior to the early 20th century Ojo de Agua’s economy relied
almost exclusively on the cultivation of corn and beans and other forms of subsistence farming.
During this time period the town was largely isolated from the outside world. Similar to the rural
villages at the end of the middle ages in Europe, such as those described in the above quote
from Oscar Hardin’s classic book The Uprooted, the town’s surrounding land was long managed
by a strong-handed hacendero and the moral values of the people were guided by the Catholic
Church. However, unlike medieval Europe, in Ojo de Agua the firm hold of indentured
servitude was not to be broken by a religious reformation or rapid industrialization, but rather,
by a brutal revolution and mass migration to the U.S.
The town’s first migrants are said to have left during the chaotic decades that followed
after then-dictator Porfirio Diaz was violently thrust from power in 1910. The revolution of
1910 marked the end of the repressive peasant society that was established in Mexico in the
decades ensuing the Spanish conquest. However, violence and social turmoil displaced hundreds
of thousands of citizens across the country. Refugees poured into urban cities throughout the
country and many countrymen and their families, including several from Ojo de Agua, migrated
44

to the U.S. in search of work and stability. This initial exodus laid the foundation for future
migrations to the U.S. Still, few would have predicted just how many individuals would come to
follow in the footsteps of these early migrants.
Since the early 20th century hundreds of people have left Ojo de Agua for the U.S. Some
have returned but the majority has settled down permanently in el Norte, which today is a term
commonly used in Ojo de Agua and other parts of rural Mexico to refer to the U.S. That is not
to say, however, that they have forgot about their hometown. Take, for example, Pedro
Gonzalez who left his hometown in the early 1980s. By the time Pedro left the dusty hills of
Jerécuaro there were already deep migration networks established on both sides of the border.
These social links served him well when he made his first migration to Mexico City in 1987,
where he lived and worked with cousins for over two years. Then in 1989 he made his first trip
to the U.S., where his brothers helped him get a stable job as a cook in the southwest city of
Albuquerque (Interview, Pedro Martinez).
Today, Pedro continues to live and work in Albuquerque. He has been employed at the
same family-owned restaurant since 1991 and over the years he has maintained a strong
relationship with his hometown. Each year he returns to Ojo de Agua during the months of July
and December to visit family and since the beginning he has sent remittances to his loved ones
to help mediate the costs of living. He also owns a small tortilleria or tortilla factory, financed by
money sent home over the years, which his brother runs in his absence. Occasionally, like other
migrants, he pitches in to help pay for the village’s largest celebration, La Fiesta de la Santa Cruz
and he played an instrumental role in the reconstruction of the town’s temple. Finally, in 2008,
when he was in Ojo de Agua on vacation, he and a cousin began discussing the possibility of
doing something larger for the town. Together they decided that their first project would be to
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repair the village’s main road, which connects the town to the municipio’s main city, Jerécuaro.
When they returned to the U.S. they began calling up community members living in other states
and despite the fact that many migrants questioned the pair’s good intentions, slowly but surely
they put together a modest $10,000. The next time they returned to Ojo de Agua, with no
previous experience in road construction, they rounded up a group of men, loaded up Pedro’s
truck with gravel at the local supplies store and set out to repair the town’s road. They had just
begun working when the town delegate, Salvador Rodriguez, stopped by to ask what they were
doing. After listening to their story, he informed them that the government had recently started
supporting migrant community projects through a program called 3x1 para Migrantes. Pedro and
his cousin thanked the representative. However, due to a lack of trust in local officials, neither of
them ever looked into the program. Then, sometime later after Pedro had returned to the U.S.,
Mr. Rodriguez called him and told him that if he visited his local Mexican consulate in
Albuquerque they would help him register a Hometown Association (HTA) with the Mexican
government. A registered HTA, Mr. Rodriguez explained, would make his group eligible to
receive $3 for every $1 they were able to raise for public work projects in Ojo de Agua, including
roads. In the fall of 2008 Pedro registered his group with the Mexican consulate located in
Albuquerque and since then he has helped complete the construction of three roads in Ojo de
Agua. The new roads have allowed for improved public transportation between the town and
nearby Jerécuaro, which in turn has permitted its inhabitants to access better education and
more reliable health care. To the developed world these improvements may seem minuscule.
However, as anyone who takes the time to visit the small town and talk to its residents will
quickly find out, for the inhabitants of Ojo de Agua the recent changes are nothing short of
monumental. As one middle aged man interviewed during a site visit in June of 2011 put it,
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“Everything you see here, the houses, the roads, the water system, the soccer field, all of it, it’s
all thanks to them [the migrants]. Without los paisanos, who knows if Ojo de Agua would even
exist anymore” (Inverview, Local Resident 1).
Still, while much of the progress made in Ojo de Agua over the course of the last few
decades stands as a testament to the hard work of migrants alone, in recent years the state has
played an increasingly important role in facilitating RLD in the town. As mentioned above, for
example, initially Pedro began supporting development projects independently of the state.
However, during each of the 3x1 projects that he and his HTA have supported, he has worked
closely with the town’s local representatives. In particular, Pedro has coordinated with Salvador
Rodriguez, who lives in Ojo de Agua and was the town’s main delegate for the period 20032009. What follows is a brief clip of an interview that I conducted with Mr. Rodriguez in the
summer of 2011.
Author: Your town has carried out a great number of projects. I didn’t realize how much
had been done until I came here. It’s clear that there has been a lot of change in town.
Mr. Rodriguez: Yes, not long ago all of the streets were very poor and so we took it
upon ourselves to improve them. Pedro started to help me even before the government
started working with his group. In fact, he paid for all of the labor costs for the road that
leads to his house.13
Author: Before 3x1 existed?

It is important to point out that while the first project Pedro Martinez supported does indeed lead to his house, it
is also the town’s main road. Given this, it would be misleading to interpret this project as stemming from selfinterest. To be sure, migrant projects are likely stimulated by a combination of self-interest and altruism. That said,
during my site visits to migrant hometowns in Guanajuato I got the overwhelming sense that the large majority of
RLD projects are the product of a deep sense of loyalty that migrants feel for their hometowns.
13
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Mr. Rodriguez: Well, 3x1 already existed but we hadn’t taken advantage of the program
yet here. The first phase for us was to expand the streets. I told Pedro, “Just let me know
how I can help you. Just let me know and we’ll get the machines and get going.” And
that’s how we got started. I went to the municipal presidency and solicited a bulldozer,
which they lent us. We had to supply the diesel and get local residents to move their
fences back so that we could widen the streets…Later we began to work with the 3x1
program. Pedro asked me, “Look, I want to begin paving the streets but there are three
types of pavement: asphalt, cobblestone with cement and pavement with curbs. Which
one do you suggest?” I told him that we should go with the best option, even if it were
more expensive and he agreed. At that point he began to work on the necessary
paperwork on his end [via the Mexican consulate] and I began to communicate with
someone I knew in the municipal president’s office that had helped me a great deal in
the past.
Author: So Pedro began working with the consulate in Albuquerque?
Mr. Rodriguez: Yes, in the consulate. He spoke to me a great deal about the consulate. I
told him, “Look, you get together your hometown association on your end and I’ll take
care of putting together a project committee on this end. When everything is ready the
municipal government will communicate with you and we will begin.” And now that the
projects are done I feel very proud and privileged because I arrived here ten years ago
and since then many things have changed.
Author: Oh, so you are not from Ojo de Agua?
Mr. Rodriguez: I was born here but I left when I was fifteen. I went to D.F. [the Federal
District]. I made a life for myself there and that’s where my children were born. Once I
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was a little better off I came back with my family with the intention of migrating to the
United States. But once I began working here I decided that I wanted to do something
for my hometown. I’m very proud and very happy with the local authorities. For me
there is no such thing as a bad government. Some people criticize the government but
while I was serving as a representative everyone in the municipal presidency was very
helpful.
Author: Did you work with different parties as a representative?
Mr. Rodriguez: Yes, one municipal president was with PAN, and the other was with PRI.
The one that was in the presidency three years ago, Joselito, helped me with 162 hours
with the D7 (bulldozer), two trucks and 163 hours with the excavator.
Author: So in the municipal presidency is there a need to pressure officials or do they
simply help any 3x1 project that they can? That is, is there competition for 3x1 project
funds?
Mr. Rodriguez: Well, you can feel the competition for funds because in the presidency
they give priority to the areas that are in most need: roads, electricity and potable water.
But it is also worth mentioning that local representatives must push for his or her
projects because if a representative just goes in once and turns in the paperwork the
project will never get off the ground. I had the experience that with the government one
has to be very, very firm and you have to keep pressuring until they finally say, “Alright,
give them the funds so that they will leave us alone.” That’s really how it is. I dedicated
six years as a local representative and that was my experience.
As this exchange demonstrates, migration runs deep in rural townships across Guanajuato. Mr.
Rodriguez, for example, was himself a migrant and it was not until he was able to achieve
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economic stability that he returned to Ojo de Agua. In particular, this exchange does a good job
of highlighting the potential for remittances to stimulate employment and subsequently help
reduce migration rates. In this case, Mr. Rodriquez chose to remain in Ojo de Agua despite his
initial intention to migrate to the U.S. Currently, Mr. Rodriguez produces and sells building
blocks in Ojo de Agua and other nearby towns. Given the region’s strong reliance on
remittances for economic activity, it is safe to conclude that at least in part Mr. Rondriguez’s
business is able to sustain itself due to the local building boom driven by migrant remittances.
This suggestion is confirmed in Chapter 5 where multiple regression results demonstrate that
RLD in Guanajuato improves the quality of life in migrant-sending regions and in doing so helps
abate migration rates.
Mr. Rodriguez also clarifies the role of local representatives in the 3x1 program. As he
points out, a representative must be very persistent in order for projects to move forward. Taken
together, this case is representative of a typical 3x1 project in which a HTA president plays a
crucial role in pooling together migrant remittances and a local representative works through the
ins and outs of the local political system. In this sense, Ojo de Agua de Mendoza reveals the
substantial overlap between RLD and local politics in the state of Guanajuato. The next case, in
turn, illustrates a somewhat more atypical case, in which the HTA president becomes a pseudorepresentative for the community.
El Timbinal, Yuriría, Guanajuato
El Timbinal, population 538, is located in the southern most extreme of Guanajuato,
near the border with Michoacán. Like other hometowns across the state, El Timbinal’s local
economy is largely dependent on migrant remittances. However, the town is somewhat unique
in that while migrants have privately funded more than a dozen public works projects since the
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late 1980s, the town’s only use of 3 x 1 funds was registered in 2009 for the reopening of a
textile factory or maquila. The factory was built in the late 1990s through an initiative named Mi
Comunidad or My Community, which was spearheaded by then-governor of Guanajuato, Vicente
Fox. The program sought to channel migrant remittances towards the construction of maquilas
throughout the state. El Timbinal’s maquila, however, like the rest of the more than twenty
maquilas funded by Mi Comunidad, closed its doors after just three years of production due to
the factory’s failure to successfully insert itself into the tumultuous global market that emerged in
the wake of September 11th, 2001. The factory remained closed from 2001 to 2009 but
eventually the president of the HTA in El Timbinal, Ángel Calderón, was able to convince the
state government to provide the town with 3 x 1 funds to aid with the training of new factory
workers and the development of more effective marketing strategies. Interestingly, in this
particular case, while the federal and state government each contributed $510,159 pesos or
roughly $40,812 dollars to the project, the local municipio of Yuriria did not contribute anything
to the project.14 The reopening of the factory was nonetheless considered a 3 x 1 project because
it was also supported by Western Union, which donated $216, 627 pesos or roughly $17,330
dollars. Currently, the factory is run by Las Mujeres Emprendadoras del Timbinal, a group of five
women who have been thoroughly trained by MIDE A.C., a civil society association that works
with migrants in central Mexico (introduced at length below). At the moment the factory is
operating on a contract basis only but it is in search of more stable, long-term contracts that will
permit it to sustain overtime. Taken together, the efforts in El Timbinal provide a good
illustration of the potential for remittances to promote economic growth and political change in
rural Guanajuato. I expand on this relationship in the paragraphs that follow.

14

Note: Peso amounts converted to dollars with an exchange rate of 12.5 pesos to 1 US dollar.

51

Don Ángel Calderón, the president of the HTA in El Timbinal, migrated to the U.S. as a
young man. For many years he worked in agriculture fields but he currently oversees three
migrant shelters in Napa Valley that provide housing to migratory workers who are employed in
the valley’s fertile wine fields. In the space that follows I provide a brief account of the nature of
Don Ángel’s work in order to give the reader an idea of the knowledge sets that Don Ángel has
acquired in the U.S. through his work. The following conversation recounts how he got involved
in his current job:
Ángel: One day I happened upon a group of 40 peasant workers living under a bridge.
And among these 40 peasants were 3 women and one of them asked me, ‘Imagine the
nights that we have to spend with these 40 animals, with all the alcohol they consume
one doesn’t have to have much of an imagination to figure out what goes on here.’ And
I responded, ‘M’hijas ,why are you here?’ To which she responded, ‘Where the hell are
we supposed to go?!’ So I got them out of there and took them to a Catholic Church and
the Father made space for them. From there I went back to the peasants under the
bridge and I told them if they stopped drinking I would start looking for a place for
them to live that would provide them with access to covers, tooth brushes, tooth paste,
soap and so on. I began to take photos of their living conditions and with the photos in
hand, I would go around to the grape producers. I would tell them, ‘Here is your labor
force. This isn’t Central America and its not Mexico. This is the United States, this is
California, this is Napa Valley. And this is your labor force, you know these individuals.’
Alone I went from one producer to the next. I focused a lot of time on this, two years in
all.
Author: When did all this start?
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Ángel: In 1998.
Author: So just before the maquila opened in El Timbinal?
Ángel: Yes. Yes and then in 2000 I began working full time with the migrant worker
program [in Napa Valley] and at that time it was just one center, we only had twenty tiny
bunk beds. Three to each room, we stuffed sixty people in there, which was difficult but
we began to work.
Author: Did you receive government funding for the project?
Ángel: No, at first we collected a small rent of $10 per day from the migrants and the
grape producers gave a small donation. Later we acquired funds from different
organizations and then, in 2000 we pushed for a small tax of $10 per acre, which
provided us with half a million dollars for the program. By 2003, so in three years, we
had three good centers, nothing opulent but good. A clean bed, a small room for two
people, three meals a day, six days a week. I managed the whole program for six years
and in those years, I pushed my twelve employees to provide good treatment. I had to let
several people go for not treating the workers well. I ran off one of the managers and his
family because they used expressions like “pinche Oaxaqueños” or “damn Oaxaqueños”.
When the harvest season was over I let them go…The most important thing in the
center is respect. They are all honorable workers, they are the responsible people in the
valley, they are humans. Right now we have a good system and we provide housing for
180 workers.
As the aforementioned passage reveals, like many HTA leaders, Don Ángel is a highly
altruistic individual and his noble actions are evident on both sides of the border. Moreover, as I
demonstrate below, it is evident that Don Ángel’s work in the U.S. naturally feeds into the
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nature of the projects that El Timbinal’s HTA has supported in Mexico. For example, as
manager of the Napa shelter, Don Ángel has come to demand respect and equal treatment for
all and as the excerpts below reveal, he has placed similar demands upon those individuals that
have come to participate in the maquila in El Timbinal. Most importantly, as Don Ángel
expressed to me while walking through his hometown streets, in the U.S. he has seen the ability
of his people to change and adopt to new cultural norms and for that reason, he knows that
change can also be brought to the hills of Guanajuato. Change, however, takes time and as Don
Ángel explains, El Timbinal has already transformed a great deal in recent decades.
At the beginning of the 20th century El Timbinal was a small, rural village located at the
end of a dusty trail. Similar to Ojo de Agua de Mendoza, the main economic activities included
raising cattle and planting corn and beans. The passage that follows recounts this humble
beginning:
Author: Was there a hacienda here before?
Ángel: No. Evidently during colonial times several men found a place where there was
potable water and there was space for cattle. There were grasslands and that was it. The
first settler was a colonel, his wife and three children, all males. Eventually his children
married and with time, other families came. Among the founders were the Calderons
[Ángel’s forefathers] and then other families came from nearby communities, the
Hernandez, Hilda and Victoria’s families [women that currently work at the factory].
Author: So your family was one of the first to settle this area.
Ángel: Yes, most likely. And for many years we were stuck. There was no road.
Everywhere you went you had to go by foot or on the back of a burro. But now,
everything you see is work of the immigrants.
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As the above quote illustrates, El Timbinal’s residents trace the town’s origins back to colonial
times and many of the town’s current inhabitants, including Don Ángel and the women that
work at the factory, are direct descendants of these original inhabitants or pobladores. For
generations economic activity in El Timbinal revolved around subsistence farming and ranching.
According to villagers, the town did not begin to change until the onset of migration to the U.S.,
which began during the Bracero period. The first remittances arrived as migrants began to settle in
the U.S. and as Don Ángel explains, they changed everything:
Author: And when did the first migrants head north?
Ángel: With the bracero program, in the 1940s and 1950s.
Author: Until 1964?
Ángel: Until 64’ when the program ended and then another [large] wave in 1996
[unrelated to the bracero program] because the people couldn’t survive because the land
here was deteriorated, so the people migrated to Mexico City. Others went to Iztapalapa,
where there are usually small partials of land available, and some to the town of
Guadalupe. Whole families left, many houses were left abandoned. A lot of people left.
In 1970 it became commonplace to see people leave for the United States without
documents. By the end of the 1970s migration was strong. During the 1980s it was an
invasion. We would leave in the month of January and February in groups of ten. We
would leave here and proceed to Zelaya and then on to Irapuato where we would grab a
bus to Tijuana. And in Tijuana…
Author: How would you cross?
Ángel: We would walk through the hills. In the 1980s it was easier to cross. During those
years there was a tremendous migration. After the amnesty program [IRCA, 1986], the
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family reunification program, whole families would leave and that has continued up until
the present. One would simply submit the paperwork and wait until he was called for an
interview and then, the whole family would leave. And from one day to the next, families
of five, six, four, three would uproot and head north.
Author: What changes has migration provoked in the village?
Ángel: Immigration has driven a great deal of drastic changes. The population has gone
down. Construction has gone up due to remittances and the economy has changed
considerably. Now the people dress well and eat well, they can pay for a taxi, they can
travel…in that sense the economy has improved a lot with the remittances. But here
there is no productivity in the community. No agriculture, no cattle and the only source
of work is external and that’s what we would like to change with the factory.
In the above passage Don Ángel refers to the Immigration Reform and Control Act, or IRCA as
it is commonly known, which U.S. legislators passed in 1986. The act fundamentally changed
Mexican migration due to the fact that it created a new set of social nexuses through which
millions of undocumented immigrants were able to solicit a path to legal residency for
themselves and their immediate family members. As Don Ángel reveals, out-migration led to a
series of important changes in El Timbinal. However, while remittances created new consumers
in El Timbinal, they did not generate jobs; which, as Don Ángel points out, is the goal of the
factory. Still, the HTA’s communal development plans did not begin with the factory. Rather,
RLD commenced in the 1980s with the public works projects that Don Ángel and other
migrants subsidized with money earned in the U.S. These initial migrant projects where not
supported by the government but rather, as Don Ángel put it, “were 1 x 0.”
Author: What were the first projects that migrants funded in the town?
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Ángel: We invested about $7,000 [in the church] and it was 1 x 0, there was no
government assistance. While we were doing this we realized who was willing to
cooperate and that helped with future projects. The second project was to tear down the
old kindergarten and build a new one. This project was 1 x 0 as well and we invested
about $14,000…Then we supported the Lepitos [children of a migrant family] so they
could study music because they weren’t doing anything productive. Their fathers were in
the U.S. and their mothers couldn’t control them and their boys frequently went out to
party. It was dangerous because they could get into fights and Raúl was one of the
leaders of the group and other kids in town followed his lead. And pulling these kids ears
didn’t work, so we gave them activities. I gave it a lot of thought and I realized that
perhaps if they got into music they would end up doing something productive. We
found a retired musician to teach the boys music. Some of them quit being loafers and
started playing in a band, others went on with their lives but they became more
productive. After that we fought for a better central plaza. I didn’t completely agree with
the project but we went along with it because the municipal president said, ‘Whatever
you guys raise for the project I will match’ and so we build a new plaza and added an
arch to the church…I didn’t like the project because it was a very expensive project and
in those years there were still outbreaks of diarrhea every year. The problem was that
every year during the rainy season the weeds would grow up and the people started to
use pesticides and herbicides about that time and so the water was no longer potable.
You couldn’t even bath yourself in it, you had to go outside to wash clothes. So
eventually we funded a project to pipe in potable water from a well outside the village.
And after that is when we opted to invest in a productive project, and that is when it got
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complicated, it is very difficult to create a business, a clothes factory, for example, in
place with these characteristics. And that’s what we told the community, which had
traditionally been a farming community and wanted to convert into an industrial
community. We knew it would be an ordeal, that it would be a long road and that we
would have to change a whole culture.
As the above quote demonstrates, migrants, and Don Ángel in particular, have played a
fundamental role in the town’s development over the last thirty years. Not only have they
funded public works projects but they have also played a principal role in the social welfare of
locals by helping fund a community center and extracurricular activities for youth. Also, as the
previous exchange illustrates, Don Ángel, although not always successful, has pushed for
projects with high social impact, such as the potable water project and the factory. Still, the
factory is unique from previous projects carried out in El Timbinal in the sense that it marks the
first time that migrants have worked in conjunction with state officials. In fact, as Don Ángel
explains below, the state government was proactive in convincing HTA members to pursue the
maquila project through the program Mi Comunidad. Nonetheless, the only monetary support
the government supplied came in the form of a large loan. According to Don Ángel, had the
migrants build the factory at cost it would have run roughly $50,000. The government, however,
insisted that they take out a loan to buy the material and so El Timbinal HTA borrowed $50,000
and paid back the money in installments. Over the course of two years they returned a total of
$100,000. When I inquired further into the nature of the loan Don Ángel pointed out that
officials also supplied a technician for twelve months, which cost the government $25,000. Thus,
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in all the migrants paid back $100,000, twenty-five percent of which consisted of interest rates.15
Concerning the HTA’s relationship with the government Don Ángel had the following to say:
Author: So the government provided you with a good deal of technical assistance?
Ángel: Yes but back in April [of 2009] when we began thinking about reopening, I didn’t
want to get involved again with the government. I simply asked that they assist me with
the bureaucratic paperwork that one has to go through every time one goes into a
government office. For God’s sake, it can be so frustrating. They treat you bad, they run
you off and so I told the Governor, help me with the bureaucratic work –with the
Federal Electricity Commission, the Treasury…that’s all I wanted but someone in the
government said, ‘Wait a minute, how much did you invest originally? Ok, what you
need to do is solicit a 3 x 1 project and that way you can receive government assistance
to reopen the maquila.’ So that’s what I did but it was advice from the government. They
offered it and so I accepted. We sat down and wrote up the project. They revised it and
we negotiated the terms and finalized the agreement. That’s when we remodeled part of
the maquila, we bought a pick-up, two more machines and computers. We invested the
majority in the remodeling.
As Don Ángel went on to point out, the 3 x 1 project has allowed the maquila to reopen its
doors and has the potential to generate a valuable source of employment for the community. In
general, it is worth highlighting the proactive role that state officials have played in convincing
the HTA in El Timbinal to work through state-sponsored programs, including Mi Comunidad
and 3x1 para migrantes. In interviews with government officials and migrants I have found that

15Readers

from developed nations might interpret a twenty-five percent interest rate as unnecessarily high. It is
important to point out, however, that in most developing countries around the world credit is extremely hard to
come by, and where it is accessible, interest rates tend to be much higher on loans than is customary in developed
nations.
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this is typical of most 3x1 projects across the state. This is of particular interest because it
demonstrates the importance of 3x1 investments from the perspective of local and state officials.
This point is corroborated by regression results in Chapter 4 of this study, which demonstrate
that 3x1 funds make up a significant percentage of public works investments in rural towns
across the state.
Another point of interest that emerges from El Timbinal concerns the relationship that
has formed between the HTA and Migración y Desarrollo A.C. (MIDE A.C.). Currently, the factory
is being supported by MIDE A.C., which is a non-profit civil association dedicated to assisting
migrant clubs with the development of projects that focus on generating employment within
migrant-sending communities. In the case of El Timbinal, MIDE A.C. has been extremely
instrumental in the factory’s reopening. The organization, for example, put Don Ángel in
contact with the headquarters of Western Union in Englewood, Colorado, which allowed the
club to access a grant of $17,330 dollars from the global financial institution. Most importantly,
MIDE A.C. has provided the factory workers with hundreds of hours of training through onsite
workshops sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and they have aided
Don Ángel in promoting democratic norms and practices among the factory workers. As MIDE
A.C.’s co-founder, Anselmo, explains, the nature of the organization’s work is part of a larger
vision aimed at promoting democratic development norms and what Anselmo referred to as
“political capital” within Mexico’s nascent democratic society:
Author: How did MIDE A.C. begin?
Anselmo: Alejandra [the other co-founder of MIDE A.C.] worked in the federal offices
of SEDESOL in Mexico City and she was working with the program ‘Oportunidades’.
The goal of the program was to reduce the high levels of poverty in Mexico. So she
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worked with highly marginalized populations throughout the country. Alejandra and I
talked frequently about the situation that was taking place in Mexico. Vicente Fox had
just won the presidency, PRI was out but it was clear that there was a need for more
civic participation. We also talked about how the respective powers—the executive, the
legislative and the judicial—were beginning to divide and that given all the changes, there
was an opportunity to develop a sort of ‘social lobby’ which didn’t exist in the country.
There were lobbyists for businesses. The pharmaceutical business, the auto industry, the
insurance companies, they all had lobbyists but there were not lobbyists for the people.
And around that time, at the outset of Fox’s sexenio Congress passed a law that
supported sustainable rural development and part of the legislation called for the
promotion of investment strategies that channeled remittances from migrants living in
the exterior towards development and that is when Alejandra and I saw an important
opportunity to begin lobbying for the people. And so that was the situation, we heard
the Congress, the federal government, the executive, the legislators and public officials
talk about the growing interest in working with the Mexican community to create a
favorable environment for development in migrant hometowns…so, we began the initial
process of founding an association that would be an intermediary between the
government and migrant organization. Why? Because the government’s discourse was
poorly understood by both parties and just as the government didn’t understand the
migrants well, the migrants did not understand the government…And so we decided to
promote the investment of migrants in their hometowns and offer them a contact point
and a means through which to contact key legislators that were in one form or another
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conscious of the role of the participation of everyday citizens in politics. We also felt a
need make people aware of their political rights as migrants.
Author: How much time passed between the initial idea and MIDE A.C.’s official debut
as a civil association?
Anselmo: We left our respective jobs in October of 2001 and chartered a civil
association in Mexico City. But really two years. Legally we chartered the organization in
July of 2003 as a non-profit civil association that could receive grant money from the
government in Mexico and from other non-profits in countries like the U.S.
This exchange is of particular interest because it demonstrates the emergence of a feedback loop
between policy and practice in regard to RLD in Mexico. In this case, Alejandra and Anselmo
left their jobs with different government agencies in order to facilitate the apparent disconnect
between policy aimed at improving development norms in migrant hometowns and the actual
practice of development in these regions. Their experience highlights the importance of local
advocates in the process of RLD in Guanajuato. In my fieldwork and data analysis I found that
“social lobbying,” to use Anselmo’s term, plays a crucial role in determining whether or not
towns pursue 3x1 projects in the first place. Specifically, my research indicates that the presence
of return migrants like Salvador Rodriguez in the case of Ojo de Agua de Mendoza and social
advocates like Alejandra and Anselmo in the case of El Timbinal play a particularly crucial role
in leveraging RLD.
Finally, it is necessary to highlight the ways in which the factory and the training sessions
with MIDE A.C. have changed the lives of the five women that currently manage production.
Unlike most rural women in the Mexican countryside, these five individuals are assertive and
proactive in factory meetings. For example, one afternoon, while I was visiting the factory in El
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Timbinal, I had the opportunity to observe a business strategy meeting held inside the maquila.
What was most interesting about the meeting was the manner in which the women interacted
with Don Ángel, Alejandra and Anselmo. They were highly participatory in the meeting and
proposed, in many cases, very viable solutions to the problems currently facing the factory. Most
importantly, it is apparent that the confidence that I observed in the women that day is not
limited to the confines of the factory. Rather, their newfound self-assurance as entrepreneurs
and business owners carries over into the public sphere. According to Don Ángel, for example,
when they have to file official papers with the government they immediately solicit meetings
with officials in the state capital and in the meetings they look government functionaries in the
eye and ask direct questions. As Anselmo pointed out as we were leaving the town one evening
after a visit to the factory, “That’s not how things used to work in Mexican politics, especially in
rural areas and never with women.” That is, it was not that long ago that political relationships in
Mexico were marked by patron-client ties dominated by men. This was especially evident in the
rural countryside where the hierarchal relationships defined during the semi-feudal colonial
period were largely reinforced under the seventy-year political reign of PRI. Given this, the very
notion of a rural campesina sitting down and negotiating the terms of a business venture with the
male governor of the state is nothing short of monumental. Still, despite the promising advances
made in El Timbinal, as Don Ángel points out in the next exchange, there is still work to be
done:
Author: What challenges has your club faced vis-à-vis the Mexican government?
Don Ángel: A challenge not only for the government but also for us, is the community
and its culture. This is a challenge for all of Mexico. We need to educate our children, we
need to change the culture that we have. We need to be industrious there, dreamers,
63

ambitious and very productive. Our culture back there is “Let’s go al Norte [to the U.S.]”.
Somebody else needs to be building bridges, our culture is to go look for work in the
U.S. And this is what has us in the situation where we currently find ourselves. As
migrants we are generally not entrepreneurs. If you take a second to reflect and you look
at the amount of money that migrants invest in business opportunities in Mexico, it’s
very minimal. The people invest money from remittances in celebrations, the church and
parties. They reconstruct the main park and make the community pretty but it’s less
frequent that migrants invest to generate employment or in educational opportunities
that will help train our children to become the entrepreneurs of the future. We are not
entrepreneurs compared to other nationalities. We are not entrepreneurs, we come to
look for work by renting our arms [brazos] here in the United States. And back there, in
Mexico we become dependent on government programs. You hear “the government is
responsible for my children.” I don’t see it that way. I’m responsible for my children.
Not the government, the government didn’t create them, I did. It is my responsibility to
educate them and provide them with a good value system, to make them honest, to
make them productive and good workers. But of course the government does matter.
The representatives we currently have [in Yuriria] are a quite lazy. This is the problem
throughout Mexico. The ones who educate our children came from us. They are germs
originating from a society infected by corruption and indolence. Changing this culture is
the biggest challenge we have as Mexicans.
Author: I see. Related to that, during this second phase of the factory in El Timbinal
have you and your fellow migrants been working with the government or have you
received any type of assistance from the government?
64

Don Ángel: We have received the support from the federal and state government but
not from the municipal government. With the municipal government it is different, they
have a very limited vision and their objectives are very small. Their perspective is very
close-minded. However, in our experience with the federal and state government it is
very different. At this level the officials are very educated. In their offices you find
engineers, architects, contractors, business administrators, ecologists and so on. It is
much easier to work with these individuals because they have a different vision of
Mexico. In the municipal government, however, things are different. The jobs at this
level are handed out based on personal connections and not individual capacity. As a
consequence, often they have very little knowledge and they don’t understand the first
thing about entrepreneurism. Moreover, their administrative period is quite short and as
a result projects are often not followed up with. Therefore, they have to hurry up and
rob as much as they can in their three years in the municipio and as a result they don’t care
much about the development of their municipio. For me it takes a great deal of patience to
talk with officials in the municipal government. I don’t mean to generalize about
everyone but I would say that 80 percent of them have studied very little. Frankly, we
[have] had a lot of problems with the municipal governments over the years and we’ve
found that it is much easier to work with the state government. They are much more
open to new ideas and change in general.
Author: And regarding the municipal government in Yuriria, have there ever been
changes in terms of the ruling party or has the same party always controlled the
government?

65

Don Ángel: Right now it is a big mess. The local government is a disaster. For many
years the PRI controlled the government through the traditional caciques. Then a young
member of PRI emerged and a group of young, professional priistas [PRI party
members] took the municipal presidency for a number of years. I worked with a few of
them. After that the old priistas, the dinosaurs, jumped over to PAN and they won under
the PAN label and they led us to ruin.16 The next president was the son of the previous
president but the son did not run under PAN but instead ran with the green ecologist
party [PVEM]. He recently left the presidency and now the president is his wife, who
also ran under the PVEM but the family has been involved with PRI, PAN and PVEM.
Their party, as you can see, really doesn’t mean much.
Author: But the family means a lot?
Don Ángel: Yes and unfortunately the family is a bunch of morons and with them it is
impossible to work because they don’t work for the people.
Author: And does SEDESOL maintain an office in Yuriria?
Don Ángel: Yes, there is an office for SEDESOL but they always have the same
response, “There are no resources, there are no resources.” They do small projects, like
the reconstruction of parks, and then they destroy the park and they reconstruct it again.
But they don’t have the capacity to develop entrepreneur projects nor educational
projects because the system is messed up.
The image of corruption, individual and systemic incompetence, and nepotism that Don Ángel
paints in the reader’s head is reminiscent of the now classic film La Ley de Herodes, which was

16“Dinosaurs”

is the term commonly used in Mexico to label PRI party members that continue to hold conservative
ideals more closely aligned with the traditional party beliefs defined during the PRI’s seventy-year reign in the
executive branch.
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released in 1999 on the eve of the 2000 presidential elections. In the film, the main protagonist is
Juan Vargas, who is depicted as a humble but well-intentioned young man who is sent by the
Secretary of State, Mr. Lopéz, to the community of San Pedro de los Saguaros to take over the
town’s municipal presidency. Unbeknownst to Vargas, the previous municipal president was
beheaded by local peasants for abusing his power. Vargas arrives to the community with the
sincere intention of bringing “progress and modernity” to the people of San Pedro de Saguaros
but little by little he is corrupted by the benefits of his newfound power. In a relatively short
period of time, Vargas transforms into a tyrant who is willing to resort to violence as a means of
maintaining his power in the community. The climax of the film is when Vargas screams out to
his latest victim, “Te tocó la ley de Herodes, o te chingas o te jodes” [You’ve met your day with
the law of Herodes, or screw yourself or fuck yourself]. As those who have seen the film will
recall, Vargas did not make up his infamous phrase but rather, he learned it from the man who
appointed him, Mr. Lopéz. Thus, the film, like Don Ángel, implies that the problem with the
Mexican political system is the culture of corruption that is passed down from generation to
generation.
Furthermore, as Don Ángel points out, there appears to be a relationship between the
education levels of local officials and municipal capacity. (I return to this association in Chapter
6.) Unfortunately, the efficiency (or lack thereof) of local bureaucracy can have a tangible effect
on migrant projects. In the case of El Timbinal, the migrant club simply chose not to go through
local officials, and instead, opted for working with state and federal officials in collaboration
with Western Union and MIDE A.C. In the short run, this relationship may aid El Timbinal as a
community. Still, in the long run, the lack of accountable and transparent government agencies
at the local level will continue to hamper the development of El Timbinal and other
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communities throughout Yuriria and Guanajuato. Regrettably, as the next case reveals, the ebb
and flow of patron-client politics does not appear to be limited to the municipal level in
Guanajuato.
Ojo de Agua/Huanímaro, Guanajuato
Ojo de Agua and El Novillero are located on the border between the municipios (roughly
the equivalents of U.S. counties) of Abasolo and Huanímaro. Although the towns technically
pertain to distinct municipios, on the ground it is impossible to distinguish one from the other.
Over the years migrants from both towns have dedicated a great deal of their time and money to
the development of the community. In recent years migrants from these two towns have come
together to form the HTA Club Ojo de Agua y Novillero Unidos (CODAYNU). According to
the group’s website, the two migrant communities formed their club with the intention of
providing a better standard of living for migrants residing in the U.S. and their family members
back in Mexico. The organization’s main purpose is to improve the lives of Guanajuatenses
through investments in public infrastructure, improved access to health care and education,
sports and social events and the promotion of new employment opportunities. In recent years
CODAYNU has overseen the construction of several roads and a community center equipped
with more than 30 computers. Most recently, the HTA has begun developing plans to open a
shoe factory as a means of generating a source of local employment.
RLD in Ojo de Agua and Novillero is particularly indicative of the degree to which
political ambitions overlap with local development projects, and specifically, 3x1 projects in the
state of Guanajuato. In order to provide a more concise account of the relationship between
RLD and local politics I briefly recount the inauguration of a migrant project that took place in
the summer of 2011 in front of the Catholic temple shared by the neighboring towns. The
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government and CODAYNU organized the event together, but as the reader will note, from
beginning to end there was a particular high level of political fanfare.
Representatives of Governor Oliva’s administration arrived in state vehicles several
hours prior to the 11:00 am speech to begin assembling a stage in front of the town’s main
church. Meanwhile, schoolteachers began leading their respective classes towards the town’s
baseball field in anticipation of the governor’s arrival. While the crowd waited for the governor’s
helicopter to appear, the government’s official photographer passed out little blue flags and led
the school children in a series of patriotic jingles. Finally, when the incongruous sound of a
helicopter could be made out in the distance, the school band began to play and the school kids
began to wave their small, white and blue flags in unison above their heads. Once the helicopter
landed and the dust had settled, the HTA leader, Armando Solís, walked out to greet Governor
Oliva and the then-director of Social and Human Development and now Governor Miguel
Marquez Marquez. The group then proceeded to a nearby street, which had been paved by a 3x1
project. Other members of CODAYNU joined in and shoulder-to-shoulder government
officials and migrant leaders began to walk towards the parish. As they walked, migrant leaders
and government officials chatted with ease, giving the impression that were well acquainted. A
large crowd gathered behind the officials and the marching band continued to play until the
group reached their destination. Upon arrival to the town square government officials and
migrants leaders took their seats upon the preassembled stage and the crowd began to fill the
seats that had been placed in neat rows in the middle of the town’s main road. Once everyone
settled in beneath the blue awnings, Mr. Solís addressed the crowd with the following words:
Armando Solis: Good morning, I am happy, excited, and nervous all at the same time.
The truth is I never, no matter how many times I speak on the microphone, I will never
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get used to it and my admiration for others grows more because I cannot do it and I
watch our representatives do it with such authority. In any case, a very good day to all.
With permission of the honorable Juan Manuel Oliva, state governor, engineer Carlos
Aguirre, Municipal President of Huanímaro, Mr. Marquez Marquez, Secretary of Social
and Human Development, Marta Silvia Robles Castro, local delegate, Paramos Aguilar,
Municipal President of Abasolo and the people present already mentioned, thank you for
being here, and to the integrates of this honorable congregation. Friends, may all of you
be welcomed. Welcome and thank you for being here today with the Ojo de
Agua/Novillero Club. This is motive for great happiness because we find ourselves
united on this morning in order to initiate very important projects that decorate the
development of our community. Today we finalize the first stage of the community
center and in the next days we will begin the second stage. [In this center] we will serve
our people and their environment, people that will now have an area to be used for
recreation and to develop their own abilities. Today we will also initiate the main street
project. Mr. Governor, our deep gratitude for all the support and help we have received
from all of your collaborators. At the same time we thank the federal government and
the municipal presidents of Huanímaro and Abasolo, who from the beginning have been
willing to make their donations. Rest assured that having your support gives us strength
to keep fighting for the land that saw us grow up and that we never cease to yearn for.
This is where our people are and for them we will keep working. Mr. Governor and
everyone present, this is your home! Thank you! (Applause) Mr. Governor on the behalf
of the migrant club, some of whom are present, we would like to offer you a gift. A hat
to cover the sun because it is very intense! And well it’s a little hot right now but you can
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wear it [Armando hands the governor a large, blue and white leather jacket] for the
picture at least! [Governor stands up and graciously accepts his gifts. After the exchange,
Armando and Juan Manuel Olivas give one another a hug.] And it fits!
As the reader will note, Armando Solis’ speech is marked by a strong sense of gratitude for his
seemingly benevolent representatives. However, it is important to note that for the most part
Mr. Solis expresses his thankfulness not towards the state of Guanajuato but rather towards
Governor Juan Manuel Oliva. Mr. Solis’ focus on the governor highlights the strong sense of
paternalism that ran throughout the speeches given that day in Ojo de Agua and El Novillero.
The subservient nature of Mr. Solis’ speech reflects the traditional hierarchy of Mexican
relations. In this sense, it is not particularly surprising, but it is quite a contrast to the female
factory workers in El Timbinal and their breakthrough to a more egalitarian political style. When
considered together, the cases presented thus far reflect a state in transition in which local
development is both the product of traditional patron-client norms and emerging democratic
practices.
Mr. Solis’ talk was followed by then-Governor of Guanajuato, Juan Manuel Oliva, who
had the following to say:
Juan Manuel Oliva: Thank you! We are grateful for the hospitality that the mayors of this
community of Novillero and Ojos de Agua, President Juan Paramo of Abosolo [PRI],
and Carlos Aguirre of Huanímaro [PRI], bring us. Thank you for receiving us and for
bringing together this team. To the men and women that we appreciate so much, to our
immigrant friends and to Armando, thank you for your effort. Today we are here to get
started with a series of projects worth 10 million pesos. We are saving…ups all the pesos
fell! [The governor accidently drops his speech but makes light of the error by saying
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“oops all the pesos fell!” and then whispering into the microphone, “I just dropped 10
million pesos!” To which the crowd erupts in laughter.] We are saving 1.6 million pesos
in the community center for these two communities, 1.3 million to start the paving of
Main Street from the program “Tu Calle” and 6.5 million pesos on other paving projects
around the community of Rancho de Guadalupe and San Aguirre. And 500,000 pesos to
provide 325 families with a firm floor and sturdy roof. But we are here to commemorate
the work of men and women we all respect, admire and love. As a public authority one
cannot do anything without society. When we speak of that part of society that loves
México, that loves Guanajuato, that loves Abasolo and Huanímaro, although being far
away from their homeland, we must speak with words of support. We must support their
effort. Men and women who risk everything to construct a future in a different country.
There, in their second motherland, the United States, being far away from their origin
they maintain their culture, their roots, their roots, their origin remains and for them our
culture remains something to be proud of for all our paisanos [countrymen]. And that is
why I tell you Armando and all the immigrants, I tell you thank you for believing in
Guanajuato. Thank you for believing in Abasolo and Huanímaro and thank you for
maintaining the dream alive of men and woman fighting for their country. I have always
said Mexico is only complete if you think about the immigrants, only if you think about
Mexico being wherever there is an immigrant…You have all started an extraordinary
project with this community center. We all want for Ojos de Agua and Novillero to be
internally united. It [the community center] will be a space of preparation, expansion and
socializing. Today we welcome the first stage with a budget of 400,000 pesos and at the
same time we begin the second stage with one million through the federal program 3x1
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para migrantes, which is supported equally by the state, the cities of Abasolo and
Huanímaro and the migrants. We would like to tell you we will be advancing with the
paving project on Main Street with 1.3 million pesos, the same project that started the
great effort of paving the streets that we inaugurated last year. But I would like to say
that we recognize your commitment, and I came to announce, thanks to the support of
Mayor Juan Paramo of Abasolo, and Mayor Carlos Aguirre of Huanímaro and the
governor of Guanajuato, an investment of 3 million pesos to finish the community
center... And so let’s get to work on the project so that before the end of 2012 we can
come inaugurate the project with our migrant friends! We are here to inaugurate the
community center, but as I always say, we are working hard so our immigrants can feel
proud and so that more Mexicans decide to stay here, while at the same time respecting
everyone’s right to migrate because it is a right held by everyone. I would like to let you
know that we strongly supporting our migrants and their communities. We have
developed an impressive scholarship program that supports over 340,000 young men
and women with their primary and professional education. We want our residents of
these communities to prepare themselves that is why we have built 25 new universities
[in Guanajuato], such as “El Tecnológico de Abasolo” which is here close by. We want
for you all to grow up to be technicians or professionals to improve the countryside as
well as the city. In 2012 we plan to invest in healthcare resources, such as specialized
medical institutions. Good examples of this are found in the community hospital in
Huanímaro and the hospital in Abasolo, and other hospitals throughout the state of
Guanajuato. This will permit us to reach ninety-eight percent health care coverage for
the population when before many did not have access to health care at all. Today 2.7
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million Guanajuatenses have social security but we must provide coverage to 470,000
Guanajuatenses before we can say that private care and social security have reached
100% coverage. These are extraordinary programs. The program Healthy Pregnancy
[Embarazo Saludable] states that no woman will give birth without quality services and
they can register for this program even if they do not have social security. Also, this
extraordinary program gives healthcare to the next generation. All children that are born
December 1st of 2013 and after will have the right to social security. We all have to keep
pushing and work hard. I would like for a very important dream to come true with the
3x1 program. I am grateful to our immigrant friends for the support they give us so we
can multiply federal, state and municipal resources. I hear our immigrants say “let’s go
for the community center, let’s go pave the street, let’s fix the public plaza, and let’s fix
the church”. However, it brings me happiness that our immigrants begin to think about
the function of 3x1 as generating employment opportunities and productivity. There are
examples here is Don Ángel [Governor Oliva signals out Don Ángel Calderón, who
happens to be in Mexico and was able to attend the event]. Armando, from the Ojos de
Agua y Novillero club, now presents us with a project designed to establish in this
community an industrial shoe factory. It could generate up to sixty jobs in the beginning.
He assures us that the most important thing is creating sources of employment for locals
and we will make this factory happen and we will support Armando. We are going to tell
Miguel, no? [Governor Oliva turns to Miguel Marquez Marquez, Secretary of Social and
Human Development, and motions his approval of the project with a thumbs up.] If I’m
not mistaken I will tell Miguel to fund the project for $5,322,140.85 pesos. Then Miguel
will review the project plan with the 3x1 committee and the Secretary on Ecological
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Development. This project will generate new employment in the community. You [the
migrants] have access to the U.S. market in which to sell the goods the factory produces,
which is the most important part. That is what gives the project life. We will begin
constructing the necessary infrastructure. This is a great project because we are using
money earned by migrants, who have left to access employment in the U.S., as a means
of generating local employment here in the communities. It only makes sense to use a
share of remittance flows for productive projects to maintain employment and
enterprise. I will remind you brother [referring to Armando Solís] that this project will
require tenacity, imagination, and a market in which to sell the products produced by the
factory. I will tell Miguel to begin to look over the project in a direct manner and
together with the Secretary of Economic Development, Don Ramón, we will review the
business plan and once the project is approved we will put in our part. I tell the
immigrants, thank you for worrying about themselves, their family, thank you for
working for your second country the United States, but also thank you for working for a
better quality of life here in Mexico and thank you for helping generate solutions for
your people. Thank you so much and god bless.
Former Governor Oliva’s speech is significant for several reasons. First, the very presence of the
Governor in the small ranching community of Ojo de Agua is symbolic of the government’s
commitment to capture remittance flows and direct them towards development initiatives. In
this respect, events like this one are suggestive of the importance that remittances currently play
in subsidizing public works projects across Guanajuato. (This point is empirically confirmed by
the results outlined in Chapter 4.) Second, the governor’s speech clearly reveals the political
undercurrents running through the 3x1 program and other development programs. This point is
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revealed in the previous quote when the governor takes advantage of the occasion to remind
citizens what his government has done for Guanajuatenses throughout the state. Specifically, he
cites advances in education and healthcare. And while Mr. Oliva never expressly cites his party in
the speech, his rhetorical use of the term “my government” is sufficient enough to associate the
government’s achievements with the ruling party, PAN. Finally, Mr. Oliva’s speech clearly
reveals the state’s effort to recapture Mexicans in the exterior as citizens and engines of
development. It is for this reason the governor emphasizes time and again the importance that
migrants play in Mexico’s future.
Conclusions
Taken together, the three case studies outlined in this chapter are illustrative of the
intersections between migrant remittances, development and politics in Guanajuato, Mexico. To
be sure, while not all RLD is as extensive as the cases described above, there are very few, if any,
regions in Mexico that have not been impacted by cash transfers from the U.S. Moreover, as
these cases demonstrate, the influence of remittances extends beyond the economic sphere,
affecting both local society and politics. The case of Ojo de Agua/Novillero is particularly
illustrative of this point. In this community migrants have been very active in initiating local
development projects. In fact, in recent years few communities in Guanajuato have taken
advantage of the 3x1 program like Ojo de Agua/Novillero. In a relatively short period of time
the community’s migrants have completed a number of high impact projects, including: several
new roads, a community center and the initial plans for a shoe factory.
Still, what is perhaps most noteworthy of the case of Ojo de Agua/Novillero is the
political grandeur surrounding the town’s projects. As the reader might imagine, flying into
small, agriculture villages in a helicopter is not common practice among local political leaders. In
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this sense, the recent attention that migrant clubs have received from the government is
indicative of the state’s growing interest in capturing remittance flows and channeling them
towards development. It also reflects, however, politicians’ growing awareness of the strong
connections between their constituencies in Mexico and migrants in the U.S. That is, politicians
realize that migrants figure among the most prominent leaders in many rural communities
around the state and thus gaining their approval has become a crucial factor in local elections. In
this sense, each of the aforementioned cases, and the 3x1 program in general, is instructive of
the state’s effort to bring migrants back into the national fold. Here ex-Governor Oliva’s
concluding statements from the speech outlined at the end of this chapter come to mind, “I tell
the immigrants, thank you for worrying about themselves and their family. And thank you for
working for your second country the United States, but also thank you for working for a better
quality of life and for helping with productive projects for your people. Thank you so much and
god bless.” As the reader notes, Governor Oliva emphasizes the fact that migrants may have left
their motherland, but in the eyes of the state, they will always be Mexicans and Mexicans will
always be their people.
The cases of Ojo de Agua de Mendoza, El Timbinal and Ojo de Agua/Novillero
demonstrate that at least in some cases remittances have the potential to act as a catalyst for
communal development and open up previously closed off political avenues. Based on these
accounts, however, there is also reason to question whether or not the inclusion of new
participants in the political process necessarily translates into meaningful development and
relatively more democratic procedures in practice. That is, one can just as easily imagine the
incorporation of new actors into the system without meaningful change. Thus, important
questions remain: Do either household remittance or 3x1 investments have a positive effect on
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economic development in Guanajuato? Moreover, how do migrants affect the political system
across Guanajuato’s municipios? Finally, does RLD help mitigate the underlying factors driving
migration to the U.S.?
As the aforementioned questions indicate, it is clear that further research is necessary to
determine the degree to which 3x1 projects actually incite local development and political change
on the ground. In the chapters that follow I address these questions via a systematic comparison
of RLD across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios. The results have important implications for migrants
and the state alike.
It is my hope that the case studies presented here provide the reader with a more
tangible portrayal of investments made through the 3x1 program. I invite the reader to re-visit
these case studies frequently as he or she ventures into the chapters that follow. At this point I
turn to a quantitative examination of 3x1 investments across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios.
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Interior of church built by migrants in Ojo de Agua de Mendoza, Jerécuaro.
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Ojo de Agua de Mendoza, Jerécuaro.
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Billboard summarizing one of the most recent 3x1 project in Ojo de Agua de Mendoza,
Jerécuaro.
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Interior of factory built in El Timbinal, Yuriría.
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Billboard summarizing El Timbinal’s 2009 3x1 project.
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Juan Manuel Oliva, ex-Governor of Guanajuato, and Miguel Marquez Marquez, then Secretary
of Social and Human Development and current Governor of Guanajuato, arrive in helicopter to
a large crowd to inaugurate a 3x1 para migrantes project in the towns of Ojo de Agua and
Novillero.
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Governor Juan Manuel Oliva and Armando Solis, president of Ojo de Agua/Novillero’s
migrant club, walk through the streets of Ojo de Agua prior to speaking to the public.
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Governor of Guanajuato, Juan Manuel Oliva, addressing a crowd in Ojo de Agua/Novillero.
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Government officials and migrants commemorating a recent 3x1 project in Ojo de
Agua/Novillero.
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Chapter 4: Old Habits Die Hard: Political Patronage and Remittance-led Development
in Guanajuato, Mexico
The government depends on two things. The government depends on oil exports, which
is its principle form of income. And the second form of income is tourism. But money
from tourism is now rivaled by the money sent home by migrants from the U.S. The
Mexican is in a very tricky situation. He leaves Mexico in reaction to the misery and he
sends money home out of the goodness of his heart. But ultimately, this perpetuates the
corruption. (Migrant, The Other Side of Immigration 2009)

In the early 1980s Mexico began a tentative transition towards democratic governance.
Since then, although the nation is far from a full-fledged democracy, local and national elections
have become increasingly more competitive and everyday politics are more transparent than in
years past. This process culminated in the year 2000 when Vicente Fox broke the PRI’s seventyone year hold on the executive office. During this same time period increased migration to the
U.S. stimulated the flow of migrant remittances to households across Mexico. By 2007
remittances flowing into Mexico surpassed $26 billion dollars, accounting for roughly 2.5
percent of the nation’s GDP (Banco de México 2007). The intersection of political transition
towards democracy with mass migration to the U.S. presents an intriguing question: To what
degree do migrant remittances influence local politics in Mexico?
To be sure, sojourner networks have had (and continue to have) profound effects on
Mexican society. Still, surprisingly little is understood about the lasting impact of emigration on
politics at the local level in Mexico. This chapter brings this phenomenon to the fore by focusing
on how household remittances and the program 3x1 para migrantes have affected local politics
at the municipal level in Guanajuato, Mexico. As becomes evident in the pages that follow, this
analysis is as much an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of the program 3x1 para
migrantes as it is an opportunity to evaluate the decentralization of political decision making in
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contemporary Mexico. I begin this discussion with a brief literature review before presenting
descriptive statistics of 3x1 investment trends in Guanajuato. Subsequently, I use multiple
regression analysis to evaluate the effect of remittances and 3x1 investments on local election
outcomes and voter turnout rates for the period 2002-2011 in the state of Guanajuato.
Regression results reveal that under the right conditions remittances channeled through the 3x1
program stimulate higher levels of voter participation, and in this manner, have the potential to
contribute to democratic growth. Still, data patterns also indicate that 3x1 investments share a
positive correlation with election cycles such that 3x1 investments rise significantly and
substantially in the years directly preceding elections. While by no means conclusive, this linkage
suggests that authorities may be systematically using the 3x1 program for patronage and/or
implicit vote-buying purposes. Still, it is important to note that the use of government programs
for patronage and electoral purposes would be neither surprising nor unusual in the context of
democratic competition anywhere; nor would such a pattern of attempted manipulation of the
program necessarily undercut the potential for positive economic and democratic impact of the
3x1 program. However, it at least raises questions to be examined through careful analysis of the
actual programmatic impact of the 3x1 program. With that in mind, the research presented
below, via an extensive analysis of 3x1 investment patterns in Guanajuato, focuses on the depth
of democratic consolidation amidst the decentralization of political decision-making in post-PRI
Mexico.
Decentralization and Participatory Democracy in Latin America
Nearly three decades ago countries across Latin America began transitioning from highly
centralized, authoritarian regimes towards relatively decentralized, democratic governments.
Initially, given Latin America’s history of strong-handed caudillos and closed-door politics,
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researchers strongly questioned the potential longevity of democracy in the region. However,
once it became apparent that the nascent democracies where not going to relapse, observers
began to focus on the degree to which democratic practices were expanding beyond the electoral
booth in Latin America.
Early research (O’Donnell 1998; Avritizer 2002, 2008) revealed that the quality of
democratic governance is contingent on the establishment of stronger links between elite
democratic norms (elections, transparency laws, checks and balances, etc.) and emerging
democratic practices in the public space (participatory budgeting, communal decision making,
etc.). Specifically, Avritzer (2002) revealed how the decentralization of political decision making
allowed new partisan voices to institutionalize participatory practices within emerging
democracies. Goldfrank (2002; 2007) and Baiocchi (2005; 2011) built on Avritizer’s theoretical
work by documenting the experiences of participatory budgeting in the South American
countries of Uruguay, Brazil and Venezuela. As these authors demonstrate, the decentralization
of resource distribution to the local level has the potential to incite greater political participation,
and in some cases, more efficient governance. However, local context appears to play a crucial
role in determining the eventual success or failure of experiments in decentralization. Yashar
(1999) and Sabitini (2003), for example, illustrate how the inclusion of sub-national political
interests in the Andean region has strained the institutional capacity of newly established
governments. Romero (2002) provides a particularly candid illustration of the unintended
consequences of decentralization in his work on the war-torn Colombian countryside. As he
demonstrates, the transfer of decision making to the provincial level has strengthened local
power brokers, including drug cartels, rebels and paramilitaries. As a result, the overall
performance of democracy in Colombia has been tenuous. Taken together, these authors
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demonstrate that the decentralization of political decision-making and resource allocation has
the potential to incite more democratic practices and norms. However, as they make clear, an
accurate account of this process requires one to carefully consider the impact of local factors.
Given this, it is not surprising that authors in the region have begun to consider the manner in
which diaspora communities affect efforts to consolidate democracy at the local level. This is
particularly evident in the case of Mexico.
An emerging body of literature addresses the effect of migration on local and national
politics in migrant-sending countries (Burgess 2005; Careja and Emmenegger 2012; Fitzgerald
2000; Fox and Bada 2008; Goldring 2002; Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Marcelli and Cornelius
2005; Rivera Salgado, 1999; M. P. Smith 2003; R. Smith 2006). Concerning emigration levels,
Pérez-Armendáriz and David Crow (2010) find that connections with “relatives or friends who
have migrated north greatly raises one’s proclivity toward democratic participation.” Their
findings indicate that individuals living in areas with high levels of migration are more likely to
participate in politics beyond the electoral booth such as civil associations and protests. Pfutze
(2012), in turn, documents a link between household remittances and political change, indicating,
“as remittances increase voters’ disposable income, the necessary clientelistic transfers paid in
exchange for political support would need to increase as well. To the extent that the government
faces budget constraints, this patronage system will become unsustainable” (2012: 173, 174).
Pfutze’s findings suggest that migrants, via cash transfers and social networks, play a role in
promoting electoral competition and “the improvement of democratic institutions at the local
level” (174). Pfutze work is supported by Chauvet and Mercier’s research in the West-African
nation of Mali, which demonstrates that migrants frequently trigger “transfers of political
norms” and in this manner contribute to higher participation rates in local elections (2011: 29).
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On a similar note, Batista and Vicente (2010) document evidence in Cape Verde that suggests
that return migrants have a positive effect on the demand for political accountability. Like
Chauvet and Mercier, they note that this effect is particularly evident among migrants who have
lived in countries with relatively better governance (3). Related to this, Rother’s work in the
Philippines demonstrates that the effect of return migrants on local politics is often dependent
on the country in which migrants resided in abroad. This finding leads the author to the
conclusion that “it [is] clear that migrants are a worthwhile factor to include in the research on
external factors of democratisation, diffusion, democratic consolidation and diffuse support for
democracies” (2009: 274).
Regarding migrant political participation, in an article titled “Migrant Political
Transnationalism and the Practice of Democracy” authors Itzigsohn and Villacres (2008) discuss
the cases of the Dominican Republic and El Salvador. In the case of the Dominican Republic
they find that the extension of the vote to Dominicans living in the U.S. added a transnational
dynamic to the country’s most recent presidential election. Nonetheless, they discover that
participation levels were lower among diaspora citizens than those living on the island. This
outcome is not particularly surprising but it is important in that it reveals a certain degree of civic
attrition among diaspora communities. It is undoubtedly for this reason that governments with
large migrant communities abroad feel the necessity to recreate a sense of duty to the
motherland via expensive outreach campaigns abroad. Mexico, for example, spends a great deal
of money every year in sending politicians and government officials to regions of the U.S. with
large Mexican-American communities. In the case of El Salvador, Itzigsohn and Villacres
analyze the role of the remittance-matching program Unidos por la Solidaridad in promoting
community development and democratic practices. Their research reveals that while the
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program has promoted relatively large development projects in communities across El Salvador,
it has failed to institutionalize democratic practices. In particular, they find that migrants and
state officials often dominate the discussion and implementation of projects, thus compromising
the participation of community members in the projects. Similar critiques have been made of the
program 3x1 para migrantes in Mexico (Fernández de Castro et al. 2006). Specifically, Aparicio
and Meseguer (2009, 2011) find that in Guanajuato, and PAN dominated states in general,
“…the 3 x 1 Program is being used as a political instrument to reward high-migration
strongholds of the federal ruling party, PAN” (2011:30).
Taken together, the aforementioned research suggests that migrants may play a role in
stimulating both economic development as well as political change within migrant-sending
regions. This potential is particularly evident in the case of the program 3x1 para migrantes. Still,
as Aparicio and Meseguer reveal, much depends on precisely how practices within the 3x1
program actually intersect with politics and development outcomes “on the ground” in Mexico.
In what remains of this chapter I hope to provide a more nuanced depiction of this process in
the case of Guanajuato.
Data and Methodology
Table 4.1 illustrates the panel data used in this chapter. As the far right column indicates,
data was collected from a variety of sources. The principal variable of interest, 3x1 investments,
is based on program investment patterns logged by SEDESHU. Investments are recorded for
each contributing party, including: migrants and the federal, state and municipal levels of
government. Based on this information I create the dependent variables: 3x1 Ratio and 3x1 per
Capita. The variable 3x1 Ratio is simply the sum of government contributions made towards
projects within a given municipio divided by migrant contributions. In theory this ratio should
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always be three but as I demonstrate below, in practice the ratio varies a great deal from year to
year and municipio to municipio. In addition, to account for population differences across municipios,
census data was gathered from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).17
This information is used to create the variable 3x1 per capita, which is the total amount of 3x1
investments made in each respective municipio divided by the municipio’s population. Similar to
GDP per capita, 3x1 per Capita provides a more accurate means of comparing 3x1 investments
across municipios. Finally, the dependent variables Electoral Participation and Electoral Competition are
generated in order to evaluate the relationship between 3x1 investments and election trends.
Data for these two variables come from the organization Proposals to Change Mexico (CIDAC)
and the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Electoral participation is simply a measure of the
percentage of eligible voters that turn out to vote in elections. In Mexico elections are held every
three years and therefore for the period 2002 to 2011 there are only data points for the years
2003, 2006 and 2009. Electoral competition, in turn, is measured by the Nb index for party
competition, which was designed by Dunleavy and Boucek in 2003.18
The Nb index is expressed in the following manner:
(
∑

)

where Vi denotes the percentage share of the votes going to each competing party i, and the
notation above and below the summation sign shows that it covers all parties from the largest
(V1) to the smallest (Vx). The index also includes a basic measure of party predominance (1/V 1),

Census data is available for the years 2000 and 2010. Statistic estimation is used to fill in missing variables.
The Nb index is one of many indexes currently in use in the social sciences. In the case of Mexico, the Molinar
index is most commonly used by the Mexican government to measure electoral competition. Still, given the context
of this study, I believe that the Nb index provides the least idiosyncratic measure of electoral competition. For a full
description of the advantages of the Nb index, please see Patrick Dunleavy and Françoise Boucek’s 2003 article,
“Contructing the Number of Parites” published in Party Politics, 9(3) pp. 291–315.
17
18
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which lowers maximum scores and produces an index that is ready for interpretation. Thus, Nb
is equal to one divided by the sum of the squared decimal shares of the vote for (or seats won
by) each party plus one divided by the decimal share of the vote captured by the winning party
times one-half (Dunleavy and Boucek 2003: 293, 303). The Nb index is calculable for all of
Guanajuato’s municipios during the period 2002-2011, and most importantly, it provides a reliable
measure for democracy’s most basic yardstick: competitive elections. An example helps clarify
the utility of the Nb index.
In 2009 in the municipio of Abasolo PRI won the municipal presidency with 54 percent of
the vote. The closest competitor was PAN, which finished with 36 percent of the vote, followed
by PRD with 3 percent, CONV with 2 percent, PT with 2 percent and NA with 1 percent. The
remaining 2 percent of the vote was annulled. Thus, for the 2009 election cycle, Abasolo’s Nb
score is equal to 2.11 or
(

)

In comparison, in the same election PAN won the municipio of Xichú with 38.9 percent of the
vote. PRI finished a very close second with 38.7 percent and PRD captured 22 percent of the
vote. Just under 1 percent of the final vote was annulled. Xichú’s Nb index score for 2009 is
equal to 2.79 or
(

)

As the case of Abosolo and Xichú illustrate, the Nb index assigns a higher score to municipios
that have relatively more competition between parties. Moreover, the formula accounts for
municipios that have overwhelmingly dominant parties by assigning them relatively lower index
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scores. For example, in the case of Abosolo only two competing parties had a chance at winning
the municipal presidency, whereas in Xichú three parties strongly competed for the municipal
office.
Table 4.1 Definitions and Description of Variables Included in Regression Analysis
Variable
Total 3x11
3x1 Ratio
3x1 per Capita
Electoral Part.2
Electoral Competition
% Homes Remittances3
% Homes Return Migrants
% Homes Migrants
Municipal Party
Municipal Population (rural = 1;
urban = 0)
Election Year (2003, 2006, 2009)
Human Development Index (HDI)
Public Work Spending per Capita

Mean
2,230,387
3.02
42.68
51.34
2.98
13.29
4.67
10.63
.39
.45

S.D.
3,904,751
.91
74.
7.21
.87
6.69
2.33
5.34
.48
.49

Data Source
SEDESHU
SEDESHU
SEDESHU; INEGI
CIDAC; IFE
CIDAC; IFE
CONAPO
CONAPO
CONAPO
CIDAC
INEGI

-.77
923.96

-.05
1031.09

IFE
INEGI; SNIM
SNIM; INEGI

Source: CIDAC, CONAPO, IFE, INEGI, SEDESHU and SNIM.
1Figures in Mexican Pesos.
2Total 3x1, 3x1 Ratio, 3x1 per Capita, Municipal Party, Rural-Urban and Public Work Spending per Capita reported
for years 2000-2011.
3Electoral participation and Electoral Competition reported for year 2003, 2006 and 2009.
4% Home Remittances, % Homes Return Migrants and Social Marginalization reported for years 2000, 2005 and
2010. Statistical estimation used to fill in missing variables.

Concerning independent variables, the variable % Homes Remittances represents the
percentage of homes in a given municipio that receive migrant remittances. In turn, the variable %
of Homes Return Migrants measures the percentage of homes that had a migrant that returned to
Mexico during the last census and stayed. The variable % Homes Migrants measures the
percentage of homes with migrants for each respective municipio. Data for these variables was
collected from the National Population Council (CONAPO). In addition, the independent
variable Municipal Party is created to account for political party differences across municipios and as
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means of analyzing potential relationships between political parties and 3x1 investment patterns.
The variable is constructed as a dummy variable, such that PAN = 0 and other parties = 1. This
variable is coded as a dummy due to the fact that during the period under analysis PAN
controlled over 60 percent of the state’s municipal presidencies. PRI, in turn, controlled nearly
30 percent. Moreover, my main interest is in this particular variable is in measuring the degree to
which PAN has controlled 3x1 projects over the program’s first ten years. With this purpose in
mind, a dummy variable will lend to easier interpretation of the regression coefficients. The
coding of this variable is such that each municipio is assigned the party that corresponds to its
municipal president during the year in question. The variable is calculated based on information
provided by CIDAC. The variable Rural-Urban is generated in order to control for population
differences across municipios. A municipio was marked as “rural” if the total population is less than
50,000 inhabitants and “urban” if the population is greater than 50,000. The variable Election
Year is a dummy variable (1 = election year; 0 = non-election year) that allows for the evaluation
of any potential relationship between 3x1 investment patterns and election cycles.19 The variable
Human Development Index (HDI) is included in order to examine the degree to which 3x1
investments are allocated based on levels of municipal development. The variable ranges from 0
to 1, such that the least developed municipios fall closer to 0 and the most developed municipios fall
closer to 1. (For a more in-depth introduction to the individual measures included in this index
please see Annex 8.) Data for this variable comes from the National System of Municipal
Information (SNIM) and INEGI. Finally, in order to control for municipal spending on public
works projects, the variable Public Work Spending per Capita is included. This variable measures the
amount of money municipios spend per capita on public works projects in a given year. Data for

19During

the period 2002-2011 elections fell in the years 2003, 2006 and 2009.
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this variable comes from SNIM and INEGI. Taken together, the descriptive statistics outlined in
Table 4.1 suggest several associations of interest. (For additional descriptive statistics concerning
this section please see Appendices 1-6.) In the pages that follow I present a series of graphs and
tables that examine these variables in more detail. I begin by taking a closer look at 3x1
investments in relation to overall household remittances.
Descriptive Statistics of 3x1 Investment Patterns
Graph 4.1 illustrates household remittances in Mexico and Guanajuato alongside 3x1
investments in Guanajuato since 2002. Total remittances in Mexico have gone up considerably
over the last ten years. In turn, household remittances in Guanajuato have experienced a more
moderate increase. Still, during this period, on average the state of Guanajuato received 9
percent of the total remittances flowing into Mexico, second only to the state of Michoacán.
Finally, as is evident, 3x1 investments make up a very small percentage of total remittances in
Guanajuato. In fact, 3x1 transfers in Guanajuato—including government contributions—
represent less than 1 percent of total remittances across the state. Nonetheless, as I explain
below, the importance of 3x1 investments across Guanajuato should not be taken lightly.
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Graph 4.1 3x1 Investments Compared with Household Remittances
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Source: Banco del Mexico; Totals are reported in U.S dollars. US$1=12.76 Pesos.
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Graph 4.1 from above may leave the reader with the impression that 3x1 investments are
so miniscule that they could hardly be thought to have an impact on development in the state of
Guanajuato. However, if one considers 3x1 investments in relation to municipal budgets, the
program’s overall impact becomes more tangible. Graph 4.2 displays the ratio between 3x1 per
capita and public works spending per capita for the period 2002 to 2010 in the state of
Guanajuato. Given the fact that the overwhelming majority of 3x1 projects are dedicated to
public works projects, this becomes a very useful comparison. As the reader can see, the ratio
changes from year to year, ranging from less than five percent to over twenty percent. For
example, in 2007 3x1 projects comprised over twenty percent of municipal funds allotted to
public works projects across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios. With this in mind, it becomes easy to
comprehend the potential impact of 3x1 investments in municipios that have relatively low
budgets to begin with. For a political leader, 3x1 funds may represent the margin of flexibility to
be able to show impact and initiative to their constituents. This is particularly likely for leaders
operating in rural, less developed municipios. In turn, from the community’s standpoint, the 3x1
framework presents local citizens with an opportunity to participate in the allocation of public
resources and thus a way to gain leverage over their own economic and social situation.
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Table 4.2 compares remittances at the national and state level with 3x1 investments in
Guanajuato over the period 2002-2011. As is evident, 3x1 investments have increased rapidly
over the program’s first ten years of operation. As of 2011, program investments in Guanajuato
were up 422 percent from the program’s inaugural year in 2002. In fact, 3x1 investments in
Guanajuato have increased at a faster rate than both overall household remittances flowing into
Mexico (131 percent) and Guanajuato (157 percent), respectively.
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Table 4.2 Total Remittances Compared with 3x1 Investments (U.S. dollars)
Year

National
(Remittances)

Guanajuato
(Remittances)

Guanajuato
(Total 3x1)

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total

9,814,000,000
13,396,000,000
16,730,000,000
20,284,000,000
25,567,000,000
26,069,000,000
25,137,000,000
21,181,000,000
21,271,000,000
22,730,000,000
202,179,000,000

834,190,000
1,152,056,000
1,542,506,000
1,736,310,400
2,278,019,700
2,393,134,200
2,317,631,400
1,933,825,300
1,978,203,000
2,147,985,000
18,313,861,000

2,651,464
2,839,425
3,458,140
8,360,074
4,967,822
6,462,719
11,721,445
11,894,187
11,735,866
13,853,577
77,944,719

Source: Banco de Mexico; SEDESOL. Figures converted to U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of US$1=12.76
Pesos.

A deeper understanding of the rapid expansion of the 3x1 program over the last decade
requires one to analyze the factors that have underpinned the programs growth. A natural
starting point for this analysis is to take a closer look at the individual parties contributing to 3x1
projects. In theory, the 3x1 para migrantes program implies that the federal, state and municipal
branches of government each contribute equal amounts to development projects initiated by
migrants. Therefore, by default, one would expect that 3x1 investments across municipios reflect a
consistent investment ratio between the government and migrants of three to one. However, as
Graph 4.3 illustrates, 3x1 contributions vary a great deal across the four participating entities.
For example, as Graph 4.3 reveals, in 2002 the state and municipal branches of government
contributed far more to 3x1 projects than migrants. The federal government, in turn,
contributed less than each of its counterparts. Interestingly, this pattern shifts when we consider
3x1 investments from 2003, an electoral year. As the graph reveals, in 2003 the state contributed
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the most to 3x1 projects, followed by individual municipios, migrants and the federal government,
respectively. Similar irregularities are evident in subsequent years. The unequal investment trends
illustrated in Graph 4.3 suggest that project funding may be defined by factors other than the
stipulations outlined in the 3x1 program’s bylaws. This pattern coincides with previous research
on the 3x1 program that concludes that program investments are driven by local factors such as
political ambitions (Aparicio and Meseguer 2011).
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To be sure, multiple factors likely influence the fluctuation of 3x1 investments from year
to year. However, as the cases studies outlined in Chapter 3 reveal, two aspects appear to stand
out: (1) migrant networks and (2) political incentives.
Concerning migrants networks, it is evident the individuals that are most active in
communal development are those who return frequently to their hometowns and maintain close
ties with friends and family in Mexico. Pedro, for example, pointed out that when he began
planning the first 3x1 project it was very difficult to raise money. When I inquired as to why, he
said that there were two main barriers that he faced. First, many of his fellow migrants did not
trust that he would follow through with the project. Second, he found that many of his fellow
paisanos did not return frequently enough to Ojo de Agua to care about the town’s future. For
these reasons, the majority of donations for the first project were collected from people he or his
family knew well and from those that returned frequently to his hometown. In contrast, as Pedro
noted, subsequent projects were far easier to organize due to the fact that potential donors now
trusted him with their money and thus they were more willing to contribute to future
development projects. In this sense, the strength of transnational social networks appears to play
a key role in explaining where projects arise and whether or not subsequent projects materialize.
Second, regarding political incentives, in each of the three cases outlined in Chapter 3 the state
was the party that initiated contact with the migrants and not the other way around. In fact, in
the case of Ojo de Agua, Pedro initially expressed a great deal of mistrust in the government.
Similarly, in the case of El Timbinal, Don Angel was quite clear in pointing out that the
government reached out to him and that at no point did he search out assistance from the state.
It appears, thus, that political incentives may also play an important role in driving 3x1
investment patterns.
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Although limited to specific experiences, the aforementioned cases suggest that migrant
social networks and state outreach play a fundamental role in dictating the timing and scope of
3x1 para migrantes projects in Guanajuato. In the space that follows I take a closer look at both
of these factors.
One way to measure for the strength of migrant social networks is through the
percentage of return migrants in a given municipio. Return migrants do not necessarily imply
organization amongst migrants; however, my fieldwork indicates that they are a strong proxy for
the strength of transnational migrants networks. In each of the migrant hometowns I visited I
found that 3x1 projects hinged in part on the synergy between migrants in the U.S. and former
migrants currently residing in Mexico. To this end, it is also worth pointing out that state
officials that I interviewed also brought up the importance of return migrants, suggesting that
former migrants brought back ideas from the U.S. about what would help their town develop.
Moreover, in the cases I was able to observe it was evident that return migrants frequently
participated in the 3x1 project planning committees and in this respect assisted a great deal in
targeting projects towards the particular needs of their communities. Graph 4.4 provides a visual
depiction of this transnational link. As is evident, 3x1 per capita is highest in municipios with
relatively more return migrants. This trend is apparent in urban and rural municipios alike but it is
particular apparent in the latter. This finding suggests that return migrants may in fact play an
important role in the 3x1 program. It also implies, however, that the program has the potential
to bring migrants back into the political fold by involving them in local development projects. (I
address both of these issues at length in the discussion section of this chapter.)
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Graph 4.4 % of Homes with Return Migrants by 3x1 Investments

Source: Author; data from SEDESOL, CONAPO.

As mentioned above, in addition to migrant networks, it is apparent that political
incentives may also play a key role in the timing of 3x1 investments. Related to this, Graph 4.5
illustrates the growth of total 3x1 investments during the program’s first ten years in the state of
Guanajuato. The percentage increase or decrease in program investments relative to the previous
year is also reported. As the reader will note, program investments tended to increase the most
in the pre-electoral years 2005, 2008 and 2011. These trends suggest that the timing of 3x1
investments may in part be determined by electoral cycles. (For more in-depth breakdown of
3x1 investment patterns by year and contributing party please see Appendix 2.)
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Graph 4.5 Total 3x1 Investments 2002-2011 (in millions of pesos)

Source: SEDESOL.
Note: Totals are reported in Mexican pesos. US$1=12.76 Pesos.
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The suggestion that 3x1 investments are strategically planned to coincide with preelection years implies that government officials may intentionally delay 3x1 investments during
their first two years of office in order to stack as many projects as possible in their third and final
year in office. In principle, this would bode particularly well for the municipal president’s party,
which could use recently christened 3x1 projects as evidence of their commitment to
constituents.20
If political objectives play a role in determining 3x1 investment patterns across municipios
in Guanajuato one might wonder whether or not any particular party is favored in the process.
For example, in an early analysis of the 3x1 program Aparicio and Meseguer concluded that
from 2002 through 2006 “municipalities ruled by the PAN are indeed more likely to participate
in the program” (2009:17). However, the evidence outlined in Table 4.3 refutes this notion. The
table depicts mean 3x1 investments across municipios by ruling political party. In addition, in
parenthesis the table reports 3x1 per capita for each fiscal year. For the period 2002-2011
average 3x1 investments and 3x1 per capita were substantially higher in the pre-election years
2005, 2008 and 2011. This pattern is evident for all parties. Still, for this particular period, there
is little evidence to support the hypothesis that the leading political party in the state, PAN, was
favored in the disbursement of 3x1 funds. For example, relative to Guanajuato’s second
principal party, PRI, during this period the PAN logged lower average 3x1 investments
(2,082,219 pesos) and a lower 3x1 per capita (39). On the other hand, parvenu parties averaged
relatively higher 3x1 investments and 3x1 per capita levels. Still, it is important to keep in mind
20Here

it is important to note that in Mexico politicians’ ultimate allegiance pertains to their party. In fact, it is
common knowledge in Mexico that a politician’s career depends in large part on his or her devotion to the party
and thus to do well by the party is to do well by ones self. This is particularly true in the case of municipal
presidents who cannot be elected to consecutive terms and thus rely on the structure of the party to secure the
future of their career. For more information regarding the political culture of Mexican politics please see: Wayne A.
Cornelius and A. L. Craig book The Mexican political system in transition (1991). Specifically, see Chapter 4: Political
Structure and Institutions and Chapter 8: Political Culture and Socialization.
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that PAN and PRI captured the vast majority of municipal presidencies during this period and
thus the results for these two parties best reflect general investment trends. Taken together,
Table 4.3 demonstrates that while there is initial evidence that the 3x1 program may be
employed as a means of rounding up electoral support leading into election years, it does not
appear that any one party has a monopoly over such practices.
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Table 4.3 Average 3x1 Investments 2002-2011 by Political Party of Municipal President

Party

2002

Average 3x1 Investment by Year (Average 3x1 per Capita in Parenthesis)
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

2011

Total

PAN

1,077,387
(18)

1,095,676
(21)

1,223,173
(24)

2,649,191
(45)

1,227,148
(27)

1,776,201
(28)

3,739,155
(78)

2,979,497
(58)

2,560,921
(48)

2,174,252
(40)

2,082,219
(39)

PRI

430,590
(22)

1,573,945
(12)

938,180
(40)

2,660,877
(97)

333,477
(5)

1,653,568
(27)

2,551,057
(44)

3,706,097
(56)

3,694,474
(79)

6,427,314
(86)

2,318,407
(48)

PRD

100,000
(1)

70,996
(.53)

687,313
(11)

3,365,105
(513)

1,192,000
(181)

1,514,489
(229)

5,998,463
(47)

12,200,000
(88)

703,155
(6)

2,408,992
(65)

1,356,790
(29)

1,729,239
(27)

4,706,546
(80)

6,557,872
(105)

4,254,391
(63)

286,032
(5)

10,200,000
(144)

12,600,000
(176)

4,035,994
(63)

695,754
(10)

588,601
(8)

1,244,384
(18)

PVEM

PCD

PT

596,155
(28)

807,662
(16)

441,618
(13)

560,656
(28)

1,233,036
(61)
174,133
(7)
3,179,841
(57)

CONV

2,479,394
(122)

777,407
865,315
1,028,833
2,530,216
1,337,761
1,852,212
3,278,136
3347030
3,461,936
(18)
(17)
(25)
(59)
(37)
(33)
(68)
(57)
(55)
Source: Author, with data from SEDESOL and CIDAC.
Note: Pre-election years highlighted in gray; figures in parenthesis represent the total number of projects for each party for that particular year. PC,
PDM and PARM did not carry out any 3x1 projects during the period 2002-2011.

Avg
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673,529
(32)
58,044
(2)
2,168,876
(45)

Another way of looking at program investments is by tabulating the percentage of 3x1
projects controlled by each respective party during the period 2002-2011. Table 4.4 displays the
percentage of municipios headed by each respective party. In addition, in parenthesis, each
municipio’s respective percentage of 3x1 projects is listed. In 2011, PAN held 61 percent of the
state’s municipios. In turn, 3x1 projects carried out in PAN-headed municipios represented only 44
percent of the 3x1 program’s total projects for the fiscal year 2011. In comparison, in the same
year PRI held 28 percent of the state’s municipios and those municipios received 50 percent of all
3x1 projects in 2011. In all, from 2002 to 2011, on average PAN governed 61 percent of the
state’s municipios and received 64 percent of all 3x1 projects. In turn, PRI held an average of 27
percent of municipal presidencies and those municipios received an average of 26 percent of all
3x1 projects. In turn, PRD held an average of 5 percent of municipal presidencies but only
received an average of 2 percent of all 3x1 projects for the period. PVEM, on the other hand,
held 3 percent of municipal presidencies but those municipios received 5 percent of all 3x1
projects. Thus, although year-to-year patterns fluctuate considerably, if we aggregate data over
the first ten years of the 3x1 program there is a clear pattern between the percentage of
municipal presidencies held by each party and the number of 3x1 projects carried out in each
party’s respective municipios. Put simply, overall, there appears to be little association between any
one particular party and 3x1 investment patterns. This finding contrasts with Aparicio and
Meseguer, who contend that in Guanajuato, and PAN dominated states in general, “…the 3 x 1
Program is being used as a political instrument to reward high-migration strongholds of the
federal ruling party, PAN” (2011:30). Rather, these results, which benefit from more program
years and thus data points, demonstrate that over the first ten years of the program, all municipios,
regardless of partisanship, were able to channel investment projects through the 3x1 program.
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Thus, although there appears to be a clear effort by all parties to increase 3x1 investments in preelection years, at this point there is no clear evidence suggesting that the 3x1 program is stacked
in favor of one party or another.
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Table 4.4 Comparison of Respective Party’s % of 3x1 Projects With % of Municipal Presidencies
Party’s Percentage of Municipal Presidencies (total % of 3x1 projects in parentheses)
2002
58%
(79%)

2003
52%
(61%)

2004
52%
(50%)

2005
52%
(52%)

2006
74%
(48%)

2007
74%
(76%)

2008
74%
(86%)

2009
61%
(87%)

2010
61%
(52%)

2011
61%
(44%)

Total
61%
(64%)

PRI

30%
(18%)

30%
(28%)

30%
(33%)

30%
(33%)

20%
(37%)

20%
(11%)

20%
(13%)

28%
(1%)

28%
(38%)

28%
(50%)

27%
(26%)

PRD

7%
(2%)

7%
(2%)

7%
(2%)

7%
(2%)

2%
(2%)

2%
(5%)

2%
(1%)

4%
(.5%)

4%
(6%)

4%
(1%)

5%
(2%)

4%

4%
(15%)

4%
(7%)

4%
(9.3%)

4%
(9%)

4%
(.4%)

2%
(3%)

2%

2%
(2%)

3%
(5%)

87

102

240

139

168

221

179

144

175

1554

PAN

PVEM
Total
Projects

99

Source: Author, with data from SEDESOL and CIDAC.
Note: Pre-election years highlighted in gray; figures in parenthesis represent the total percentage of projects for each party for that particular year.
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To a certain degree, the previous findings show the 3x1 program in a favorable light
in so much that they suggest that the state government, which has been run by a PAN
governor for the whole existence of the 3x1 program, does not distribute 3x1 resources in a
way that overtly favors municipios run by PAN presidents. Still, the fact that the 3x1 program
clearly stacks development projects such that more projects are carried out in pre-election
years demonstrates that government officials wield control over the timing of development
projects run through the program. This finding does not necessarily mean that 3x1
investments have a negative impact on development outcomes nor does it conclusively
illustrate mechanisms of political patronage. However, it does draw into question the degree
to which 3x1 investment decisions are made based on local demand and development needs
alone.
The descriptive statistics presented above suggest a number of hypotheses worth
submitting to further scrutiny:
1) 3x1 investments are more elevated in municipios with relatively higher levels of
household remittances.
i.

This hypothesis relates to the expectation that 3x1 projects are more likely to
emerge in areas where migrants already demonstrate a high level of
commitment to their friends and family in the form of cash transfers.

2) 3x1 investments will share a positive relationship with return migrants.
i.

It is expected that migrants that have returned from the U.S. to live in
Mexico may potentially improve communication between migrants in the
U.S. and hometown communities. These transnational links, in turn, would
be expected to facilitate 3x1 projects.

3) 3x1 investments will be higher in those municipios that are most affected by migration.
i.

This expectation relates to the fact that projects are at least partially driven by
migrants, and therefore, one would expect that the majority of 3x1
investments would take place in municipios reporting relatively high levels of
emigration.
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4) All things being equal, more 3x1 investments will be made in the least developed
municipios.
i.

This hypothesis addresses the explicit goal of the 3x1 program to target the
state’s most marginalized communities and municipios. Moreover, migrants
have traditionally emerged from underdeveloped, rural areas and thus it is
expected that these same regions would be the most likely to carry out 3x1
projects.

5) 3x1 investments are at least in part influenced by election cycles, such that
substantially more projects are funded in pre-election years.21
i.

In theory 3x1 investments are a product of local demand within migrant
hometown communities. That said, given the high level of state participation
in this particular program it is also expected that investment trends will share
a relationship with local election cycles. This hypothesis is grounded in the
expectation that political parties may see the 3x1 program as a means
through which to garner political support.

6) 3x1 investments share a positive relationship with electoral participation.
i.

Over the last ten years 3x1 investments have come to represent an important
source of funding for local infrastructure projects in the state of Guanajuato,
leading to visible development gains in participating municipios. Moreover, the
3x1 program provides local citizens with an avenue through which to
participate in the distribution of public resources. Given this, one might
expect that civic participation in elections would increase in municipios with
more 3x1 projects.

7) 3x1 investments at first contribute to political competition amongst parties but in
time, as development improves, contribute to political consolidation.
i.

This hypothesis is grounded in the expectation that the opportunity to
participate in the distribution of public resources will at first incite political
alternatives in the form of parvenu parties. Thus, electoral competition
between parties is expected to first increase before eventually dropping off as
meaningful development takes place and successful parties establish stable
constituencies. Given this, it is expected that the relationship between 3x1
investments and electoral competition will be quadratic.

21From

a political standpoint this tendency would be ideal due to the fact that municipal elections fall every
three years. Thus, the parties of municipal presidents would have the most to gain from investments made in
the year prior to the election itself. Given that elections are held in July in Mexico, this would assure that the
municipal president currently in office would be able to inaugurate any remaining projects prior to the election
the following year.
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8) No one political party shares a competitive advantage over the distribution of 3x1
project funds.
i.

This hypothesis challenges the notion the 3x1 program is stacked in favor of
the state’s dominant party, PAN. Rather, it is expected that in practice the
3x1 framework is impartial to individual political parties.

In the space that follows I submit the aforementioned hypotheses to the rigor of
multiple regression analysis:
Regression Analysis on Select Dependent Variables
In this section I examine 3x1 investments via multiple regression analysis. The data
set used here, which I described at length above, consists of multiple observations across
Guanajuato’s 46 municipalities at ten distinct points in time (2002-2011). Specifically, I use
fixed effects models to estimate the effect of independent variables on select dependent
variables. In order to evaluate model-data compatibility I run a Hausman test for each
individual regression model presented in this study. The Hausman test weights the preferred
model, random effects (RE), against the alternative model, fixed effects (FE). The test
analyzes the degree to which unique errors (UI) correlate with the individual regressors. The
null hypothesis is that UI are uncorrelated with independent variables. Concerning the
present study, the Huasman test indicates that FE is the best model for my data, thus
throughout this study I run regressions exclusively in FE. As a model, FE treats explanatory
variables as if they were non-random and imposes time-independent effects for each
measure that could potentially correlate with the regressors. Related to this, FE models aid in
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in panel data, especially when observations are
constant over time (Greene 2000:576). Put simply, fixed effects models are most useful
when one suspects that dependent variables are associated with independent variables that
are not observable but that correlate with observed explanatory variables. When such
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omitted variables are consistent over time, which they are here, fixed effects models allow
for a consistent estimate of the effect of observed independent variables.
Previous researchers of the 3x1 program (Aparicio and Meseguer 2011) use total 3x1
investments in their quantitative analysis. I expand on this work by employing three distinct
measures of 3x1 investments, including: total 3x1 investment amounts, 3x1 per capita and
3x1 ratio. Each respective measure allows for a slightly distinct assessment of the program.
Regression on total 3x1 investments, for example, provides the reader with a more intuitive
means through which to consider the relative importance of regression coefficients. 3x1 per
capita, in turn, is a better measure than total investment logs to compare across municipios due
to the fact that it takes into consideration the population size of individual municipios. Finally,
the 3x1 ratio allows for the reader to gauge the conditions under which migrants receive
more or less support from the government. In general, I believe that when taken together
these three measures provide a more complete understanding of the 3x1 program. It is for
that reason that I include each of them in the analysis that follows.
Table 4.5 analyzes the impact of select independent variables on total 3x1
investments. χ2 tests show that regressions are significant across all four models. I run fixedeffects, least squares estimations in order to determine the effect of a number of variables
upon total 3x1 investments across 46 municipios in Guanajuato, Mexico. The model can be
specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. The
effects, and

terms are the municipios fixed

is the error term. The dependent variable is Total 3x1, and the vector

includes the independent variables discussed below.
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The coefficient for % Homes with remittances is significant in models II, III and IV,
indicating that the percentage of homes receiving migrant remittances has a significant and
positive effect on the total amount of 3x1 investments in a given municipio. In fact, for every
one percent increase in household remittances, total municipal 3x1 investments increase
$563,813 pesos or roughly $44,185 U.S. dollars. This finding is to be expected given the fact
that one would anticipate 3x1 investments to increase in municipios with relatively higher rates
of remittances. The percentage of return migrants in a given municipio also has a strong
positive effect on 3x1 investments, such that for every one percent increase in return
migrants 3x1 investments rise $1,289,812 pesos or roughly $101,082 U.S. dollars. This
discovery, considered alongside the previous finding, suggests that transnational social
networks play a more important role in underpinning 3x1 investments than raw remittances
alone. In contrast, the percentage of migrants living in a given municipio shares a strong
negative relationship with 3x1 per capita, such that for every one percent increase in this
variable 3x1 per capita falls by 5,660,144 pesos or 443,584 U.S. dollars. This results likely
stems from the fact that at early stages of migration individuals who have left to the U.S. lack
the capital necessary to participate in 3x1 projects. In addition, all models demonstrate the
importance of election cycles in determining the timing of 3x1 investments. As model V
shows, for example, in pre-election years the total amount of 3x1 investments increases a
little more than $834,981 pesos or roughly $65,437 U.S. dollars. This finding implies that for
any given municipio investments made through the 3x1 program may at least partially hinge
on the preferences of the party currently occupying the municipal presidency. That said, the
variable for political party does not report significance in any of the four models outlined
below, thus indicating that no one political party shares any inherent advantage in the 3x1
framework.
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The variables HDI and HDI Squared are also included to control for shifts in 3x1
investments across different levels of development. As model V indicates, 3x1 investments
appear to initially fall in municipios with low levels of development before increasing
substantially in municipios with relatively better human development levels. A thorough review
of descriptive data indicates that investment trends are slightly bimodal with modes at HDI
levels of .65 and .8, respectively. The twin-peak distribution of 3x1 projects implies that
investments are less common in extremely marginalized rural municipios as well as in highly
developed urban municipios. Put differently, 3x1 investments are most prevalent in more
developed rural municipios as well as less developed urban municipios. Finally, a variable for
municipal population is included in order to control for population differences across
municipios. The variable indicates that 3x1 capita increases substantially in rural municipios
(population < 50,000) relative to urban municipios (population > 50,000).
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Table 4.5 Regression Analysis of 3x1 Total (All Parties)
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

3x1 Total

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

% Homes with
remittances
(1
year lag)

604207.5***

552231.6***

539376.2***

563813.3***

(121015.9)

(126219.8)

(128042.1)

(563813.3)

% Homes with
return migrants
(1 year lag)

1396083***

1529154***

1435859***

1289812***

(168031.6)

(181073.8)

(272982.4)

(268858.2)

% Homes with
Migrants (1 year
lag)

-6823922 ***

-6671432***

-6428408***

-5660144***

(1036647)

(1093151)

(1185825)

(1191335)

Election Year (1
year lead)

--

768750.3**

783971**

834981.8**

(--)

(303497.2)

(304875.3)

(297996.2)

--

--

198927.8 (342474.3)

(--)

(--)

214909.3
(349179.4)

--

--

-6001545

-375000000***

(--)

(--)

(11800000)

(107000000)

--

--

--

253000000***

(--)

(--)

(--)

(69800000)

--

--

--

5066465

(--)

(--)

(--)

(1988231)

-701840.2

-4123913***

-4221679***

-131000000***

(1186580)

(1261126)

(1272977)

(40900000)

.06

.17

.18

.22

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

387

387

387

387

Municipal Party
(1 year lag)
HDI

HDI Squared

Municipal
Population (rural
= 1; urban = 0)
Constant

R2
Prob. > χ2
N

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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Regarding the aforementioned findings, the distribution of 3x1 investments across
municipios likely relates to two factors: (1) migrant demand for projects and (2) government
planning. Regarding the former, in general migrants participating in the 3x1 program tend to be
well-established individuals who have been in the U.S. for decades. Younger immigrants, on the
other hand, lack the economic stability to participate in the program. This helps explain the
negative relationship between migration levels and 3x1 investments. That is, 3x1 projects are
likely most prevalent today in the very regions where migration levels were highest twenty to
thirty years ago. 22 In turn, in those areas where migration levels are currently highest it is
probable that those who have left have done so in recent years and thus still lack economic
stability in the U.S. This, in turn, would reduce the likelihood of regions currently experiencing
high migration from participating in the 3x1 program. Concerning the latter, government
planners are likely to favor relatively more sustainable projects, thus favoring areas in which
development shows signs of long term potential. Thus, from a strictly practical standpoint, it
would make little sense to pour resources into Guanajuato’s most underdeveloped regions.
Given these two elements, the results reported in Table 4.5 are not particularly surprising.
Nonetheless, the findings are of interest because they directly contradict the state’s claim to
channel 3x1 investments towards its most marginalized municipios. If nothing else, this reveals the
fact that the way in which the state “markets” the program may not necessarily correspond to
investment trends in practice.
Table 4.6 analyzes the impact of select independent variables on 3x1 per capita. Again,
χ2 tests show that regressions are significant across all four models. I run fixed-effects, least

22This

pattern relates to the fact that in general migrants to the U.S. do not emerge from the most marginalized
regions but rather they tend to come from areas that are slightly better off. This tendency results from the fact that
in order to migrate in the first place an individual needs to be able to absorb the initial costs of travel to the U.S. For
Mexico’s most marginalized citizens these costs often prohibit international migration altogether.
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squares estimations as a means of measuring the effect of select independent variables on 3x1
per capita across 46 municipios in Guanajuato, Mexico. The model can be specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. The
and

terms are the municipios fixed effects

is the error term. The dependent variable is 3x1 per capita, and the vector

includes the

same independent variables outlined in the first column of Table 4.6.
The models in Table 4.6 report relatively similar findings to those outlined in Table 3.6.
That said, 3x1 per capita is a more suitable measure for comparing 3x1 investment trends across
municipios due to the fact that it controls for population differences from municipio to municipio.
Regarding Table 4.6, as is evident in model I, the percentage of households receiving remittances
has a positive effect on 3x1 per capita, implying that as the percentage of homes receiving
remittances in a given municipio increases, 3x1 per capita in the ensuing year also increases. This
relationship maintains as additional independent variables are added in models II, III and IV.
Regarding the full model, regression results indicate that for every ten percent increase in
household remittances, 3x1 per capita increases 175 pesos or about 14 U.S. dollars. This finding
suggests that regions already receiving household remittances are more likely to participate in
3x1 projects. Still, while this finding suggests that remittances are perhaps a necessary condition
for 3x1 projects, they do not appear to be the only factors at play. With that in mind, as models
II, III and IV indicate, municipios with relatively more return migrants in the previous year report
more favorable 3x1 per capita levels. In fact, for every ten percent increase in the rate of return
migrants, 3x1 per capita increases by roughly 354 Mexican pesos or roughly 28 U.S. dollars. This
finding reaffirms the role of transnational networks in underwriting successful 3x1 development
projects. In other words, it appears that 3x1 projects are largest precisely where more migrants
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return, indicating that return migrants may play a particularly important role in brokering 3x1
investments and maintaining the transnational ties necessary to carry out development projects.
Still, as Table 4.6 reveals, the most powerful explainer of 3x1 investments is the percentage of
migrants reported at the household level in each respective municipio. Specifically, for every ten
percent increase in migrants there is a corresponding decrease in 3x1 per capita of about 1748
pesos or 137 U.S. dollars. This finding indicates that areas currently experiencing high levels of
migration are less likely to participate in the 3x1 program. As explained previously, this finding
likely relates to the nature of migration cycles in Mexico. Concerning election cycles, all other
things being equal, 3x1 per capita increases just over 18 pesos in pre-election years. In turn, the
coefficients for the variables HDI and HDI Squared reveal a similar trend to one documented in
Table 4.5. Still, neither variable is significant in the full model, indicating that HDI levels may
not be the best explainers of 3x1 investments. Finally, the variable Municipal Population is
significant, revealing that 3x1 per capita is roughly 80 pesos or 6 U.S. dollars higher in rural
municipios relative to urban municipios. This is perhaps to be expected given the fact that rural
communities tend to maintain a stronger sense of place, thus facilitating the formation of
migration clubs in the U.S. and in turn the possibility of supporting 3x1 projects back in Mexico.
Here it is worth noting that I originally ran Municipal Population as a continuous variable;
however, it did not report significance until I recoded it for rural and urban municipios. This
outcome likely relates to the fact that rural municipios are distinct in nature when compared to the
more urban areas of Guanajuato. Specifically, rural municipios tend to preserve a greater sense of
community. Given this, it is quite possible that migrants emerging form rural municipios maintain
a stronger connection with their communities, and consequently, over the years they retain a
more acute sense of duty to those they left behind.
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Table 4.6 Regression Analysis of 3x1 per Capita (All Parties)
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

% Homes with remittances (1 year
lag)

14.46***

16.85***

17.27***

17.54***

(2.24)

(2.49)

(2.51)

(2.52)

% Homes with return migrants (1
year lag)

24.86***

32.12***

36.33***

35.46***

(3.12)

(3.59)

(3.61)

(5.45)

% Homes with Migrants (1 year
lag)

-133.37***

-165.29***

-174.88***

-174.89***

(19.27)

(21.65)

(23.46)

(24.06)

--

18.44***

18.01***

18.25***

(--)

(6.02)

(6.03)

(6.02)

--

--

-1.34

-.61

(--)

(--)

(6.91)

(6.92)

--

--

-247.19

-1535.40

(--)

(--)

(232.65)

(2157.29)

--

--

--

888.72

(--)

(--)

(--)

(1409.25)

--

--

--

80.31**

(--)

(--)

(--)

(40.15)

-98.96***

-128.44***

51.89***

475.71**

(22.72)

(25.22)

(170.75)

(825.16)

387

387

387

387

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

.16

.21

.21

.23

3x1 Per Capita (All Parties)

Election Year (1 year lead)

Municipal Party (1 year lag)

IDH

IDH Squared

Municipal Population (rural = 1;
urban = 0)
Constant

N
Prob. > χ2
R2

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

Table 4.5 and 4.6 analyze 3x1 investments by regressing on the combined contributions
made by migrants and each branch of government. This analysis provides a better understanding
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of the factors that underpin the timing and size of 3x1 investments. Still, it is quite possible that
the respective contributors to the program are motivated by distinct incentives. For this reason,
it in the tables that follow I analyze 3x1 investment trends for each contributing party.
Table 4.7 displays the regression of independent variables on five distinct dependent
variables, including: (1) 3x1 per capita (all parties), (2) 3x1 per capita (federal), (3) 3x1 per capita
(state), (4) 3x1 per capita (municipal) and 3x1 per capita (migrants). In each model I run fixedeffects, least squares estimations in order to determine the effect of a number of independent
variables upon the aforementioned dependent variables across 46 municipios in Guanajuato,
Mexico. The models can be specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. The
and

is the error term. The vector

terms are the municipios fixed effects

includes the independent variables outlined in Table

4.7.
The table allows for easy comparisons to be made across models. Concerning the
variable % Homes with remittances, it is evident that raw remittance levels have a generally positive
effect on 3x1 per capita in the ensuing year. In each model an increase in household remittances
results in higher contributions to 3x1 projects. This finding implies that remittance levels play a
crucial role in initiating 3x1 development projects and perhaps in attracting the attention of state
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officials in the first place. Similarly, across all models, an increase in the percentage of homes
with return migrants has a positive effect on 3x1 per capita in the ensuing year. It is worth
noting that this particular effect is weakest in model IV, indicating that municipal contributions,
while clearly influenced by return migrant levels, may be influenced to a greater degree by other
variables. In turn, as in previous models, the percentage of homes with migrants reveals a
negative relationship between migration and 3x1 investments. Regarding election cycles, as
model I illustrates, 3x1 per capita levels increase substantially across all models in pre-election
years. However, not surprisingly the coefficients for Election Year are largest in models II, III and
IV. This implies that election cycles impact the 3x1 contributions made by the government more
than those made my migrants. Intuitively, this finding makes sense in that migrants would have
the least to gain from supporting larger investments in pre-election years. State officials, local
representatives and their respective political parties, on the other hand, could potentially gain
popularity within their respective districts by stacking 3x1 investments in pre-election years. At
this point it is important to recall that 3x1 projects are approved through the COVAM, in which
municipal, state and federal officials make up 75 percent of the votes. With this in mind, in
most cases a coalition of local politicians would be enough to approve a disproportional number
of projects in pre-election years. Regarding political parties, it is apparent that individual political
parties explain very little of the variation in 3x1 investments patterns. Similarly, neither HDI nor
HDI Squared report significance, indicating that levels of municipal development do not improve
our understanding of 3x1 investments. In contrast, the variable Municipal Population is positive
and significant, demonstrating that 3x1 investments are far more prevalent in rural municipios.
This outcome is to be expected given the fact that 3x1 projects tend to be carried out in smaller,
rural municipios and less frequently in municipios with larger urban populations.
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Finally, in comparing across models, it is evident that model IV underperforms in
comparison to the other models outlined in Table 4.7. This indicates that while there are clearly
omitted variables in each model, this may be particular true of model IV. Although there is no
clear explanation for this, taken together, the comparisons made above suggest that 3x1
investments made by municipal governments disproportionately hinge upon variables that lie
outside of the 3x1 development model. With this in mind, it is likely that additional factors not
captured by this regression also impact 3x1 contributions from municipal governments.
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Table 4.7 Comparison of Regression Analysis of 3x1 per Capita
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Model V

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

All Parties

Federal

State

Municipal

Migrant

% Homes with remittances
(1 year lag)

17.54***

3.85***

5.32***

4.61***

3.73***

(2.52)

(.69)

(.75)

(.65)

(.64)

% Homes with return
migrants (1 year lag)

35.46***

11.56***

9.47***

5.94***

8.31***

(5.45)

(1.49)

(1.62)

(1.39)

(1.39)

% Homes Migrants (1 year
lag)

-174.89***

-50.95***

-49.25***

-35.07***

-39.32***

(24.06)

(6.57)

(7.18)

(6.16)

(6.12)

18.25***

4.56***

4.93***

4.95***

3.82**

(6.02)

(1.64)

(1.79)

(1.53)

(1.52)

-.61

-.26

-.09

-.88

.59

(6.92)

(1.88)

(2.06)

(1.77)

(1.76)

-1535.40

-238.89

-487.25

-418.60

-340.60

(2157.29)

(547.79)

(598.39)

(513.46)

(510.52)

888.72

114.62

289.07

276.27

192.67

(1409.25)

(364.45)

(398.12)

(341.61)

(339.65)

Municipal Population (rural
= 1; urban = 0)

80.31**

15.28+

25.19**

19.43*

20.70*

(40.15)

(10.95)

(11.96)

(10.26)

(2.97)

Constant

475.71**

78.49*

151.99*

115.12*

110.57*

(825.16)

(209.73)

(229.11)

(196.59)

(195.46)

387

387

387

387

387

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

.23

.26

.21

.17

.21

3x1 per capita

Election Year (1 year lead)

Municipal Party (1 year lag)

HDI

HDI Squared

N
Prob. > χ2
R2

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

The previous analysis clarifies a number of important factors underpinning 3x1
investments trends; however, the results from above also demonstrate that there are a number of
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exogenous variables that are not accounted for in the model. On that note, examining the
relationship between respective 3x1 contributions over time may shed light on the factors that
influence funding patterns within the 3x1 program. Table 4.8 analyzes the relationship between
select independent variables and the ratio of 3x1 investment contributions across municipios. As
in previous models, here I run fixed-effects, least squares estimations in order to determine the
effect of a number of independent variables upon the 3x1 ratio across 46 municipios in
Guanajuato, Mexico. The model can be specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. The
and

terms are the municipios fixed effects

is the error term. The dependent variable is 3x1 ratio, and the vector

includes the

independent variables outlined in the first column of Table 4.8.
In the general, the model explains little of the variation surrounding the dependent
variable 3x1 ratio. Still, both % Homes with remittances and % Homes Migrants report significance.
Specifically, as the percentage of household remittances increases, the 3x1 ratio also increases. In
contrast, as the percentage of homes with migrants increases at the municipal level the 3x1 ratio
decreases. This finding reaffirms the notion that high migration levels do not necessarily
guarantee high remittance levels. Rather, as explained previously, it appears that remittances
begin to flow into communities well after initial emigration has begun. This relationship has clear
implications on the 3x1 program in so much that the 3x1 contribution ratio is generally highest
in those areas with heavy in-flows of cash transfers and not necessarily areas of high migration.
Put simply, migrants and their communities get more bang for their buck in municipios with
relatively larger flows of remittances. Although the casual mechanism driving this outcome is not
entirely clear, it appears that state officials may consciously contribute more to projects located
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in municipios with large remittance flows. Finally, the variable Election Year indicates that the 3x1
ratio is more favorable for migrants in pre-election years (P < .1). This finding is important as it
indicates that while state officials do indeed stack 3x1 projects in pre-election years, it is at least
in part to the benefit of migrants and their communities. Together, these findings point back to
the importance of the state in brokering 3x1 projects. No other independent variables in this
model report statistical significance.
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Table 4.8 Regression Analysis of 3x1 Investments
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

3x1 Ratio

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

% Homes with remittances (1 year lag)

1.91**

2.40***

2.48***

2.56***

(.61)

(.72)

(.73)

(.74)

.37

.78

.51

.53

(.61)

(.74)

(1.18)

(1.18)

-9.44

-13.50**

-13.34**

-12.92**

(4.39)

(5.38)

(5.80)

(5.87)

--

1.60

1.59+

1.61+

(--)

(1.30)

(1.31)

(1.32)

--

--

-1.24

-1.33

(--)

(--)

(1.62)

(1.63)

--

--

14.10

-456.21

(--)

(--)

(57.22)

(603.18)

--

--

--

301.09

(--)

(--)

(--)

(383.38)

--

--

--

1.44

(--)

(--)

(--)

(8.30)

-12.18

-16.39*

-27.01

-153.67

(5.55)

(6.53)

(42.75)

(236.05)

N

387

387

387

387

Prob. > χ2

.011

.000

.000

.000

R2

.11

.05

.05

.06

% Homes with return migrants (1 year lag)

% Homes Migrants (1 year lag)

Election Year (1 year lead)

Municipal Party (1 year lag)

HDI

HDI Squared

Municipal Population (rural = 1; urban =
0)
Constant

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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The next series of tables present the results of regression analysis on political factors
related to 3x1 investments. Table 4.9 addresses the relationship between select independent
variables and public works spending per capita. For this model, I run fixed-effects, least squares
estimations in order to determine the effect of a number of independent variables upon public
works per capita across 46 municipios in Guanajuato, Mexico. The model can be specified as:

where i indexes the municipio, t indexes the year. The

terms are the municipios fixed effects and

is the error term. The dependent variable is Public Works per Capita, and the vector
includes the independent variables outlined in Table 4.9.
Across all models, a negative relationship is noted between public works spending and
3x1 per capita levels. Specifically, as model IV indicates, as 3x1 per capita increases 100 pesos,
public works per capita falls 218 pesos in the ensuing year. This finding implies that government
officials may use 3x1 investments as a means of offsetting public work investments. Put
differently, it appears that municipios do not necessarily contribute “extra” cash to 3x1 projects
but rather divert funds to the program that they would have otherwise use for public works
projects anyways. It is quite possible, nonetheless, that public works spending follows a cyclical
trend, such that when investment is high one year, it tends to fall in the subsequent year. For this
reason I control for public works spending in the previous year by including an independent
variable Public works spending per capita, which is lagged one year. Still, as the reader can see, as
public works spending increases 100 pesos, public works spending in the subsequent fiscal
period increases by roughly 50 pesos. Given this, it appears rather clear that in the state of
Guanajuato 3x1 investments are used strategically to offset municipal spending on public works
projects. As previously mentioned, this draws into questions the degree to which municipios are
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actually “matching” migrant contributions. It does not necessarily, however, negate the potential
of 3x1 projects to stimulate meaningful development. (I return to this point in Chapter 5.)
Moreover, this finding reveals the influence that migrants wield over public works spending
within the 3x1 framework. That is, while the 3x1 resources put forth by the government may not
necessarily be “new” funds, the program’s framework does indeed provide migrants and their
communities with a new means through which to leverage local development.
The percentage of homes receiving remittances is found to have a positive impact on
public works per capita. To be specific, a 10 percent increase in homes receiving remittances
results in a $722 peso increase in public works per capita. Similarly, the percentage of return
migrants in a given municipio has a significant effect on public works spending. As model IV
reveals, as the percentage of return migrants increases 10 percent, expenditure on public works
per capita in the ensuing year increases by about $1,304 pesos or roughly $102 U.S. dollars. In
turn, the relationship between public works spending and election years is positive; indicating
that, like 3x1 investments, public works per capita increase in pre-election years. This result is
particularly important because it reveals the fact that election cycles play an important role in
determining not only the timing of 3x1 investments but also the timing of all public
infrastructure projects in Guanajuato.
Finally, as displayed in model IV, there appears to be a parabolic relationship between
public works per capita and human development levels, such that spending increases with
development until a threshold is reached at which point public works per capita begins to fall.
No other variables in Table 4.9 report statistical significance.
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Table 4.9 Regression Analysis of Public Works per Capita
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

-1.61**

-2.31***

-2.14***

-2.18***

(.62)

(.68)

(.68)

(.68)

.52***

.49***

.49***

.49***

(.05)

(.05)

(.05)

(.05)

20.94

93.97**

77.71**

77.28**

(22.06)

(36.10)

(36.12)

(36.12)

172.5***

281.01***

114.43*

130.42**

35.09

(55.05)

(76.35)

(76.39)

--

-813.66**

-448.91*

-620.73*

(--)

(320.13)

(338.47)

(346.56)

--

--

94.78+

86.27+

(--)

(--)

(77.46)

(77.21)

--

--

-106.6

-94.90

(--)

(--)

(82.57)

(82.39)

--

--

8803.2**

69755.6**

(--)

(--)

(3049.2)

(29532.1)

--

--

--

-39565.5**

(--)

(--)

(--)

(19144.5)

--

--

--

230.19

(--)

(--)

(--)

(463.96)

-491.64***

-909.39**

-7225.52***

-30573.4**

(305.39)

(344.35)

(2232.9)

(11369.8)

N

344

344

344

344

Prob. > χ2

.000

.000

.000

.000

R2

.36

.37

.39

.41

Public works per capita
3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

Public Works per Capita (1 year lag)

% Homes with remittances (1 year lag)

% Homes with return migrants (1 year
lag)
% Homes Migrants (1 year lag)

Election Year (1 year lead)

Municipal Party (1 year lag)

HDI

HDI Squared

Municipal Population (rural = 1; urban =
0)
Constant

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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The models displayed in Table 4.10 address levels of electoral participation. In general,
the models perform well, explaining nearly forty percent of the variation surrounding electoral
participation patterns across municipios. χ2 tests show that all regressions are significant. In
contrast with previous models, here I run random-effects, robust generalized least squares
estimations in order to determine the effect of select independent variables upon total 3x1
investments across 46 municipios in Guanajuato, Mexico. The model can be specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. The
and

terms are the municipios fixed effects

is the error term. The dependent variable is Electoral Participation, and the vector

includes the independent variables outlined in Table 4.10.
As the reader will note, the coefficient for 3x1 per capita reveals a positive relationship
between 3x1 investments and electoral participation in the ensuing year. Specifically, as outlined
in model IV, a 100 peso increase in 3x1 per capita results in a 2.1 percent increase in voter
participation. The actual increase in participation levels is clearly minimal. Still, since 1982 voter
turnout in Mexico has fall from 72.56 percent of registered voters to 44.61 percent in 2009 (IFE:
Data accessed on 07/07/2012). Thus, while the measured effect of 3x1 investments on voter
participation is small, the significance of the effect is nonetheless noteworthy. Similarly, the
coefficient for Public works per capita is significant, indicating that as public works per capita
increases 100 pesos voter turnout increases by .2 percent. These findings imply that 3x1
investments—and public works projects in general—may in fact be governed by a certain degree
of clientelism. Still, the results outlined in Table 4.10 also provide evidence to support the notion
that government investments drive higher turnout rates due to the fact that constituents are
pleased to see their officials responding to their demands. Taken together, these results suggest
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that the consolidation of democratic practices in traditionally non-democratic public spaces does
not necessarily follow a “this road or that road” logic.
The previous finding appears to be related to the positive relationship found between the
percentage of return migrants in a municipio and voter participation levels. As Model IV
illustrates, for every 10 percent increase in return migrants, voter turnout increases by more than
5 percent. There are three potential mechanisms that could be driving this increase. On the one
hand, it is quite possible that voter participation increases in municipios with relatively larger 3x1
per capita levels precisely due to the fact that citizens sense that the government responds to
their demands, and as a result, they reward their representatives by turning out at the polls. On
the other hand, it is possible that municipios with relatively higher 3x1 per capita levels vote more
often due to the fact that they have stronger social networks. That is, one would expect that
municipios with a relatively active citizenry would be more likely to turn out at the election polls.
This scenario is consistent with previous research that demonstrates the role of social capital in
underpinning successful transitions to democratic governance (Putnam 1994). Still, there is a
potential third scenario as well. That is, it is just as possible that politicians drive higher turnout
rates by patronizing potential voters with public works projects. As the reader will note, these
scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, it is quite possible that all three
scenarios play out in practice to varying degrees. In this sense, progress should be measured by
the degree to which the first two scenarios occur in relation to the latter.
Table 4.10 also demonstrates that as household remittances increase electoral
participation decreases. This finding suggests that communities that receive large cash transfers
from abroad may have less incentive to pressure the state for resources. In addition, regarding
the variable Municipal Party, regression analysis documents that as party type moves away from
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PAN, electoral participation increases. Intuitively, this finding makes sense given the fact that
PRI is the second largest party in the state and tends to be more successful in rural municipios,
which traditionally have higher participation rates due to the fact that political patronage systems
of years past still have relatively more political traction. Finally, the variables HDI and HDI
Squared illustrate a parabolic relationship between electoral participation and human
development levels; such that participation first increases with development but eventually falls
off as development continues to improve. This finding is supported by the variable Municipal
Population, which demonstrates that electoral participation is higher in rural municipios relative to
urban municipios. Together, these three variables demonstrates what developed countries know all
to well—highly consolidated democracies do not necessarily have highly participatory publics.
With that in mind, it is worth noting that even when controlling for municipal population size
and development levels, 3x1 investments continue to have a positive effect on electoral
participation. As I argue in the discussion section of this chapter, this finding has implications
for democratic theorists working both inside and outside of Mexico.
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Table 4.10 Regression Analysis of Electoral Participation
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Electoral Participation

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

.023**

.026**

.027***

.021**

(.008)

(.008)

(.008)

(.009)

.002***

.0022***

.002***

.002***

(.0006)

(.0006)

(.0006)

(.0006)

-.43***

-.64**

-.69**

-.74***

(.13)

(.26)

(.26)

(.24)

.79*

.47

.58+

.52+

(.39)

(.52)

(.61)

(.57)

--

2.01

2.11

.80

(--)

(2.17)

(2.43)

(2.28)

--

--

2.37*

2.14**

(--)

(--)

(1.10)

(1.05)

--

--

6.59

7.95***

(--)

(--)

(1.75)

(2.73)

--

--

--

-5.05***

(--)

(--)

(--)

(1.76)

--

--

--

6.15***

(--)

(--)

(--)

(1.70)

5.07***

5.23***

4.68***

-2.60**

(1.71)

(2.35)

(.136)

(1.05)

N

129

129

129

129

Prob. > χ2

.000

.000

.000

.000

R2

.19

.19

.24

.36

Public Works per Capita (1 year lag)

% Homes with remittances (1 year lag)

% Homes with return migrants (1 year lag)

% Homes migrants (1 year lag)

Municipal Party (1 year lag)

HDI

HDI Squared

Municipal Population (rural = 1; urban = 0)

Constant

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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The models displayed in Table 4.11 address levels of electoral competition, as measured
by the Nb index. I run the model in random-effects, robust generalized least squares estimations
in order to determine the effect of a number of variables upon party competition across 46
municipios in Guanajuato, Mexico. The model can be specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. The
and

terms are the municipios fixed effects

is the error term. The dependent variable is Electoral Participation, and the vector

includes the independent variables outlined in Table 4.11.
Overall, the models outlined below perform poorly, explaining roughly ten percent of
the variation. In addition, all four models report less than stellar χ2 scores. Still, the analysis is
not entirely in vain. As model IV illustrates, the percentage of homes with migrants has a
positive effect on electoral competition. This may reflect the fact that emigration generally tends
to take place in semi-marginalized municipios, which are precisely the areas in which one would
expect traditional patron-client norms to influence electoral politics. In addition, the percentage
of homes receiving remittances has a negative effect on electoral competition, as does the
percentage of homes with return migrants. Both of these variables likely reflect the fact that
return migrants and remittances flows tend to be higher in relatively more developed rural
municipios. In general, little can be drawn from these results. Still, as I explain below, the story
may be more complex than anticipated.

140

Table 4.11 Regression Analysis of Electoral Competition
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Electoral Competition

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

-.002*

-.0008

-.0008

-.001

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

.00006

.00007

.00007

.00006

(.00008)

(.00007)

(.00007)

(.00008)

-.002

-.09**

-.08**

-.09**

(.02)

(.03)

(.03)

(.03)

-.06

-.19**

-.19**

-.19*

(.05)

(.08)

(.08)

(.08)

--

.88**

.88**

.86**

(--)

(.32)

(.32)

(.32)

--

--

-.09

-.10

(--)

(--)

(.14)

(.14)

--

--

-.31

-2.39

(--)

(--)

(2.26)

(36.47)

--

--

--

1.63

(--)

(--)

(--)

(23.61)

--

--

--

.19

(--)

(--)

(--)

(.24)

3.20***

3.82***

4.09*

4.71

(.24)

(.31)

(1.74)

(14.05)

N

129

129

129

129

Prob. > χ2

.11

.005

.01

.05

R2

.10

.10

.10

.11

Public Works per Capita (1 year lag)

% Homes with remittances (1 year lag)

% Homes with return migrants (1 year lag)

% Homes migrants (1 year lag)

Municipal Party (1 year lag)

HDI

HDI Squared

Municipal Population (rural = 1; urban = 0)

Constant

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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The results reported in Table 4.11 are at best muddled. However, as insinuated above,
one reason for this may have to do with the relationship over time between electoral
competition and development. One might expect, for example, that electoral competition would
initially experience a strong increase in municipios that have long been dominated for decades by
the PRI. That is, once the PRI’s grip on a given electorate were broken, upstart parties would be
expected to rush in and take advantage of the sudden political void. However, overtime it would
be expected that electoral competition would fall slightly once it became apparent which parties
were able to successfully compete for the support of constituents from election to election.
Graph 4.6 supports this notion. As the graph illustrates, as human development improves in
municipios electoral competition rises at first only to fall again in the state’s most developed
municipios.
The aforementioned trends are of interest due to the fact that electoral participation and
competition are highest in specifically those municipios where the majority of 3x1 projects are
carried out. This places the 3x1 program in a unique position to recapture the confidence of
citizens that had come to place little faith in the autocratic norms of previous political regimes.
Naturally, any such efforts would be fruitless if the 3x1 program does not contribute to
meaningful development on the ground. With that in mind, I turn to the subsequent chapter in
which I analyze the relationship between 3x1 investments and indicators to human development.
First, however, I briefly summarize the findings from this chapter.
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Graph 4.6 Electoral Competition and Human Development

.65
.7
.75
.8
.85
.9
Human Development Index (0 = least developed; 1 = most developed)
Source: Author; data from SEDESOL, CONAPO.

Conclusions
The results of this analysis corroborate previous research demonstrating the piecemeal
nature of democratic consolidation within the Third Wave of Democracy in Latin America.23
Specifically, via an empirical examination of the 3x1 program, this study provides insight into the
process of political consolidation amidst Mexico’s transition towards democratic governance.
Related to this, regression analysis identifies two mechanisms that are central to understanding
3x1 investment trends: (1) migrant networks and (2) political utilitarianism. Concerning the

Note: There is a very large literature available concerning the relationship between democracy and
decentralization in Latin America. In addition to those cited previously in this study, see: Cameron (2005), Eaton
(2004, 2006), Fox (2007), Fox and Moguel (1995), Fox and Aranda (1996), Gibson (2004), Montero and Samuels
(2004), Moreno-Jaimes (2007) and Rowland (2001).
23
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former, it is clear that migrants must supply remittances, time and energy in order for 3x1
projects to materialize. Moreover, the presence of strong migrant networks within municipios
appears to be paramount to the 3x1 process. This point is extremely important because it reveals
the potential for migrants to stimulate political participation at the local level. Moreover, it
demonstrates that migrants transfer much more than mere financial resources back to Mexico.
Rather, as documented elsewhere, they transfer important social remittances (Levitt 1998, 2011),
including knowledge about democratic alternatives (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow). On the other
hand, in regard to the latter, politicians appear to play a clear role in determining the timing of
3x1 projects. Moreover, it appears that local governments do not necessarily “add” to overall
development funds in participating in 3x1 projects. Still, the reader should interpret this
particular finding cautiously because this is likely true of most participatory programs.
Decentralization, after all, does not miraculously create “additional” funds but rather alters the
process through which government funds are distributed. In this respect, the 3x1 program does
allow migrants and their communities to play a hands-on role in determining the destination of
funds that would have otherwise been allotted to public works projects with little to no
communal input. Nonetheless, in the case of the 3x1 program, government officials do place a
great deal of emphasis on the fact that they “match” migrant funds. While there is no direct
deception at play here, in my conversations with government officials it became quite evident
that an important part of the program from the government’s standpoint is the maintenance of
their image as an altruistic entity that makes real concessions in order to match migrant
sacrifices.24

Here it is worth pointing out that in interviews with government officials every time I would inquire about the
funding paths from which state and municipal governments draw to support 3x1 projects, the official I was
speaking with would skirt the issue and quickly transition the conversation towards a less sensitive topic.
24
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Taken together, the findings presented here demonstrate that migrant remittances clearly
have the potential to underpin a unique form of development in which migrants gain agency
within the micro and macro economies of municipios across Guanajuato. Still, as the findings
outlined throughout this chapter reveal, this potential is often tempered by the political
overtones that accompany 3x1 projects. Two brief anecdotes from the field help clarify this
point. As the reader will note, each example reveals the degree to which political parties use the
state structure—and specifically the 3x1 para migrantes program—for electoral purposes.
On July 1st, 2012 the former director of SEDESHU, Miguel Marquez Marquez, won
Guanajuato’s governorship as a candidate for PAN. There is nothing particularly peculiar about
this except for the fact that Marquez Marquez was director of SEDESHU for less than a year.
Prior to moving to SEDESHU he directed Guanajuato’s office for Accountability and
Transparency. After declaring his candidacy for governor, members of the press immediately
began accusing the governor at the time, Juan Manuel Oliva (PAN), of repositioning Marquez
Marquez into the SEDESHU position as a means of getting him “face time” with local
communities. If in fact this was PAN’s intention, SEDESHU represented the perfect platform
for Mr. Marquez due to the fact that the department carries out development projects across the
state and thus requires the director to make frequent visits to communities in each of the state’s
46 municipios. Related to the research at hand, during his time as director of SEDESHU Mr.
Marquez made multiple high-profile visits to migrant communities in order to commemorate
3x1 projects. I had the opportunity to witness one of these visits in the town of Ojo de Agua
(Abasolo). As described in Chapter 3, for this particular event, Juan Manuel Oliva and Miguel
Marquez Marquez arrived by helicopter to a frenzied crowd. In addition to inaugurating a road
funded by the 3x1 program, Mr. Oliva and Mr. Marquez participated in a series of speeches that
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lasted for well over an hour. And although the pair focused on the 3x1 program, they made a
point of emphasizing the current administration’s commitment to social development around
the state. They also made it quite clear that if PAN—and thus Marquez Marquez—were elected
in the upcoming elections, citizens could expect more of the same from the next administration.
The next anecdote concerns an interview I did back in 2009 with the director of migrant
affairs in the municipio of San José de Iturbide. The main purpose of the interview was to inquire
about San Iturbide’s growing level of participation in the 3x1 program. In particular, I was
interested why the municipio had invested such a great deal in the expansion of electricity grids
but had only made minor investments in other projects. The director’s response was surprisingly
straightforward: “Our municipal president prefers to invest in projects that are visible. Other
projects may be meaningful but the people do not see them.” By “visible”, of course, the official
was drawing an association between public works projects, party interests and elections. Put
simply, San Iturbide’s president was most interested in supporting projects that would visibly
reflect favorably upon his government and thus help his party win future elections.
These two anecdotes reveal the potential political importance of 3x1 projects—and
remittances in general—from the standpoint of state representatives as well as municipal
officials. At face value, this is an unhealthy relationship. The degree to which election cycles
dictate development projects in the state of Guanajuato is troubling if nothing else due to the
fact that citizens should not have to wait for pre-election years in order to see their demands
met. Rather, in a democratic society, politicians should work throughout their tenure to improve
the standard of living within their respective districts. This discussion must be considered
alongside the fact that relatively less developed municipios with high migration rates are far less
successful at accessing state resources. Given this, one cannot help but wonder what will happen
146

to public investment patterns in the most marginalized regions of rural Mexico as migration to
the U.S. begins to drop.25
In theory politicians should work hard to improve the lot of all citizens and not merely
those who have the capital to purchase political influence. Migrants represent a unique social
group in the sense that unlike most rural citizens in Mexico, they have the potential to pool large
quantities of cash and as a result they are able to garner the attention of politicians. This point
obviously brings up real concerns about the degree to which other powerful constituents are
able to influence political officials. Specifically, concerning rural Mexico, this finding makes one
wonder to what degree narcotrafficking networks are able to influence local politics in
Guanajuato and other parts of the country. As noted previously, decentralization has the
potential to make resource allocation more efficient and responsive by providing local citizens
with access to the political decision making process. Still, under the wrong conditions,
decentralization also has the ability to open the door to perverse power structures, such as drug
cartels. Given the fact that in recent years decentralization in Mexico has coincided with a major
economic recession and a clear increase in narcotrafficking activity across the country, it is
entirely plausible that this scenario will become a reality for municipios that experience high levels
of drug trafficking. In fact, it may already have. In an interview I conducted in 2009 with a senior
official within Guanajuato’s 3x1 administrative offices, it was brought to my attention that state
officials suspect that drug money has been laundered through the 3x1 program by respective
cartel members residing in the U.S. While the official reassured me that these types of transfers

25Recent

studies demonstrate that Mexican migration to the U.S. has reached a “net-zero” for the first time since the
1960s (Massey and Castañeda 2012). Moreover, taking into account falling fertility rates, improved economic
development in Mexico and slow economic recovery in the U.S., there are no immediate signs that indicate that
migration rates from Mexico to the U.S. will ever return to the historic levels reached over the course of the last
three decades.
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have since ceased, she also made it clear that it is beyond the capacity of government officials to
determine whether or not migrants obtained their funds from illicit activities. The official’s
message was clear: migrants are migrants and cash transfers, regardless of their origin, are cash
transfers.
Taken together, this chapter illustrates the complex reality of political decentralization
and democratic consolidation in Mexico. In particular, regression analysis reveals that local
officials employ decentralized funds to their political benefit. While these findings are limited in
scope and should not be used to generalize about the decentralization process elsewhere, it is
important to point out that they resonate with other studies concerning decentralization and
politics in Mexico. For example, in a national study regarding fiscal decentralization and
elections in Mexico, Moreno-Jaimes (2007) concludes, “…spending on public works projects is
highly political: not only does it increase significantly in election years, but it is also a useful
means through which municipal governments are able to make their actions more visible to the
population…” (2007, 432). Still, to many these findings will not come as a surprise. After all, old
habits die hard. In a region historically tarnished by sinecures and clientelistic political practices,
one might expect local politicians to use remittances to their benefit, just as one would expect
migrants to take advantage of the 3x1 program as a means of increasing the impact of RLD in
hometowns. Still, the fact that 3x1 investments share a positive relationship with electoral
participation demonstrates that electoral politics are real in the state of Guanajuato. Moreover,
the 3x1 program is evidence that the decentralization process has successfully incorporated new
incentives to appeal to voters. Given this, one could argue that the findings reported here reflect
the growing pains of progress and that as long as human development indices are improving
(and they are in Mexico) there is no reason to fret too much about less than democratic political
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practices. As the Lipsetian adage goes: development, then democracy. With this in mind, a
lingering question remains: Do municipios with relatively more 3x1 investments have better socialeconomic development outcomes than municipios that participate less in the program? In the
chapter that follows I address this question by analyzing the impact of 3x1 investments on
human development indicators across Guanajuato’s forty-six municipios.
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Chapter 5: Remittances and Human Development Trends
Put in other words, in the context of this simple model, the impact of the international
transfer on the growth rate will depend on the policies being implemented by the
country. Policy makers, therefore, can potentially affect the impact that an international
income transfer has on growth by introducing appropriate changes to the policy
environment. (Calderón et al. 2008:336)

In 1959 Seymour Lipset contented that "[I]n dealing with democracy, one must be able
to point to a set of conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries...which
differentiate most democratic states from most others" (1959:69). Specifically, Lipset concluded
that open-class systems, economic wealth, egalitarian value systems, a capitalist economy, a
literate population and high participation in voluntary organizations, while not sufficient in and
of themselves for democracy, appear to be necessary conditions for stable democratic
government. In subsequent years these factors went on to form the core variables of an
emerging body of empirical research focused on the economic determinants of democratic
governance. Findings from this body of literature provide a fairly clear depiction of the factors
that distinguish democracies from non-democracies. In particular, researchers document a
positive relationship between economic growth and government investment in social programs.
In turn, improved health care and wider access to education foster the development of human
capital, which creates more productive workers and increases the likelihood of citizens
participating in the political system. Moreover, this development appears to improve the
probability that citizens will hold elected officials accountable for their policy decisions (Lipset
1959; Muller 1995:966; Barro 1999). In the most basic sense, these advances mark the
foundation of democratic governance.
This aforementioned process is particularly influenced by the expansion of the middle
sectors. For example, Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) find that "the middle class emerges as the main
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pro-democratic force in Lipset's analysis, and this class gains in size with socioeconomic
development" (1992:14). Developing countries, nonetheless, are not historically blessed with
strong middle classes. There are examples, however, where developing countries have been able
to stimulate the growth of middle sectors through economic expansion and the extension of
education to previously ostracized groups. (The cases of South Korea, Taiwan, Poland and
Ireland clearly demonstrate this possibility.) Still, nowhere has this process been linear. On the
contrary, at first economic development tends to incite an increase in income inequality before
eventually acting as a catalyst for a more egalitarian society (Ahluwalia 1976; Bollen and Jackman
1985; Kuznets 1963; Lydall 1979; Muller 1988, 1995; Paukert 1973; Weede 1980; Weede and
Tiefenbach 1981). It was for this reason that Simon Kuznet argued that in developing countries
inequality would at first rise only to fall in latter stages as the benefits of modernity begin to
benefit all groups in society. Still, few countries around the world have neatly followed the
contours of Kuznet’s curve. Rather, the degree to which inequality reaches the backside of
Kuznet’s curve appears to hinge largely on the government’s ability to expand educational
opportunities and transfer economic growth to previously unincorporated communities through
meaningful social programs. 26 Developments in Mexico over the last fifty years seem to
corroborate this process.
In their renowned 1965 study The Civic Culture, which included Mexico as a case study,
authors Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Vebra conclude that:
Among the demographic variables usually investigated—sex, place of residence,
occupation, income, age, and so on—none compares with the educational variable in the
extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes. The uneducated man or the

26Recent

upswings in inequality in the U.S. and U.K. suggest that public policy can also reverse a country’s initial
descent down the backside of Kuznet’s curve. Specifically, as the aforementioned cases reveal, deregulation of the
financial sector coupled with lower taxes and less focus on social welfare programs can incite unprecedented
increases in social inequality in even the most highly developed countries in the world.
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man with the limited education is a different political actor from the man who has
achieved a higher level of education. (1965:316)
Sindney and Vebra’s findings are corroborated by Rafael Segovia’s (1975) results published in La
Politización del Niño Mexicano in which the author documents a negative relationship between
education attainment and support for paternalistic political organizations. Specifically, Segovia
finds that children with higher education levels were less supportive of political organizations
and unions, and in general, they were more likely to hold negative attitudes towards paternalistic
political norms. As the Segovia notes, this is particularly interesting given the fact that the
children with higher education attainment in the author’s survey stood the most to gain from
supporting traditional political norms given that at the time the political status quo was likely to
have benefited their families directly.
Still, the redistribution of public resources—including education—to the general public
requires sustained economic growth. In the case of Mexico, despite initial evidence of social
change in the late 1970s, by the mid-1980s it was clear that macro-economic growth and regional
integration in Mexico had failed to incite more equitable social relations (Legovini, et al. 2005
and Portes 1985 and 2003). Instead, from 1984 to 1994 Mexico was witness to rising social
inequality and the contraction of employment sectors amongst the middle and lower classes
(Korzeniewicz 2000; Portes 1985 and 2003). These developments led critics of the political
transition to conclude that while neoliberal economics may have spurred the emergence of stable
democratic elections in Mexico, they did not appear to have improved the quality of democratic
governance (Weyland 2004; Cansino 2009). That said, recent research indicates that social equity
in Mexico has improved over the last decade. Specifically, since the late 1990s income
inequalities have fallen in Mexico and according to Mexican economist Gerardo Esquivel, this
trend is largely a product of the expansion of education, more pointed social programs and
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migrant remittances. Concerning the latter, Esquivel provides evidence that remittances have
played an important “equalizing” role in reducing income inequality throughout the country and
in particular in rural communities (Esquivel 2010). Esquivel’s discovery echoes findings from
across Latin American that indicate that remittances share a positive relationship with economic
growth (Calderón et al. 2008:336; Birdsall, Lustig, and McLeod 2011:12).
Taken together, the findings outlined above point to a potential association between
migrant remittances, economic growth and democratic consolidation in Mexico. In this chapter I
focus on the relationship between migrant remittances and human development. I begin by with
a brief overview of previous work addressing the impact of remittances in communities across
Mexico.
Remittance and Human Development in Mexico
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), development is the
process through which individuals gain access to "an enabling environment” that allows them
“to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives." In short, development provides individuals with
leverage over the factors that condition their lives. With this definition in mind, the basic
question driving this chapter is: Do migrant remittances, and specifically remittances channeled
towards certain types of community initiatives, lead to higher levels of human development (i.e.,
improved education attainment, more access to healthcare and higher levels of per capita
income)?
Traditionally, both academics and the Mexican state viewed migration to the U.S. as an
irrevocable form of exit that trapped migrants in a vicious cycle of dependency in which
migrants and their families wasted away precious savings on superfluous consumption in
hometowns and nearby urban centers (Reichert 1981; Stuart and Kearney 1981; Wiest 1979).
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Subsequent research challenged these early findings, arguing that remittances have multiplier
effects within local economies, thus directly and indirectly stimulating employment, investment
and income (Adelman, Taylor and Vogel 1988; Adelman and Taylor 1992; Durand, Parrado and
Massey 1996; Calderón 2008). This line of research illustrated the emerging potential for a
migrant “voice” in communal development in Mexico and refuted notions suggesting that “exit”
necessarily mean that migrants irretrievably lose positive influence within their hometown
communities.
One of the earliest studies to reveal the potential of RLD in hometown communities was
Adelman, Taylor and Vogel's article titled, "Life in a Mexican Village: A SAM Perspective." In
their article the authors employ a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) to analyze the structural
makeup of a migrant sending community in central Mexico. In their analysis the authors find
that international migrant remittances play a crucial role in growth patterns in the village
economy (1988). Several years later, in a review of remittance studies conducted in Mexico,
Durand and Massey (1992) find that on average less than 50% of migrant remittances are spent
on production but that there is a great deal of variance in remittance spending patterns across
communities. This latter finding leads the authors to conclude that, "it is more appropriate to
ask why productive investment occurs in some communities and not in others” (Durand and
Massey 1992:27).
Taylor et al. (1996) recognize two factors that stand in the way of effective RLD: (1)
inadequate public services and infrastructure and (2) the absence of factor markets, namely rural
credit markets, which hamper the possibility for sustained multiplier effects (Taylor et al.
1996:402). As the authors note, deficiencies in either of these two categories means that the
migrants and their families assume the full load of turning savings into production (Durand and
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Massey 1992, Taylor et al. 1996 and Grindle 1988; Quinn 2005). As George (1990) explains,
individuals migrate "because of the lack of meaningful development in the first place. In the
absence of policies designed to channel migrants' savings into productive investment, it is naive
to expect migrants to behave very differently” (quoted in Taylor et al. 1996:402; George
1990:170). This point is reaffirmed by Calderón and colleagues (2008) who find that
“…remittances are more effective in raising investment and enhancing growth in countries with
higher levels of human capital, strong institutions, and good policy environments” (Calderón,
Fajnzylber and López 2008:366).
RLD therefore appears to be a question of degree; that is, the degree to which
remittances stimulate development depends on local and regional factors that have the potential
to either incite or inhibit the multiplier effects of remittances in local communities. As a result,
one might expect that in overcoming local barriers to RLD migrants and their communities
would be wise to work with the Mexican government. The potential for such cooperation is
illustrated in the three case studies outlined in Chapter 3. As these rural villages reveal, statemigrant cooperation has the potential to improve development outcomes in localities with high
migration and entrenched poverty. Still, to my knowledge, no studies to date have empirically
addressed whether or not the program 3x1 para migrantes actually improves development
outcomes. Furthermore, no author to my knowledge has studied whether or not the 3x1
program improves development outcomes in comparison to traditional household remittances.
In this chapter, I address these points of inquiry by analyzing how different forms of remittances
affect human development outcomes across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios.
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Data and Methodology
The principle variable of interest in this chapter is the human development index (HDI).
Figure 5.1 outlines the three dimensions and corresponding indicators used to calculate the HDI
for Guanajuato’s 46 municipios. As the figure indicates, the HDI measures health, education and
income. The HDI is composed of development patterns logged by the Instituto Nacional de
Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). The index is based on calculations made by the UNPD. The
HDI ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 is highly developed and 0 is completely undeveloped. In
Guanajuato, highly developed municipios approach .9, whereas largely underdeveloped municipios
are closer to .5. (For additional information on the HDI index please see Appendix 8.)

156

Human
Development
Index
Health

Education

Infant
Mortality
Rate

Education
Attendance
Rate
+
Literacy
Rate

Living
Standards

Per Capita
Income

Source: INEGI; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Figure 5.1 Components of the Human Development Index
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Table 5.1 illustrates the panel data used in this chapter. (For additional descriptive
statistics please see Appendix 1.) As the far right column indicates, data was collected from a
variety of sources. For the period 2002 to 2011, the mean HDI across the state’s municipios was
.77. Concerning health, Infant Mortality Rate is employed as an indicator of wellbeing. Across
Guanajuato, from 2002-2011 there was an average of 21.9 deaths per 1,000 live births. This
figure reduced substantially over the time period in question, falling to 14.9 deaths per 1,000 live
births by 2010 (INEGI). Still, for the sake of comparison, in 2010 Mexico’s national infant
mortality rate was 14.4 deaths per 1,000 live births. In the U.S., in turn, there were only 4.29
deaths per 1,000 live births (Mathews et al. 2012:1).
Regarding education, the variables Education Attendance Rate and % Pop Illiterate are used as
indicators of education levels. From 2002 to 2011 nearly 62 percent of children and young adults
ages 6 to 24 were attending school. By 2010 school attendance rates in Guanajuato were 65
percent for children ages 6 to 24. In turn, concerning illiteracy rates, from 2002 to 2011 about
13.6 percent of Guanajuato’s population was unable to read or write. In comparison, in 2010 in
the U.S. less than 1 percent of children age 15 and over was unable to read and write. Taken
together, these variables indicate that while education levels in Guanajuato improved during the
time period in question, basic education is far from universal.
Finally, in regard to living standards, per capita income is used as an indicator of
economic wellbeing. Over the ten-year period included in this study GDP per Capita Municipal
averaged slightly over $7,000. By 2010 GDP per capita in Guanajuato was calculated at $8,834.
However, at the national level GDP per capita was estimated at $14,400 in 2010. In the U.S., on
the other hand, GDP per capita for the same year was estimated at $48,500. These stark
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contrasts help clarify why many residents from Guanajuato migrant to stronger regional
economies in search of work, and occasionally, to the U.S.
Concerning independent variables, the variable 3x1 per capita is calculated as the total
amount of 3x1 investments made in each respective municipio divided by the municipio’s
population. Similar to GDP per capita, 3x1 per Capita provides a more accurate means of
comparing 3x1 investments across municipios. In turn, the variables Electoral Participation and
Electoral Competition are generated in order to evaluate the relationship between electoral trends
and development. Data for these two variables come from the organization Proposals to Change
Mexico (CIDAC) and the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Electoral participation is simply a
measure of the percentage of eligible voters that turn out to vote in elections. Electoral
competition, in turn, is measured by the Nb index for party competition, which was designed by
Dunleavy and Boucek in 2003.27
The variable % Homes with Remittances represents the percentage of homes in a given
municipio that receive migrant remittances. In turn, the variable % of Homes with Return Migrants
measures the percentage of homes that had a migrant that returned to Mexico during the
previous census and stayed. Data for these variables was collected from the National Population
Council (CONAPO). In addition, the independent variable Municipal Party is created to account
for political party differences across municipios, which permits for the evaluation of potential
relationships between political parties and human development patterns. The variable is
constructed as a dummy variable, such that PAN = 0 and other parties = 1. This variable is
coded as a dummy due to the fact that during the period under analysis PAN controlled over 60
percent of the state’s municipal presidencies. PRI, in turn, controlled nearly 30 percent.

Note: For more information on the calculation of the Nb index please see the data and methodology section in
Chapter 4.
27
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Moreover, my main interest in this particular variable is in analyzing the degree to which partisan
trends impact human development patterns in Guanajuato. Given this, a dummy variable will
lend to easier interpretation of the regression coefficients. The coding of this variable is
calculated based on information provided by CIDAC. The variable Rural-Urban is generated in
order to control for population differences across municipios. A municipio was marked as “rural” if
the total population is less than 50,000 inhabitants and “urban” if the population is greater than
50,000. The variable Election Year is a dummy variable (1 = election year; 0 = non-election year)
that allows for the evaluation of any potential relationship between human development patterns
and election cycles. Finally, in order to control for municipal spending on public works projects,
the variable Public Work Spending per Capita is included. This variable is a measure of the amount
of money municipios spend on public works projects in a given year divided by municipal
population. Public works spending per capita averaged 923 pesos across the ten-year period
2002-2011. Ramo 26 per Capita and Ramo 33 per Capita measure federal transfers to municipal
governments.

28

These variables permit for an evaluation of the relationship between

decentralization of federal funds and municipal development. As the reader will note, Ramo 26
and Ramo 33 accounted for 768 pesos of per capita spending. While these funds are not
necessarily exclusively used on public works projects, they do represent the most important
source municipios have to support investments in public infrastructure. Data for this variable
comes from SNIM and INEGI. (For additional descriptive statistics concerning these two
variables please see Appendices 9-10.) In the pages that follow I present a series of graphs and
tables that examine the variables presented in Table 5.1 in more detail. I begin by taking a closer
look at the relationship between human development patterns and household remittances
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Note: For additional information on Ramo 26 and 33 please see Chapter 2.
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Table 5.1 Definitions and Description of Variables Included in Regression Analysis
Variable
HDI
Infant Mortality Rate
Education Attendance Rate
% Pop Illiterate
GDP per Capita Municipal
3x1 per Capita
Electoral Participation
Electoral Competition
% Homes Remittances
% Homes Return Migrants
Municipal Party
Municipal Population (rural = 1; urban
= 0)
Election Year (2003, 2006, 2009)
Public Work Spending per Capita
Ramo 26 per Capita
Ramo 33 per Capita

Mean
.77
21.9
61.84
13.67
7057.92
42.68
51.34
2.98
13.29
4.67
.39
.45

S.D.
.05
8.01
4.06
4.75
2372.76
74
7.21
.87
6.69
2.33
.48
.49

Data Source
INEGI
INEGI
INEGI
INEGI
INEGI
SEDESHU
CIDAC; IFE
CIDAC; IFE
CONAPO
CONAPO
CIDAC
INEGI

-923.96
464.13
304.78

-1031.09
443.91
344.76

IFE
SNIM; INEGI
SNIM
SNIM

Source: UNDP, CIDAC, CONAPO, IFE, INEGI, SEDESHU and SNIM.
1 Figures in Mexican Pesos.

Descriptive Statistics of Remittance-led Development in Guanajuato, Mexico
Figure 5.2 illustrates human development disparities as evident on the U.S.-Mexico
border. The map, which is borrowed from the United Nation’s 2009 Development Report,
clearly reveals the social and economic motives underpinning migration trends between the two
nations. The map visualizes what has been evident to many Mexican citizens for the better part
of a century: Migrating from Mexico the U.S. has the potential to drastically improve one’s
quality of life. As the authors of this report point out, “A pattern that jumps out is the strong
correlation between the side of the border that a place is on and its HDI. The lowest HDI in a
United States border county (Starr County, Texas) is above even the highest on the Mexican side
(Mexicali, Baja California). This pattern suggests that moving across national borders can greatly
expand the opportunities available for improved well-being” (UNDP 2009:1) Moreover, it is
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worth keeping in mind that counties on the border region in the U.S. are among the poorest in
the nation. In turn, Mexico’s northern states makeup some of the country’s most developed
regions. With such stark disparities divided by a mere line in the sand, it is not at all surprising
that so many Mexicans have opted to migrate to the U.S. in recent decades. Nonetheless, and
most important for the study at hand, this map also demonstrates that an improvement in
human development levels in Mexico would likely reduce the number of citizens migrating to
the U.S. Moreover, in theory, remittances could contribute to this development, and thus,
facilitate a reduction in migration. The goal of this chapter is to tease out the degree to which
this actually takes place in practice.

Source:UNDP 2009:1.

Figure 5.2 Human Development on the Border (2000)
Figure 5.3 illustrates HDI levels across Mexico. As is evident, development levels are
relatively high (alto) in northern states, moderate (medio) in central states and low (bajo) in
southern states, with the exception of the Yucatan peninsula. The Federal District, which is
located in central Mexico, is the country’s most developed area. Guanajuato falls in the middle,
registering development levels that are higher than many of the southern states but substantially
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lower than most northern states. Still, like elsewhere in Mexico, HDI levels in Guanajuato have
improved a great deal in recent decades.

Source: INEGI.

Figure 5.3 Human Development in Mexico
Graph 5.1 plots human development from 1985 through 2010 in Guanajuato’s 46
municipios. As the reader will note, HDI has clearly improved in Guanajuato over the last three
decades. In 1985 none of Guanajuato’s municipios surpassed .8 on the HDI scale. In turn, by 2010
half of the state’s municipios had exceeded the .8 level and all municipios registered HDI levels well
above the .6 level. In comparison, in 1985 roughly half of the municipios fell below the .6 mark
and several reported HDI levels of less than .4. Moreover, as the reader will note, inequality in
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terms of HDI has drastically decreased over the last 25 years; this trend is evidenced by the
reduced distance between the most developed and least developed municipios in Guanajuato over
time.
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Graph 5.1 Human Development in Guanajuato 1985-2010

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Year
Source: Author; data from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Development requires funding, and from the standpoint of local governments, the most
important source of funding for development projects is taxation. As Graph 5.2 clearly
demonstrates, there is a strong positive relationship between HDI and the percentage of
municipal income that local governments are able to capture in the form of taxes. That is, as
HDI improves, officials appear to become much more effective in capturing taxes. In theory,
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this has the potential to create a virtuous circle, in that municipios that capture more taxes are able
to re-invest more resources in society and as a result improve levels of human development.
Graph 5.2 Human Development and Taxes in Guanajuato

Source: Author; INEGI and SNIM

Graph 5.3 points to the potential importance of migrants in rural communities. As the graph
indicates, rural municipal governments capture far less taxes than urban municipios. As a result,
remittances represent a potentially important alternative source of income for rural municipal
governments. In this sense, for municipios with small populations, the 3x1 program represents a
quasi-tax system in which municipal governments are able to capture a small percentage of
migrant remittances and channel them towards specific development projects within local
communities. Thus, municipios that are able to capture more remittances through the 3x1
program are presented with a unique opportunity to advance development projects that they
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otherwise would not have the ability to get off the ground. Thus, in theory, one might expect
that 3x1 investments would share a positive relationship with human development levels across
Guanajuato’s municipios.
Graph 5.3 Human Development and Taxes in Rural and Urban Municipios

Source: Author; INEGI and SINEM

HDI clearly varies across municipios in Guanajuato. Given this, one might expect that
HDI levels also differ according to the political party governing respective municipios. Table 5.2
illustrates human development patterns by political party for the period 2002 through 2011. As
the table demonstrates, PAN governed municipios average an HDI score of .78, whereas PRI
municipios averaged .75. PRD municipios average the highest HDI score at .79. Concerning the
individual indicators of the HDI index, both PAN and PRD municipios average an infant
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mortality rate of 20 deaths per 1,000 births. PRI, on the other hand, registers a slightly higher
rate of 23 deaths per 1,000 births. Similarly, concerning literacy, in both PAN and PRD
municipios 86 percent of the population is literate. PRI municipios, in turn, average a literacy rate of
83 percent. Despite these differences, all municipios, regardless of governing party, average school
attendance rates of 62 percent. Finally, concerning per capita income, individuals living in both
PAN and PRI municipios average a yearly income of roughly $7,000. People living in PRD
governed municipios, however, average an income of nearly $9,500 dollars per year. Still, it is
important to keep in mind that for the time period in question PAN and PRI controlled the vast
majority of municipal governments. In fact, as Table 5.3 indicates, PAN governed 61 percent of
municipal presidencies during this time period, followed by PRI with 27 percent and PRD with
5 percent. Given this, the most meaningful differences in Table 5.2 are those between PAN
governed municipios and PRI municipios. Although the variance in terms of HDI is slight in
absolute terms, the difference is nonetheless meaningful. As the table indicates, in PAN
municipios children are more likely to live past their first birthday and they are subsequently more
likely to be literate in their adult lives. Moreover, individuals living in PAN municipios earn just
over $100 more than their counterparts in PRI governed municipios. Put simply, for the period
2002 to 2011 PAN municipios outperformed PRI municipios in terms of human development.
Table 5.2 Human Development Performance by Political Party
Party (% of
municipios)

HDI

Infant
Mortality Rate

Pop Literate

School
Attendance

Per Capita
Income

PAN (61 %)

.78

20 per 1,000

86%

62%

$7048

PRI (27%)

.75

23 per 1,000

83%

62%

$6939

PRD (5%)

.79

20 per 1,000

86%

62%

$9477

Source: UNDP; INEGI.
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As Table 5.3 reveals, development trends in Guanajuato also vary significantly as one
moves from urban municipios to rural municipios. In 2011, for example, urban municipios maintained
an average HDI score of .82, compared to .78 in rural municipios. Urban municipios had less infant
mortalities (13.27 vs. 19.84), a more literate population (89.59 vs. 85.75), higher school
attendance rates (65.98 vs. 64.78) and a higher per capita index score (.74 vs. .73). To be clear,
urban municipios are more developed than rural municipios in Guanajuato. That said, from 2001 to
2011 rural municipios developed at a higher rate than urban municipios. That is, while rural
municipios averaged an HDI of .71 in 2001, they improved to a score of .78 in 2011, for an overall
improvement of .07. Moreover, rural municipios held pace with urban municipios in terms of
improvements in infant mortality rates, literacy and school attendance. However, in terms of per
capita income, rural municipios improved significantly more than urban municipios during the last
decade, increasing their index score by .10 compared to the .02 increase averaged across urban
municipios. Given this, one might expect that as access to income improves in rural communities,
individuals living in these areas will slowly gain access to improved health care and education.
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Table 5.3 Human Development Performance by Urban/Rural Municipios
Municipio
Type/Year

HDI

Infant
Mortality Rate

Pop Literate

School
Attendance

Urban (2011)

.82

13.27

89.59

65.98

Per Capita
Income
(index)
.74

Urban (2001)

.76

25.47

86.01

58.29

.72

Difference

.06

-13.20

3.58

7.69

.02

Rural (2011)

.78

19.84

85.75

64.78

.73

Rural (2001)

.71

29.08

82.12

58.39

.63

Difference

.07

-9.24

3.63

6.39

.10

Source: UNDP; INEGI.

The results illustrated in Table 5.3 indicate that rural municipios developed at a slightly
quicker pace from 2001 to 2011 than their urban counterparts. Still, it is important to keep in
mind that this does not necessarily indicate that rural municipios outperformed urban municipios in
terms of development. Rather, these trends reveal that rural municipios finally demonstrated the
capacity to catch-up with the development levels evident in Guanajuato’s urban municipios.
Accounting for the factors that drove this rapid development is the central goal of this chapter.
One potential catalyst of development, in both subtypes of municipios, but especially in rural
municipios, are remittances and 3x1 para migrantes investments.
Graph 5.4 illustrates the relationship between human development levels and 3x1 per
capita measures in the previous year. As is evident, 3x1 per capita appears to have a positive
effect on HDI levels, especially in rural municipios. This implies, as suggested above, that 3x1
investments provide cash strapped governments in sparsely populated municipios with an
important tool for investing in development initiatives, and most importantly, the program
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appears to work, in so much that municipios with relatively more 3x1 investments in the previous
year have improved HDI levels in the subsequent year. (Regression analysis in the subsequent
section of this chapter will examine this trend with more rigor.)
Graph 5.4 Human Development and 3x1 per Capita

Source: Author; INEGI and SEDESOL.

Table 5.4 presents a series of cross-tabulations between key dependent variables and
independent variables of interest. The correlations are across all municipios. Correlations across
only rural municipios are included in parenthesis. Statistically significant correlations are denoted
by asterisks (P < .05). Although tentative in nature, several points of interest emerge from the
table. To begin, literacy rates, school attendance rates, infant mortality rates and per capita
income all share strong positive relationships with HDI levels across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios.
Still, this relationship is notably weaker in rural municipios. This difference is most evident in the
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case of the relationship between school attendance rates and HDI. In urban municipios school
attendance rates and HDI levels have a significant correlation of .68. This relationship holds in
rural municipios but the correlation is substantially weaker at .14. This difference suggests that
quality of education in rural municipios may be lower than in urban municipios, and as a result, even
when children in rural areas attend school as frequently as urban children, may not be as well off
as their urban counterparts. In turn, 3x1 per capita levels do not correlate with HDI levels in
urban municipios. However, in rural municipios there is a significant correlation of .25 between HDI
and 3x1 per capita. This finding implies that if 3x1 investments affect HDI levels, they most
likely do so in relatively more rural municipios. Moreover, and most important for this study, this
correlation suggest that 3x1 investments may indeed improve human development outcomes in
rural municipios across Guanajuato. This relationship holds across all indicators of HDI. That is,
3x1 investments in rural municipios appear to improve literacy rates, school attendance rates,
infant mortality and per capita income. In turn, in both urban and rural municipios the percentage
of homes receiving remittances has a negative effect on HDI levels. Still, this effect is notably
less in rural municipios. These trends hold across each of the individual indicators of HDI. In the
previous chapter it is found that return migrants play a substantial role in the 3x1 development
process. Given this, one would suspect that they might also play an important role in municipal
development. However, as the table below indicates, return migrants appear to have a slightly
negative effect on HDI levels in urban municipios. Still, this effect disappears in rural municipios,
where return migrants appear to have a null effect on HDI and its individual indicators.
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Table 5.4 Correlations Between HDI and Key Independent Variables
HDI

% Literacy

% School
Attendance

Infant
Mortality Rate

Per Capita
Income

3x1 per capita
(1 yr lag)

% Homes
Remittances (1
yr lag)

HDI

1
(1)

% Literacy

.89*
(.75*)

1
(1)

% School
Attendance

.68*
(.14*)

.51*
(-.18*)

1
(1)

Infant
Mortality Rate

.93*
(.89*)

.76*
(.77*)

.65*
(.15*)

1
(1)

Per Capita
Income

.88*
(.79*)

.79*
(.34*)

.47*
(.06)

.67*
(.48*)

1
(1)

3x1 per capita
(1 yr lag)

.03
(.25*)

-.07
(.17*)

.04
(.15*)

.13
(.28*)

-.07
(.13*)

1
(1)

% Homes
Remittances (1
yr lag)
% Homes
Return
Migrants (1 yr
lag)

-.55*
(-.19*)

-.71*
(-.06)

-.33*
(-.37*)

-.42*
(-.12)

-.52*
(-.19*)

.12*
(.11)

1
(1)

-.21*
(.03)

-.31*
(.02)

-.006
(-.05)

-.18*
(-.03)

-.30*
(-.09)

.34*
(.24*)

.62*
(.57*)

Note: Correlations marked * are statistically significant at the .05 level or beyond.
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% Homes
Return
Migrants (1 yr
lag)

1
(1)

Taken together, the trends outlined above suggest a number of testable hypotheses:
1) All things being equal, 3x1 investments share a positive relationship with HDI.
i.

This hypothesis relates to the expectation that 3x1 projects lead to measurable
development across Guanajuato’s municipios and thus would be anticipated to
positively impact HDI levels.

2) 3x1 investments contribute to lower infant mortality rates.
i.

This hypothesis is grounded in the fact that 3x1 investments improve local
infrastructure—including electricity, roads and healthcare institutions—which in
turn would be expected to have a positive effect on the quality of local healthcare
as well as access to it.

3) 3x1 investments contribute to higher attendance rates within local school districts.
i.

Here it is expected that improved infrastructure would facilitate local
transportation routes, and thus, potentially, foster higher attendance rates within
local schools. Moreover, it is expected that improved education resources—new
buildings, electricity, running water, etc.—would motivate students to attend
school more frequently.

4) 3x1 investments help reduce illiteracy rates across municipios.
i.

As noted above, it is expected that improved physical infrastructure will
contribute to higher attendance rates within local schools. Given this, one might
also expect that education levels would improve and consequently illiteracy rates
would fall within municipios with relatively more 3x1 investments.

5) 3x1 investments correlate with higher levels of per capita income.
i.

If 3x1 investments contribute to improved healthcare and higher levels of human
capital, one might also expect that 3x1 investments would improve per capita
income over time.

6) 3x1 investments share a negative relationship with migration rates
i.

This hypothesis emerges from the fact that 3x1 investments target the very
conditions that push people to migrate in the first place. Given this, it would be
expected that in time municipios with relatively more 3x1 investments would
experience a decrease in emigration.

In the section that follows I empirically evaluate these hypotheses via regression analysis.
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Regression Analysis of Human Development in Guanajuato, Mexico
In the space that follows I subject the trends outlined in the previous section to the
scrutiny of regression analysis. Table 5.5 analyzes the impact of select independent variables on
human development levels across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios. χ2 tests show that regressions are
significant across all four models. I run fixed-effects estimations in order to determine the effect
of independent variables on human development in the state of Guanajuato. The model can be
specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. Thus, HDI is the dependent variable
observed for municipio i at time t.

is a time-variant matrix of independent variables. The

terms are the municipios fixed effects, and

is the error term.29

The variable 3x1 per capita is significant across all four models, implying that 3x1
investments have a positive effect on human development trends in the ensuing year. The
coefficient for 3x1 per capita is small at .00002; still, it is important to note that the HDI runs
from 0 to 1 and in general development changes very slowly over time. Thus, despite a relatively
small coefficient, this finding is substantially quite significant. The independent variable % Homes
with remittances is also significant across all models but in contrast with 3x1 investments,
household remittances share a negative relationship with human development in the ensuing
year. The coefficient for this variable is relatively large, ranging from -.0019 in Model I to -.0014
in Model IV. This finding corroborates the trends found in the previous section, indicating that
household remittances alone repress human development at the municipal level in Guanajuato.
29In

contrast with the Random Effects (RE) model in which the unobserved is independent of , in the Fixed
Effects (FE) model correlates with the matrix . As a result, the econometrician cannot observe and thus
cannot be directly controlled for.
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On the other hand, the variable % Homes with return migrants shares a strong positive relationship
with human development. Taken together, these initial three variables indicate that remittances
have the potential to improve human development outcomes at the municipal level. However, it
appears that this potential is only realized in those cases in which migrants and their
communities work in conjunction with the state.
Although remittances are clearly a major source of income for municipios across
Guanajuato, they are hardly a replacement for economic production and government taxation.
Given this, one would expect that the municipios that capture a larger percentage of municipal
production in the form of taxes would have relatively better development outcomes. The
variable % Municipal Production Taxed supports this notion, reporting positive and relatively large
coefficients across each model. Still, the variable is only statistically significant in Model IV
(P<.1). One possible explanation for this outcome is the fact that taxation does not necessarily
indicate government investment in social welfare. For this reason, the variables Public Works per
Capita, Ramo 26 and Ramo 33 may be more meaningful in that, like 3x1 para migrantes
investments, these variables measure government allocations towards specific ends. As the table
indicates, each of these variables has a positive impact on human development. This is an
important finding, specifically as it concerns the latter two variables Ramo 26 and Ramo 33,
which are both key components in the government’s effort to decentralize funding across
Mexico. Thus, at least in the state of Guanajuato, it appears that decentralization efforts have
been fruitful in so much that they have had a positive impact on human development. It is very
difficult, of course, to determine the degree to which human development indicators would have
improved in the absence of decentralization. Still, given the dearth of local resources prior to the
decentralization of funding in 1997, it is very hard to imagine that local development would have
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progressed as much under the traditional federal-centric system. Finally, Per Capita Income shares
a positive relationship with HDI, implying that human development improves more in
municipios with higher per capita income. This finding is related to the relationship between
Municipal Population and HDI, which indicates that human development is relatively worse in
rural municipios when compared to their urban counterparts.
Table 5.5 highlights a number of interesting findings concerning the relationship
between remittances and development in Guanajuato. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in
mind that the HDI is an index composed of four distinct indicators, including: infant mortality
rates, literacy rates, school attendance rates and per capita income. Thus, although the previous
regression analysis finds that 3x1 investments improve development outcomes in Guanajuato, it
is quite likely that migrant projects affect the individual indicators of human development
differently. For that reason, in the space that follows I explore in turn the relationship between
3x1 investments and each of the four indicators of HDI. I begin with infant mortality rates.
Table 5.6 reports results from the regression of select independent variables on infant
mortality rates. χ2 tests show that regressions are significant across all four models. As in the
previous model, I run fixed-effects estimations as a means of determining the effect of
independent variables on infant mortality rates in the state of Guanajuato. The model is
specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. Thus, Infant Mortality Rates is the dependent
variable observed for municipio i at time t and
variables. The

is a time-variant matrix of independent

terms are the municipios fixed effects, and
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is the error term.

Table 5.5 Regression Analysis of Human Development in Guanajuato
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

.00002***

.00002*

.00001+

.00002**

(.00001)

(.00001)

(.00001)

(.00001)

% Homes with remittances (1 year
lag)

-.0019***

-.0019***

-.0015***

-.0014***

(.0004)

(.00001)

(.0003)

(.0003)

% Homes with return migrants (1
year lag)

.012***

.009***

.008***

.008***

(.0006)

(.0008)

(.0008)

(.0008)

% Municipal Production Taxed (1
year lag)

.055

.033

.071

.079+

(.064)

(.063)

(.059)

(.058)

.000006***

.000002**

.000009***

.000009***

(.000001)

(.000001)

(.000001)

(.000001)

--

.00003***

.00002***

.00002**

(--)

(.000007)

(.000007)

(.000007)

--

.000005**

.000004**

.000004**

(--)

(.000002)

(.000002)

(.000002)

--

--

.00001***

.00001***

(--)

(--)

(.000001)

(.000001)

--

--

--

-.028***

(--)

(--)

(--)

(.008)

.74***

.74***

.73***

.74***

(.006)

(.007)

(.007)

(.007)

.58

.61

.65

.67

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

388

388

388

388

HDI
3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

Public Works per Capita (1 year
lag)
Ramo 26 (1 year lag)

Ramo 33 (1 year lag)

Per Capita Income (1 year lag)

Municipal Population (rural = 1;
urban = 0)
Constant

R2
Prob. > χ2
N

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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The variable 3x1 per capita is significant in each model. In Model IV, for example, as 3x1
per capita increases 1000 pesos infant mortality falls by 6 in the ensuing year, indicating that for
every 1,000 births 6 fewer children die before their fifth birthday. The independent variables %
Homes with remittances is also significant across all four models. The coefficient is positive in each
model, indicating that for a 10 percent increase in household remittances infant mortality rates at
the municipal level increase by 5. This does not necessarily mean that remittances do not help
improve the healthcare of some individuals. In fact, they do. During my visits to the case study
towns outlined in Chapter 3 I met countless individuals with medical ailments that they were
able to receive treatment for thanks in large part due to the money family members sent back
from the U.S. Still, there were many other individuals in these same communities who were not
receiving remittances. As a result, in the case of an emergency, these individuals would have
lacked the ability to foot the bill at a private clinic or in the case of a public health care center,
they would have had trouble paying for the medicine after the doctor gave them a prescription.
Put simply, remittances alone do not appear to be a good substitute for public investments in
healthcare. Concerning the variable % Homes with return migrants, there is a strong negative
relationship between the percentage migrants who return from the U.S. and infant mortality
rates. Specifically, as Model IV indicates, for a 10 percent increase in return migrants infant
mortality rates fall in the ensuing year by an astounding 13 deaths per 1,000 births. This finding
reaffirms the apparent importance of migrants themselves in community development across
Guanajuato’s municipios.
Migrants and remittances may indeed play an important role in community development,
especially in Guanajuato’s rural municipios. Still, as previously demonstrated, remittances are
hardly a substitute for public investment in local communities. This point is made evident by the
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variable % Municipal Production Taxed, which shares a strong negative relationship with infant
mortality rates. In Model IV, for example, for every 1 percent increase in the taxation of
municipal production infant mortality rates fall by 16. This finding clearly demonstrates that the
municipal government’s ability to improve social conditions is in large part a function of its
ability to tax municipal income. With this in mind, it is somewhat surprising that neither Ramo 26
nor Ramo 33 report significance in the four models outlined in Table 5.6. If nothing else, this
speaks to the relative importance at the municipal level of migrant investments made through
the 3x1 para migrants program in Guanajuato. In turn, the variable Per Capita Income is significant
and implies that as per capita income increases 1000 pesos infant mortality rates fall by 1 among
every 1,000 births. Finally, the variable Municipal Population is significant and shares a strong
positive relationship with the dependent variable. In Model IV, for example, rural municipios have
8 more infant mortalities than urban municipios. Given that migrants are predominantly from
rural areas, this finding again highlights the potential importance of 3x1 investments across
Guanajuato’s rural municipios.
Table 5.7 displays the results from the regression of select independent variables on
school attendance rates. χ2 tests show that regressions are significant across all four models.
Again, in this model I run fixed-effects estimations as a means of determining the effect of
independent variables on school attendance rates across Guanajuato’s municipios. The model is
specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. Thus, School Attendance Rates is the dependent
variable observed for municipio i at time t and
variables. The

is a time-variant matrix of independent

terms are the municipios fixed effects, and
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is the error term.

Table 5.6 Regression Analysis of Infant Mortality Rates in Guanajuato
Infant Mortality Rate

Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

-.005**

-.005**

-.005**

-.006***

(.002)

(.002)

(.002)

(.002)

% Homes with remittances (1 year
lag)

.58***

.57***

.54***

.52***

(.075)

(.075)

(.075)

(.073)

% Homes with return migrants (1
year lag)

-1.69***

-1.49***

-1.34***

-1.38***

(.12)

(.15)

(.16)

(.15)

% Municipal Production Taxed (1
year lag)

-12.66

-11.04

-14.43+

-16.88*

(11.61)

(11.61)

(11.52)

(11.17)

-.0009

-.0007***

.0003

.0002

(.0002)

(.0002)

(.0004)

(.0004)

--

-.002

-.001

-.001

(--)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

--

-.0007

-.0006

-.0005

(--)

(.0004)

(.0004)

(.0004)

--

--

-.001***

-.001***

(--)

(--)

(.003)

(.003)

--

--

--

7.82***

(--)

(--)

(--)

(1.63)

22.83***

23.02***

23.96***

20.66***

(1.22)

(1.21)

(1.24)

(1.38)

.50

.51

.52

.55

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

388

388

388

388

3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

Public Works per Capita (1 year
lag)
Ramo 26 (1 year lag)

Ramo 33 (1 year lag)

Per Capita Income (1 year lag)

Municipal Population (rural = 1;
urban = 0)
Constant

R2
Prob. > χ2
N

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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Table 5.7 Regression Analysis of School Attendance in Guanajuato
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

.006***

.006***

.006***

.007***

(.002)

(.002)

(.002)

(.002)

% Homes with remittances (1 year
lag)

-.42***

-.42***

-.44***

-.43***

(.06)

(.06)

(.06)

(.06)

% Homes with return migrants (1
year lag)

1.10***

1.03***

1.11***

1.14***

(.09)

(.12)

(.12)

(.12)

% Municipal Production Taxed (1
year lag)

-12.71+

-13.20*

-14.85*

-12.84+

(8.85)

(8.89)

(8.89)

(8.58)

Public Works per Capita ( 1 year
lag)

.0004**

.0004**

.0009**

.0009**

(.0001)

(.0002)

(.0003)

(.0003)

--

.0008

.0014

.0013

(--)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

--

.0004

.0004

.0004

(--)

(.0003)

(.0003)

(.0003)

--

--

-.0005*

-.0006*

(--)

(--)

(.0003)

(.0003)

--

--

--

-6.51***

(--)

(--)

(--)

(1.25)

63.19

63.09

63.55***

66.30***

(.96)

(1.06)

School Attendance Rates
3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

Ramo 26 (1 year lag)

Ramo 33 (1 year lag)

Per Capita Income (1 year lag)

Municipal Population (rural = 1;
urban = 0)
Constant

R2
Prob. > χ2
N

.45

.45

.46

.50

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

388

388

388

388

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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Concerning Table 5.7, 3x1 per capita has a positive effect on school attendance.
Specifically, as 3x1 per capita increases 1000 pesos school attendance increases between 6 to 7
percent in the following year. When placed in context, this finding makes more sense. For
example, imagine for a moment a rural community with poor roads and limited access to
electricity. In this community school attendance rates would be expected to be low due to the
fact that students would have a relatively harder time getting to school and once at school the
quality of education would be affected by the building’s access to electricity. If, in this same
community, 3x1 investments focused on improving the community’s roads and expanding the
electricity grid, one would expect school attendance rates to improve in subsequent years. One
might expect to find a similar correlation between % Homes with remittances and school attendance
rates; however, as Table 5.7 indicates, attendance rates actually fall as remittance levels increase.
Although the mechanism driving this particular outcome is not entirely self-evident, this finding
quite likely relates to the fact that in communities that receive high levels of remittances children
grow up idolizing migrants. After all, in financial terms migrants are among the best off in their
community. As a result, young men (and more recently women) look not to education as the key
to a successful future but rather to the U.S. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising
that municipios with relatively higher remittance rates have lower school attendance rates. Put
simply, in high-migration regions one’s rate of return on education is far less than a successful
trip al Norte.30 This finding relates to the relationship between % Homes with return migrants and
school attendance rates. As Table 5.7 reveals, for every 10 percent increase in return migrants,

30It

is worth noting that in recent years the government of Guanajuato has begun funding English as a second
language classes in rural communities throughout the state. There are at least two immediate goals driving this
development. First, the government recognizes the need to provide an education that results in tangible skills. In the
case of migrants, few skills are as important as English. Second, the government is well aware of the fact that
migrants who speak English well often land better paying jobs in the U.S. and thus would be more likely to send
back larger cash transfers to Guanajuato.
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school attendance rates at the municipal level increase by 11 percent. There are perhaps multiple
explanations for this but as the case studies from Chapter 3 illustrate, return migrants are highly
aware of the value of education. This is particularly evident in the case of Don Ángel, who over
the years has made an effort to improve education facilities in El Timbinal and in general
demonstrates a genuine desire to help the youth of his hometown community.
The variable % Municipal Production Taxed indicates that education attendance rates fall by
nearly 13 percent for every 1 percent increase in the taxation of municipal production. This
finding may seem counterintuitive, however, as Graph 5.5 reveals this trend reflects a tendency
that is apparent in other high migration regions in Mexico and around the world. That is,
migrants are predominately from relatively rural areas but generally they are not the poorest of
the poor. Rather, migrants tend to come from the rural areas that are a little better off than
surrounding communities. This results from the fact that in order to migrate one needs enough
money to pay for transportation to a more developed region or country. This principle applies to
both legal migrants who are faced with thousands of dollars in fees and transportation costs, and
illegal migrants, who are forced to pay border-crossers or coyotes hefty fees for their services. In
this sense, Graph 5.5 reflects the fact that, at least initially, in municipios with high migration rates
education attendance goes down as municipal capacity strengthens. This appears to result from
the fact that as social conditions begin to improve in extremely poor areas more people begin to
migrant, and specifically, more young men and women who would otherwise be in school begin
to search out employment opportunities abroad. Related to this, it is also quite likely that in
municipios with high migration rates young men and women look to the U.S. as the only viable
option to get ahead in life, and thus, in these communities education takes a back seat to
migration. Still, as Graph 5.5 illustrates, this trend is far less evident in urban municipios,
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suggesting that there is a point of inflection at which increased taxation, which itself is a proxy
for development, begins to encourage school attendance. Thus, one would expect that this trend
would hold across Mexican states with high migration but would likely disappear in states with
relatively higher levels of development.
Graph 5.5 School Attendance Rates by Municipal Taxation

Source: Author; INEGI and SEDESOL.

Regarding Public Works per Capita, Table 5.7 demonstrates that as public investments in
infrastructure increase school attendance rates improve slightly in the ensuing year. To be
precise, for every 1000 peso increase in public works per capita school attendance rates increase
nearly 1 percent. Similarly, the coefficients for Ramo 26 and Ramo 33 indicate a positive trend;
however, neither coefficient is statistically significant. In turn, Per Capita Income has a slightly
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negative effect on school attendance rates in the ensuing year. Similar to municipal taxation,
increases in per capita income appear to actually repress school attendance rates. However,
again, it necessary to note that this trend is strongest in rural municipios with high migration rates
and all but disappears in more developed urban municipios such as León and Celaya. Still, this
trend is clearly the norm across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios, reflecting the fact that the majority of
the state’s municipios continued to experience relatively high migration rates over the last decade.
In time as municipal development improves and migration rates drop it would be expected that
per capita income would stimulate higher school attendance rates. This interpretation is
supported by the coefficient for Municipal Population, which indicates that rural municipios have
school attendance rates that are 6.5 percent below the rates recorded in urban municipios.
Table 5.8 displays the results from the regression of select independent variables on
literacy rates. χ2 tests show that regressions are significant across all four models. As in the
previous models, I run fixed-effects estimations as a means of determining the effect of
independent variables on literacy rates across Guanajuato’s municipios. The model is specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. Thus, Literacy Rates is the dependent variable
observed for municipio i at time t and
terms are the municipios fixed effects, and

is a time-variant matrix of independent variables. The
is the error term.

Table 5.8 displays the results of regression analysis of the relationship between literacy
rates and select independent variables in Guanajuato. The coefficient for 3x1 per capita is positive
but is statistically non-significant across all models. Taken into consideration with the results
from Table 5.7, this finding indicates that while 3x1 investments do improve school attendance
rates, they do not appear to affect literacy rates. Put simply, 3x1 investments increase the
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likelihood of children going to school but they do not appear to influence the outcome of the
learning process that takes place once they are there. Intuitively this makes sense when one
considers the fact that 3x1 investments focus mainly on public works projects and rarely address
issues of human capital, such as instructor capacity within primary and secondary schools. It is
necessary to keep in mind, however, that in time improved infrastructure may very well help
attract and retain more qualified instructors and thus contribute to improved education
outcomes. Still, any development of this nature would be expected to take place over a long
period of time and thus would be unlikely to be captured by the regression models presented
here. Regarding the variable % Homes with remittances, all models report a strong negative
relationship between household remittances and literacy rates. Specifically, concerning Model
IV, for every 10 percent increase in the percentage of households receiving remittances literacy
rates fall by roughly 1.3 percent. This finding echoes the results of Table 5.7, reemphasizing the
fact that municipios with high migration tend to have weaker education outcomes due to the fact
that a good number of young men and women drop out of the education system in order to
migrate to larger cities in Mexico or to the U.S.
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Table 5.8 Regression Analysis of Literacy Rates in Guanajuato
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

.001

.001

.001

.001

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

% Homes with remittances (1
year lag)

-.15***

-.15***

-.138***

-.136***

(.032)

(.032)

(.032)

(.032)

% Homes with return migrants
(1 year lag)

.68***

.57***

.53***

.53***

(.05)

(.065)

(.068)

(.068)

% Municipal Production Taxed
(1 year lag)

9.80*

8.79**

9.84**

10.13***

(4.96)

(4.94)

(4.94)

(4.94)

.0002**

.0002*

.0001

.0001

(.00008)

(.0001)

(.0002)

(.0002)

--

.001**

.001+

.001+

(--)

(.0006)

(.0006)

(.0006)

--

.0003*

.0002+

.0002+

(--)

(.0002)

(.0002)

(.0002)

--

--

.0003*

.0003*

(--)

(--)

(.0001)

(.0001)

--

--

--

-.92

(--)

(--)

(--)

(.72)

84.03***

83.96***

83.67***

84.06***

(.52)

(.52)

(.61)

(.61)

.43

.44

.45

.46

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

388

388

388

388

Literacy Rates
3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

Public Works per Capita (1 year
lag)
Ramo 26 (1 year lag)

Ramo 33 (1 year lag)

Per Capita Income (1 year lag)

Municipal Population (rural = 1;
urban = 0)
Constant

R2
Prob. > χ2
N

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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The reader will recall that in Table 5.7 it was found that municipal taxation shares a
strong negative relationship with school attendance rates. However, as Table 5.8 reveals, across
Guanajuato municipal taxation appears to stimulate higher literacy rates. This finding is very
promising in so much that it demonstrates that as municipal capacity improves in Guanajuato,
local governments respond by reinvesting in education. Literacy rates are a very basic but
meaningful proxy for education quality, especially in marginalized regions that have high
illiteracy rates; and thus, the fact that improved taxation at the local level leads to an increase in
literacy rates indicates that municipal capacity is a key factor along the road to development.
Although Table 5.8 does not clarify the relationship between municipal taxation and 3x1
investments, Graph 5.6 helps shed light on the role of RLD in this process. At the graph
illustrates, in urban municipios where relatively less 3x1 projects are carried out, 3x1 per capita
shares a negative relationship with the percentage of municipal production captured by taxes in
the ensuing year. In rural municipios, however, where taxes rates are the lowest in the state, 3x1
investments appear to improve municipal taxation in the subsequent year. This finding reflects
positively on the 3x1 para migrantes program in that it indicates that 3x1 investments correlate
with higher taxation rates, and in turn, taxation improves education outcomes.
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Graph 5.6 Municipal Taxation by 3x1 per Capita

Source: Author; INEGI and SEDESOL.

Given Graph 5.6, the reader may wonder how household remittances affect municipal taxation
rates. Graph 5.7 demonstrates a strong negative trend between municipal taxation and
household remittances in urban municipios. This trend is much more uniform than the one found
in Graph 5.6. Concerning rural municipios, Graph 5.7 shows an initially positive relationship
between taxation and household remittances. However, as the percentage of households
receiving remittances increases beyond 10 percent municipal taxation begins to fall. Taken
together, Graphs 5.6 and 5.7, in conjunction with Table 5.8, reemphasize the importance of
channeling remittances towards certain ends. Specifically, when directed towards specific
development projects, remittances appear to have the potential to improve not only municipal
taxation but also stimulate better education outcomes in local schools.
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Graph 5.7 Municipal Taxation by Household Remittances

Source: Author; INEGI and SEDESOL.

Still, the clearest relationship between literacy rates and distinct measures of migration is
found in the case return migrants. As Table 5.8 indicates, a 10 percent increase in return
migrants leads to a roughly 5 percent increase in literacy rates. As with previous findings
highlighted in this study, this discovery stresses the importance of strong transnational
networks—between migrants and their communities—in channeling remittances towards
meaningful ends.
The variable Public Works per Capita has a positive effect on literacy rates, indicating that
municipal investment in public works project has the potential to improve human capital
outcomes by supporting investments in public infrastructure. The state’s capacity to foster
development is also supported by the variables Ramo 26 and Ramo 33, which both share a
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positive relationship with literacy rates. This is specifically important in the case of Ramo 26
investments due to the fact that these particular transfers are aimed towards the country’s most
marginalized municipios. This finding would suggest that the country would be wise to expand
these particular transfers, as they appear to not only reach the most excluded citizens, but most
importantly, improve their lives. Regarding the variable Per Capita Income, Table 5.8 shows that
for every $1,000 dollar increase in per capita incomes literacy rates improve by less than 1
percent. This finding, which is overshadowed by the positive influence of municipal taxation and
return migrants on literacy outcomes, underscores the importance of state support and
community ties in improving education outcomes. Finally, the variable Municipal Population is not
significant, although the coefficient indicates, as one might expect, that literacy outcomes are
worse in rural municipios.
Table 5.9 displays the results from the regression of select independent variables on per
capita income in Guanajuato. χ2 tests show that regressions are significant across all four
models. I run the model with fixed-effects estimations as a means of highlighting the effects of
independent variables on literacy rates across Guanajuato’s municipios. The model is specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. Thus, Index of Per Capita Income 31 is the
dependent variable observed for municipio i at time t and
independent variables. The

is a time-variant matrix of

terms are the municipios fixed effects, and

is the error term.

The variable 3x1 per capita reports a slightly negative coefficient but the variable is
statistically non-significant across each model. This finding implies that 3x1 investments have a
31 The

dependent variable in this model is an index calculated according to the United Nations Development
Programme. The index is based off of per capita income and is equal to the natural logarithm of the maximum and
minimum values of per capital income for each municipio.
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negligible effect on per capita income across Guanajuato’s municipios. Still, as Graph 5.8 indicates,
3x1 investments do appear to slightly improve per capita income in rural municipios. This trend,
however, is washed out in the regression model, which pools rural municipios together with urban
municipios.
Concerning the variable % Homes with remittances, it is evident that as household
remittances increase at the municipal level per capita income improves. Still, the reader will recall
that the results displayed in Table 5.5 reveal a strong negative relationship between household
remittances and overall human development. Remittances alone do not, thus, lead to improved
human development at the municipal level in Guanajuato. This finding implies that while
income is clearly a necessary factor for economic and social development, it is not sufficient. Put
differently, raw income is hardly a substitute for a development-minded state that facilitates the
channeling of resources to those areas of society in which they are most needed. Still, as the
variable % Homes with return migrants indicates, the development process is facilitated by strong
community networks. On this note, across all four models the percentage of homes with return
migrants has a positive effect on per capita income.
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Graph 5.8 Income Per Capita and 3x1 Investments

Source: Author; INEGI and SEDESOL.

The variable % Municipal Production Taxed shares a positive relationship with per capita
income but the variable is insignificant statistically across all four models. Similarly, the variable
Public Works per Capita reports a positive coefficient but the variable is statistically insignificant
across all models. It is quite probable that both of these factors improve per capita income in
time. Still, given the limited data available for this study, it is not possible to lag the variables by
more than one year. Taking this into consideration, despite the fact that neither variable reports
statistical significance, they both likely play a fundamental role in the increase of per capita
income at the municipal level over time. In turn, the variables Ramo 26 and Ramo 33 both have a
positive influence on per capita income. Again, this is an extremely meaningful finding in so
much that it demonstrates the decentralization of federal funds in Guanajuato over the last ten
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years has not been in vain. Finally, although not statistically significant, the variable Municipal
Population implies that per capita income is relatively less in rural municipios.
Table 5.9 Regression Analysis of Per Capita Income in Guanajuato
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

-.00001

-.000001

-.000001

-.00001

(.00002)

(.00003)

(.00003)

(.00003)

.002*

.002*

.002*

.002*

(.0009)

(.0009)

(.0009)

(.0009)

% Homes with return migrants (1
year lag)

.013***

.012***

.008***

.008***

(.001)

(.014)

(.002)

(.002)

% Municipal Production Taxed (1
year lag)

.05

.05

.002

.0008

(.14)

(.14)

(.13)

(.14)

--

.000002

.000002

.000002

(--)

(.000002)

(.000002)

(.000002)

--

--

.00006***

.00006***

(--)

(--)

(.00001)

(.00001)

--

--

.000009*

.000009*

(--)

(--)

(.000005)

(.000005)

--

--

--

-.007

(--)

(--)

(--)

(.02)

.63***

.63***

.63***

.62***

(.015)

(.015)

(.015)

(.02)

.24

.27

.27

.28

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

388

388

388

388

Per Capita Income
3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

% Homes with remittances (1
year lag)

Public Works per Capita ( 1 year
lag)
Ramo 26 (1 year lag)

Ramo 33 (1 year lag)

Municipal Population (rural = 1;
urban = 0)
Constant

R2
Prob. > χ2
N

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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Table 5.10 compares regression results from the regression of independent variables on
five distinct dependent variables, including: (1) HDI, (2) Infant Mortality Rates, (3) School
Attendance Rates, (4) Literacy Rates and Per Capita Income. In each model I run fixed-effects
estimations in order to determine the effect of a number of independent variables upon the
aforementioned dependent variables across 46 municipios in Guanajuato, Mexico. The models can
be specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. The
and

is the error term. The vector

terms are the municipios fixed effects,

includes the independent variables outlined in left-hand

column of the table below.
Each of the results reported in Table 5.10 are discussed individually above. For that
reason, here I focus on comparisons of interest that emerge from the respective regressions
outlined in the table. One of the clearest findings in Table 5.10 concerns the last variable
RuralUrban, which demonstrates that urban municipios have clearly made more progress along the
road to development than their rural counterparts. As previously mentioned, this finding
underscores the importance of programs such as 3x1 para migrantes that aid rural municipios in
their efforts to improve human development. In turn, the principle pattern emerging from Table
5.10 relates to the fact that each independent variable outlined in the first column of the table
has a distinct effect on each of the four indicators of HDI. For example, concerning 3x1 per
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capita, overall 3x1 investments have a positive effect on human development levels. Still, it is
evident that 3x1 investments impact infant mortality rates and school attendance rates more than
literacy rates and per capita income. In contrast, the variable % Homes with remittances has a strong
effect on each indicator of HDI, such that a 10 percent increase in homes receiving remittances
increases infant mortality rates by 5 deaths per 1,000 births, reduces school attendance rates by 4
percent and pulls down literacy rates by 1 percent. Still, as the number of homes receiving
remittances increases, per capita income also rises. Thus, although an increase in homes
receiving migrant remittances does in fact pull overall human development down, it would be
misleading to conclude that migrant remittance adversely affect all levels of development. Return
migrants, on the other hand, have a positive effect overall on human development, reducing
infant mortality rates, while improving school attendance rates, literacy rates and per capita
income. Taken together, these first three variables reemphasis the fact that raw cash transfers do
not necessarily improve the lives of those receiving them. Rather, in order for remittances to
improve development outcomes, they must be channeled towards certain ends. Evidence of this
point is found in the variables % Municipal Production Taxed, Public Works per Capita, Ramo 26 and
Ramo 33. The first of these variables measures the capacity of local government, whereas the
remaining are indicators of state redistribution. As Table 5.10 indicates, each of these variables
has an overall positive effect on human development. Still, across all variables municipal taxation
has the largest impact on human development, demonstrating the importance of municipal
capacity in the development process. To be sure, cash transfers from migrants and the federal
government are important supplements for municipios across Guanajuato but they are clearly not
substitutes for a capable local government.
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Table 5.10 Regression Analysis in Comparison

3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

% Homes with remittances (1
year lag)
% Homes with
migrants (1 year lag)

return

% Municipal Production
Taxed (1 year lag)
Public Works per Capita (1
year lag)
Ramo 26 (1 year lag)

Ramo 33 (1 year lag)

Per Capita Income (1 year lag)

Municipal Population (rural =
1; urban = 0)
Constant

R2
Prob. > χ2
N

HDI

Infant
Mortality

School
Attendance

Literacy

Per Capita
Income

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

.00002**

-.006***

.007***

.001

-.00001

(.00001)

(.002)

(.002)

(.001)

(.00003)

-.0014***

.52***

-.43***

-.136***

.002*

(.0003)

(.073)

(.06)

(.032)

(.0009)

.008***

-1.38***

1.14***

.53***

.008***

(.0008)

(.15)

(.12)

(.068)

(.002)

.079+

-16.88*

-12.84+

10.13***

.0008

(.058)

(11.17)

(8.58)

(4.94)

(.14)

.000009***

.0002

.0009**

.0001

.000002

(.000001)

(.0004)

(.0003)

(.0002)

(.000002)

.00002**

-.001

.0013

.001+

.00006***

(.000007)

(.001)

(.001)

(.0006)

(.00001)

.000004**

-.0005

.0004

.0002+

.000009*

(.000002)

(.0004)

(.0003)

(.0002)

(.000005)

.00001***

-.001***

-.0006*

.0003*

--

(.000001)

(.003)

(.0003)

(.0001)

(--)

-.028***

7.82***

-6.51***

-.92

-.007

(.008)

(1.63)

(1.25)

(.72)

(.02)

.74***

20.66***

66.30***

84.06***

.62***

(.007)

(1.38)

(1.06)

(.61)

(.02)

.67

.55

.50

.46

.27

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

388

388

388

388

388

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

197

A final point of inquiry concerns the relationship between human development and
migration. At least in theory one might suspect that higher levels of human development would
eventually lead to lower levels of migration. To test this hypothesis I regress select independent
variables on the percentage of households with migrants in each of Guanajuato’s 46 municipios.
Table 5.11 displays the results of this analysis. χ2 tests show that the regressions in this particular
run are significant across each model. I run the model with fixed-effects estimations. The model
is specified as:

where i indexes the municipio and t indexes the year. Thus, % Home Migrants is the dependent
variable observed for municipio i at time t and
variables. The

is a time-variant matrix of independent

terms are the municipios fixed effects, and

is the error term.

The independent variable 3x1 para migrantes is significant across all four models and
indicates that 3x1 investments lead to a reduction in the number of households with migrants in
the ensuing year. The coefficient for this variable is small, indicating that for a 1000 peso
increase in 3x1 per capita the percentage of households with migrants falls by 7 percent. Still,
this finding is of great practical importance in so much that it signals that when channeled
towards specific ends, remittances can play a role in reducing emigration. In turn, the variable %
Homes Remittances is found to share a positive relationship with migration, implying that
emigration increases as the percentage of homes receiving remittances goes up. Specifically, a 10
percent increase in the percentage of homes receiving remittances leads to a 6 percent increase
in the percentage of homes with migrants. This relationship is at least in part due to the fact that
remittances provide tangible evidence of the Sueño Americano that so many rural villagers hear
about. In this sense, at first only a handful of risk takers leave but as the fruits of their labor
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become more and more evident, it only makes sense that others would exit as well. Return
migrants, in turn, appear to contribute to a reduction in overall migration trends. Regarding
Model IV, a 10 percent increase in return migrants leads to a nearly 6 percent decrease in the
percentage of homes with migrants. In turn, a mere 1 percent increase in municipal taxations
leads to an 8 percent decrease in households reporting migrants. Similarly, the variables Public
Works per Capita, Ramo 26 and Ramo 33 each contribute to slight reductions in migration. Still,
among independent variables, HDI levels have by far the largest impact on the percentage of
households with migrants. As the coefficients for HDI and HDI Squared indicate, the percentage
of municipal homes reporting migrants initially rises as human development improves but in
time migration rates decrease. This finding is supported by the variable Municipal Population,
which indicates that the percentage of households with migrants is substantially higher in rural
municipios. Together, these findings point to a basic conclusion: Tangible development—
improved healthcare, investments in human capital and infrastructure—is the best way to reduce
emigration. Regarding this, it is important to keep in mind that during the period in question—
2002 to 2011—the U.S. government spent more money on “controlling migration” than at any
time in the nation’s history. Despite this, migration across Guanajuato only fell in those
municipios that were able to make significant gains in human development. In this sense, levels of
human development, more than the height of border walls, seems to best predict migration
trends in Mexico.
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Table 5.11 Regression Analysis of Migration Rates in Guanajuato
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

-.007***

-.007***

-.007***

-.007***

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

.65***

.66***

.62***

.60***

(.04)

(.04)

(.04)

(.04)

% Homes with return migrants (1 year
lag)

-1.01***

-.81***

-.55***

-.59***

(.06)

(.08)

(.09)

(.09)

% Municipal Production Taxed (1 year
lag)

-4.11

-7.47

-6.53

-8.51+

(6.09)

(6.06)

(6.02)

(5.77)

--

-.0002*

-.0002*

-.0001*

(--)

(.0001)

(.0001)

(.0001)

--

-.002***

-.002***

-.002***

(--)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

--

--

-.0003*

-.0003*

(--)

(--)

(.0002)

(.0002)

--

--

-20.84***

65.04*

(--)

(--)

(5.15)

(.0002)

--

--

--

-53.36**

(--)

(--)

(--)

(30.71)

--

--

--

3.27***

(--)

(--)

(--)

(.86)

10.99***

125.77***

22.56***

-12.65+

(.82)

(12.67)

(3.83)

(18.35)

.61

.64

.66

.68

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

388

388

388

388

% Homes With Migrant
3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

% Homes with remittances (1 year lag)

Public Works per Capita (1 year lag)

Ramo 26 (1 year lag)

Ramo 33 (1 year lag)

HDI (1 year lag)

HDI Squared (1 year lag)

Municipal Population (rural = 1;
urban = 0)
Constant

R2
Prob. > χ2
N

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
+p<.1
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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Conclusions
In this chapter I have placed specific emphasis on how remittances affect human
development outcomes. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study to compare the
development effects of household remittances with 3x1 investments. Two clear points emerge
from this analysis: (1) household remittances alone drive down social and economic
development and (2) remittances channeled through the program 3x1 para migrantes have a
positive effect on human development outcomes. These findings echo the results of the studies
outlined in the first section of this chapter. In particular, as Calderón and colleagues (2008)
argue, “…remittances are more effective in raising investment and enhancing growth in
countries with higher levels of human capital, strong institutions, and good policy
environments” (Calderón, Fajnzylber and López 2008: 366). In this sense, the findings outlined
in this chapter add to the conversation by documenting the degree to which pro-migrant policy
improves the development potential of remittances in the state of Guanajuato, Mexico.
Moreover, this study demonstrates that RLD varies a great deal across municipios, indicating that
it would be a grave mistake to generalize about the nature of RLD at the state or national level
without also documenting the nuances of development outcomes at the local level. Finally, and
most important for the larger conversation at hand, this analysis illustrates the role of 3x1
investments in improving human development in select municipios across the state of Guanajuato.
As documented above, municipios that have participated in the 3x1 program are relatively more
developed today than they were ten years ago. Given this, one might expect that these municipios
would have relatively more transparent and accountable governments. In the subsequent chapter
I test this hypothesis by analyzing the relationship between development and governance across
Guanajuato’s municipios.
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Chapter 6: Paving the Path for Democracy in Guanajuato, Mexico
[T]he ultimate outcome of the decentralized development strategy will depend in part on
the extension of the third wave of democratization to the subnational levels of
government in developing countries, a process that to date remains sporadic. (Hiskey
2003:56)
As the first four chapters of this study demonstrate, in the state of Guanajuato fiscal
decentralization establishes the structural foundation for a more participatory form of local
government and acts as a catalyst for human development. The program 3x1 para migrantes is a
product of this shift. Still, it is unclear whether or not these structural moves underpin actual
changes in governance. In this chapter, as a means of addressing this issue, I analyze the
relationship between remittances and governance across Guanajuato’s municipios. A brief
anecdote from my field research sets the stage for this discussion.
One evening while I was staying in the town of Ojo de Agua de Mendoza, located in the
municipio of Jerécuaro, I found myself talking with two young immigrants who had recently been
deported from the U.S. Both young men had lived in the U.S. for a number of years, one in
Albuquerque, NM and the other in Lincoln, NE. At the time of my visit the men were working
with part of a road crew that was widening a small alleyway in preparation for a new street. Part
of their task was to widen the current avenue so that the paving crew would have enough space
to lay down the new road. However, as both men explained to me, the project was hung up at
the moment because one of the neighbors was unwilling to relinquish a small strip of his land
that bordered the projected roadway. As a result, as soon as they were done clearing out debris
from the alleyway, the project was going to be put on hold. I asked them if they had spoken to
the government about the issue, to which the young man who had lived in Lincoln responded:
Yes, we talked with the individual directly and once it was clear that he was not going to
work with us, we went to the municipal government but they said they couldn’t do
202

anything about the issue. You know, in the U.S. the government would take this issue on
and make the owner give up his strip of land for the better good of the community but
not here. [Here it is important to note that the young main referred specifically to
eminent domain.] You see, that is the difference between the U.S. and Mexico. In the
U.S. the government pushes progress and here the government and the people are
accustomed the way things are. That’s why it’s so hard to live here because nobody
thinks about the future.
Now, if the young man had been the property owner whose land was being asked to be sold for
the public good I imagine he might have been less willing to defend the government’s use of
eminent domain. Still, what stuck in my mind after this conversation was the way in which the
young men quickly invoked the cultural and political practices of people in the U.S. In fact, in
each of the three case studies outlined in Chapter 3 I ran across migrants and community leaders
who spoke of the beliefs and value systems of the U.S. in discussing development issues in their
hometowns. One of the most evident examples of this emerged during a conversation I had
with Anselmo, the co-director of MIDE-AC, on a warm July afternoon during the summer of
2011 during a visit to El Timbinal, Guanajuato. The visit itself was quite interesting but perhaps
the most important juncture during my stay took place in the car ride en route to El Timbinal. I
had never been to the small, southern Guanajuato town but MIDE-AC was kind enough to
offer me a ride in their double cab pickup truck. During the two-hour ride Anselmo and I sat up
front and Alejandra and Don Ángel rode in the back. While they discussed an upcoming
meeting with the factory workers in El Timbinal, Ansemo kindly answered the many questions I
had for him. The majority of my inquiries concerned how MIDE-AC got started and the
previous work that they had done with migrant clubs in Zacatecas. Still, what stood out the most
from our conversation was a two-pronged process Anselmo described as “social lobbying” and
the development of “political capital”. Specifically, Anselmo had the following to say:
Early on we [MIDE-AC] discussed the importance of political participation and the
importance that migrants themselves follow the laws and that they began to see
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themselves as transnational citizens. When we began working with migrants we
immediately noticed that they recognized the social and legal importance of the law the
United States. At the same time, as an organization we felt that as the country began its
transition towards democracy it was fundamental that in Mexico citizens learn to respect
the law. That is, we had to learn that it was preferable not to buy off local officials [pagar
la mordida], that it was better to let them take your car than to allow police officers to
extort you for money. So, as an organization, we felt that it was crucial that we
demonstrate to migrants that it is just as important to follow the law in Mexico as in the
United States. In our training sessions we began to tell migrants, “You have lived in the
U.S. and you understand the importance of following the law. So, why, as soon as you
cross the border back into Mexico do you stop using your seat belt, you go back to
throwing trash out the window and you feel that it is ok to drink and drive?” As you can
see, part of what we do at MIDE-AC involves constructing citizenship [formación
ciudadana]. From the beginning this was one of our main interests. We knew that to be
effective over the long run we would have to address the political culture of local
communities. We knew that our impact would be small scale to begin because we are a
very small organization. So, we decided that we could offer consultation to migrants but
what really interested us was an alliance with Mexican citizens working with the theme of
democracy. We wanted to instill the idea that citizens are essentially vigilantes that
constantly scrutinize the government but in order for this type of attitude to emerge we
knew that migrants and their communities had to be aware of their responsibilities as
citizens. Our history in Mexico has accustomed Mexicans to see the government as an
all-powerful entity that gives and takes at its own discretion. Given this history, we felt it
was necessary to help people see the need to mature as citizens and realize that the
government is our responsibility, that if the government fails it is our fault and that if the
government robs it is because we permit them to do so by helping them rob or turning a
blind eye. And specifically, as the migrants are concerned, we wanted them to realize that
if their projects failed it is at least in part because they did not put enough effort into
seeing the project through. We felt it necessary to help the migrants realize that they
could not simply survive on government subsidies because they make us slaves, they
make us clients of one political party or another. So, as you can see, as an organization
we see ourselves as social lobbyists and our goal is to develop political capital within
local communities.
As Anselmo clearly demonstrates, one of the most difficult obstacles to development in
migrant hometowns in central Mexico is not a question of funding but rather the cultivation of a
new political culture. Moreover, as he pointed out to me on multiple occasions, in his experience
economic development and the cultivation of democratic norms always hand in hand. The
results from my study confirm this notion. Specifically, in previous chapters I find that migrants
do in fact have a voice in rural development initiates but cold cash transfers alone are not
enough to impulse meaningful development. Rather, household remittances tend to repress
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human development levels at the municipal level. In contrast, investments made through the 3x1
para migrants program have a positive effect on development outcomes. In municipios with
relatively more 3x1 investments education and healthcare outcomes are better, and in rural
municipios, per capita income also improves in the years ensuing 3x1 investments. In short, in all
municipios—and especially rural municipios—3x1 investments improve the quality of life enjoyed
local citizens. As extant research suggests, the mechanisms driving these results may be directly
tied to the process that Anselmo describes above. That is, 3x1 projects are a catalyst for
economic and human development but they may also contain the potential to have a positive
impact on political norms. In order to further evaluate this possibility I turn to a quantitative
evaluation of political norms across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios. I begin this analysis with a brief
review of existing research concerning the relationship between democracy and development.
The Spread of Democracy
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and
woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that
democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time." (Winston Churchill 1947)
Government, to be sure, is but a necessary burden. The great American revolutionary
Thomas Paine made this point clear in Common Sense when he wrote “Society in every state is a
blessing, but government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil” ([1776] 1995:1). Over the
course of the 20th century democracy emerged as one of the most common forms of
government in the world. Graph 6.1 illustrates this point. Data for the graph comes from the
Polity IV project, which ranks government types around the world from 1800 through present.
Graph 6.1 considers three types of governments: (1) Democracies, (2) Anocracies and (3)
Autocracies. As the reader can see, by the year 2000 roughly half of the world’s countries were
democracies.
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Graph 6.1 The Spread of Democracy, 1800-2011

Source: Polity IV, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity1.htm.
With little doubt, among the typologies outlined in Graph 6.1, democracy is arguably the
most desirable. Still, as Winston Churchill points out above, democracy is far from perfect. In
fact, there is a great deal of variation within democratic countries around the world. As Graph
6.2 illustrates, in 2011 roughly half the world’s countries were democratic. Still, only a handful of
countries were considered “fully democratic” in 2011. In this sense democracy can be seen as a
theoretical principle that societies aim to achieve but in practice often fall short of reaching.
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Graph 6.2 Government Types by Country, 2011

Source: Polity IV, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity1.htm.
Relatively more democratic societies are attractive for a number of reasons. First,
democratic societies tend to go to war with one another less frequently than non-democratic
societies.32 Given this, it comes as no surprise that the number of armed conflicts around the
world has dropped significantly as democracy has spread. Second, democratic societies allow
citizens to participate in the redistribution of resources, which in turn gives citizens a vested
interest in government. Finally, basic measures of human prosperity share a strong positive
correlation with democracy. With these elements in mind, understanding the factors that
32Immanuel

Kant is often cited as the first author to systematically discuss this issue in his 1795 publication Perpetual
Peace. Thomas Paine made a similar argument in 1776 in his book Common Sense. Since then, however, a great
number of authors have added to the conversation. For a contemporary treatment of this issue see: Doyle, Michael
W. Ways of War and Peace. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
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improve the stability and quality of democratic governance is obviously of great importance. It
comes as little surprise, therefore, that the relationship between economic performance and the
quality of governance has received a great deal of attention in recent years. This is particular true
in the case of Mexico, which I turn back to now.
Remittances, Development and Democracy in Mexico
Early analysts of economic restructuring in Mexico argued that by introducing economic
reforms and slowly conceding to political liberalization, the PRI-dominated Mexican
government planted “the seeds of its own decline” (Al Camp 1993:28) and in doing so sowed
the seeds of a relatively more democratic future (Centeno 1997:4). Still, critics of the literature on
the economic determinants of democracy argue that while economic development may have
stabilized electoral cycles in Mexico and Latin America, it has not improved the quality of
democratic governance in the region. In fact, by the time Samuel P. Huntington announced the
“Third Wave of Democracy” in 1991 (Huntington 1991), Latin America had already begun to
witness several tentative transitions towards democracy throughout the region (O’Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986; Stallings and Kaufman, 1989; Karl 1990). However, Huntington’s threshold for
democratic government was remarkably simple: competitive and transparent elections in which
elites could vie for political power (also see, Dahl 1989 and O’Donnell 1987). Early critics of the
third wave literature critiqued simplistic measures of democracy based solely on electoral
accountability (Stallings and Kaufman 1989; Remmer 1990; Karl 1990; Geddes 1995).
Guillermo O’Donnell, himself a migrant from Argentina, was one of the first authors to
analytically theorize the problems associated with the Latin America’s incipient democracies. In
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1987), for example, O’Donnell and Schmitter point out that
the transition towards democratic regimes in the region would require the distinction between
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different sub-types of democracies in order to take into account the often divergent experiences
of individual countries as they moved towards consolidating more inclusive political norms.
O’Donnell (1994) later argued that many of Latin America’s democracies were “delegative
democracies” that lacked horizontal accountability. Namely, he contended that while open
elections guaranteed the transparent competition for power among elites in most countries
throughout Latin America, there were very few checks and balances in place to hold
governments accountable once a given party gained power. As a result, according to O’Donnell,
once they were elected, elites had “delegative” powers that extended well beyond the authorities
granted to most executives in established democracies around the world. O’Donnell further
developed this point in his 1998 article titled, “Horizontal Accountability” in which he claimed
that the most evident weakness of democratic regimes in Latin America was the lack of checks
and balances upon the executive. In his opinion, the inflated delegative powers of the executive
encroached on the liberal (private rights) and republican (public duties) tenets inherent to
democratic governance, and as a consequence, compromised the quality of representative
government in the region. In this respect, according to O’Donnell, the future of democratic
governments in Latin America depends largely upon the ability of governments to rein in
delegative executive powers and expand democratic practices beyond the electoral sphere.
After it was clear that democracies in the region might avoid authoritarian lapses,
researchers began to call for process-based paradigms capable of capturing the often distinct trials
and tribulations of democratic consolidation evident in emerging democracies. Terry Lynn Karl
(1990), for example, called for an “interactive approach that seeks explicitly to relate structural
constraints to the shaping of contingent choice” (Karl 1990:1). By the dawn of the new
millennium research within this vein concurred that democratic governments in Latin
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America—more often than not guided by neoliberal economic policy—while more stable, were
not necessarily more democratic in nature (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2003; Weyland 2004;
O'Donnell 1998; and Avritzer 2002). As a result, in recent years researchers have begun to place
more focus on in-country variation as well as the identification of previously unexplored
variables related to democratic growth (Daron 2008:810). With that in mind, analysis of 3 x 1
investments in Guanajuato within the context of fiscal decentralization provides an excellent
good opportunity to address a small part of this shortcoming.
In much of Latin America the principle approach to reining in executive power and
expanding decision making to previously marginalized sectors of society has come through the
decentralization of federal resources to local levels of government. In Mexico, this process began
in the 1980s but it did not gain force until 1997, when the federal government redesigned Ramo
26 and created Ramo 33. Together, Ramo 26 and Ramo 33 provided local governments across
Mexico with the necessary funding to invest in education, healthcare and the promotion of local
economies. Put simply, 1997 marked the first time in Mexican history that local governments
had the ability to respond to their development needs on their own terms. Not surprisingly, for
many local regions across Mexico development initiatives have long been tied to remittances
flowing in from the U.S. Thus, it is not surprising that as local governments began to gain access
to decentralized funds from the federal government, they began to support migrant
development projects. This is the context from which the program 3x1 para migrantes emerged.
As previously noted, the program is unique in that it reincorporates migrants into the political
sphere by contributing to RLD projects with decentralized funds. As a result, the 3x1 program
provides an opportunity to analyze both the economic impact of RLD across Guanajuato as well
as the program’s impact on local politics. This potential is captured in Figure 6.1, which was first
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presented in Chapter 2. Evidence outlined in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 demonstrate that all of the
potential outcomes outlined in the figure are possible. Specifically, in Chapter 4 it is
demonstrated that the 3x1 program appears to reinforce patron-client norms by stacking
development projects in pre-election years. Moreover, 3x1 investments appear to increase
electoral participation. On the other hand, research presented in Chapter 5 reveals the potential
of 3x1 projects to improve economic and human development outcomes. Specifically, 3x1
investments increase literacy rates and healthcare outcomes, and at least in rural municipios, they
improve per capita income. Finally, across Guanajuato’s municipios it is clear that 3x1 projects
outperform household remittances as a catalyst for local development. In fact, as findings
presented in Chapter 5 point to time and again, household remittances alone actually have a
negative effect on human development outcomes.
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Outcome (RLD)

Principal Actors
Migrants (HTA)

Infrastructure

-Monetary remittances

-Bridges
-Roads

Feedback
-Legislation
-Conferences
-Research
-Dialogues

Migrant Community
-Project committee

-Sewage
-Electricity grids

Government
-Economic resources
-Professional assessment

Businesses
-Farms
-Factory

Civil Society
-Bridge between migrants and
government

Reinforcement of nonDemocratic Norms
-Patron-client politics (+)
-Lack of transparency (?)
-Limited political spaces (?)

Growth of Democratic Norms
-Competitive elections (-)
-Government transparency (?)
-Expansion of political spaces (+)

Improved Social Conditions
-Improved education (+)
-Improved Healthcare (+)
-Increased income per capita (+)

Source: Author.

Figure 6.1 Potential Development Paths Within the 3x1 para Migrantes Program
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Nonetheless, despite the associations outlined in Figure 6.1, it is still unclear to what degree
these development outcomes influence political norms and behavior across Guanajuato’s
municipios. With that in mind, in the paragraphs and pages that follow I address the relationship
between governance and RLD cross Guanajuato’s 46 municipios.
Data and Methodology
In the space that follows I evaluate the potential effect of human development on
governance across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios. The tables and figures in this section combine data
used in previous chapters with a 2004 survey concerning municipal governance conducted in
each of Guanajuato’s 46 municipios.33 Unfortunately, the limited nature of this data does not allow
for meaningful regression analysis of potential relationships between development and
governance over time. For that reason, the enquiries that follow are limited to an analysis of
correlations between specific variables of interest. In this sense, the findings in this chapter are
tentative in nature. Still, as becomes evident, this data provides a unique opportunity to observe
the relationship between development trends and the quality of governance within Guanajuato’s
municipal presidencies for the year 2004.
Table 6.1 illustrates the data used in this section. As in previous chapters, data was
collected from a variety of sources, each of which is outlined in the far right column. The first
three variables in Table 6.1 are the main variables of interest. The variable Transparency measures
“mechanisms employed by the municipio to make its management of public affairs transparent to
citizens” in addition to “the percentage of council sessions open to the public.” Municipal

33 The

variables used in this analysis comes the municipal index of institutional capacity (ICCIM), which is
constructed mainly with data from the Nation Survey of Municipal Governments (ENGM). In addition, the ICCIM
uses financial data from National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and information regarding public
expenditures from National Population Council (CONAPO). For specific information concerning the respective
indexes please see: De Dios 2008.
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transparency is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, in which 0 represents a complete lack of
transparency and 100 represents absolute transparency. According to the survey, the mean score
across Guanajuato’s municipios is 69. Still, there is a great deal of variance across municipios,
indicating that some municipal governments are far more transparent than others. In turn, Civic
Participation represents “mechanisms and instances that allow citizens to participate in
government decisions and permit the municipal government to become familiar with the needs
of the population”. In this case, 0 represents no civic participation, whereas a score of 100
indicates extremely high levels of participation. As the table reveals, civil participation across
Guanajuato averages 31.21, with a standard deviation of 11.36. Based on these results, it is
evident that across the state of Guanajuato civic participation is far from optimal. Finally,
Municipal Planning is defined as “the existence of municipal development plans; including urban
development, civil protection and ecological protection”. A score of 0 indicates an absolute
dearth of development plans, whereas a score of 100 implies a clear and coherent plan for
municipal development in the years to come. Across Guanajuato municipios average a score of
64.29. The standard deviation of this particular variable is 25.06, indicating that there is a great
deal of variation in regard to municipal planning. (For a full description of the remaining
variables please see Appendix 1.)
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Table 6.1 Definitions and Description of Variables Included in Correlation Analysis
Variable
Transparency
Civic Participation
Municipal Planning
HDI
Infant Mortality Rate
Education Attendance Rate
% Pop Illiterate
GDP per Capita Municipal
3x1 per Capita
Electoral Participation
Electoral Competition
% Homes Remittances
% Homes Return Migrants
Rural-Urban
Social Marginalization
Public Work Spending per Capita
Ramo 26 per Capita
Ramo 33 per Capita

Mean
69.03
31.21
64.29
.77
21.9
61.84
13.67
7057.92
42.68
51.34
2.98
13.29
4.67
.45
-.44
923.96
464.13
304.78

S.D.
23.35
11.36
25.06
.05
8.01
4.06
4.75
2372.76
74.
7.21
.87
6.69
2.33
.49
.56
1031.09
443.91
344.76

Data Source
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
INEGI
INEGI
INEGI
INEGI
INEGI
SEDESHU; INEGI
CIDAC; IFE
CIDAC; IFE
CONAPO
CONAPO
INEGI
SNIM
SNIM; INEGI
SNIM
SNIM

Source: UNDP, CIDAC, CONAPO, IFE, INEGI, SEDESHU and SNIM.
1 Figures in Mexican Pesos.

Table 6.2 displays correlations between mechanisms of civic participation and a number
of independent variables. As the reader will note, the indicators of HDI do not correlate with
public participation across Guanajuato’s 46 municipios. In turn, the percentage of return migrants
in a given municipio, the percentage of homes receiving remittances and 3x1 per capita all share a
positive and moderately strong correlation with civic participation. Although these findings are
limited to 2004, they suggest that RLD may improve civic participation in Guanajuato’s
municipios.
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Table 6.2 Correlations of Civic Participation with Select Independent Variables
Correlation
Civic Participation (2004)

R2

Human Development Index (1 year lag)

-.07

Infant Mortality Rate (1 year lag)

-.04

Literacy Rate (1 year lag)

.01

School Attendance Rates (1 year lag)

-.01

% Homes Return Migrants (1 year lag)

.21*

% Homes Receiving Remittances (1 year lag)

.20*

3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

.17*

Ramo 26 (1 year lag)

.07

Ramo 33 (1 year lag)

.07

Source: SEDESOL, INEGI, UNDP.
Table 6.3 reveals the results of correlations between transparency and select independent
variables. As the results demonstrate, human development levels share a positive relationship
with transparency within municipal governments. This finding implies that, more developed
municipios have relatively more transparent municipal governments. Concerning the individual
indicators of HDI, as one might expect, as infant mortality rates increase, government
transparency decreases. Put differently, government transparency improves as infant mortality
rates begin to fall. On the other hand, as literacy rates go up government transparency improves;
thus it seems that as education outcomes improve government practices appear to follow suit. In
turn, school attendance rates share a negative relationship with government transparency. This
finding supports the results of Chapter 5, which demonstrated that school attendance rates do
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not necessarily imply improved education outcomes. Table 6.3 reveals the practical implications
of this finding by showing that the quality of education influences the type of governance
evident at the municipal level. This implies that while building schools is certainly important,
recruiting quality educators is indispensable. The percentage of return migrants and remittances
in a municipio appears to have little influence on government transparency. 3x1 per capita, in
contrast, has a positive effect on municipal transparency. This implies that participatory
programs such as 3x1 para migrantes have the potential to pressure government officials to
conform to relatively more transparent norms. This finding is of particular interest because it
demonstrates that 3x1 investments not only improve development outcomes but also potentially
influence governance at the municipal level. Finally, neither Ramo 26 nor Ramo 33 shares a
statistically significant relationship with government transparency.
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Table 6.3 Correlations of Transparency with Select Independent Variables
Correlation
Transparency (2004)

R2

Human Development Index (1 year lag)

.16*

Infant Mortality Rate (1 year lag)

-.17*

Literacy Rate (1 year lag)

.19*

School Attendance Rates (1 year lag)

-.12*

% Homes Return Migrants (1 year lag)

.01

% Homes Receiving Remittances (1 year lag)

-.04

3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

.39*

Ramo 26 (1 year lag)

-.19

Ramo 33 (1 year lag)

-.01

Source: SEDESOL, INEGI, UNDP.
Table 6.4 reveals the correlations between select independent variables and municipal planning.
As the reader will note, overall human development shares a positive relationship with levels of
municipal planning. This finding suggest that municipios with relatively better education and
healthcare outcomes also have municipal governments that do a better job planning for the
future of their citizens. This is corroborated by the individual relationships between municipal
planning and infant mortality, which indicates that higher quality healthcare improves
government preparation. In turn, literacy rates share a positive relationship with municipal
planning; indicating that the higher the quality of education, the more prepared government
officials are to perform their jobs. Finally, Ramo 26 and Ramo 33 both share a negative
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relationship with municipal planning. In all likelihood this reflects that fact that Ramo 26 and
Ramo 33 both target the most undeveloped municipios.
Table 6.4 Correlations of Municipal Planning with Select Independent Variables
Correlation
Municipal Planning (2004)

R2

Human Development Index (1 year lag)

.27*

Infant Mortality Rate (1 year lag)

-.21*

Literacy Rate (1 year lag)

.31*

School Attendance Rates (1 year lag)

-.10

% Homes Return Migrants (1 year lag)

-.08

% Homes Receiving Remittances (1 year lag)

-.11

3x1 per capita (1 year lag)

.02

Ramo 26 (1 year lag)

-.37*

Ramo 33 (1 year lag)

-.38*

Source: SEDESOL, INEGI, UNDP.

Conclusions
The findings in the chapter—although hardly conclusive—suggest that in the state of
Guanajuato good governance is at least in part a product of human development. These results
mirror the findings of previous research at the national level that find that as human
development begins to improve the quality of local governance responds in kind (De Dios
2008). Moreover, and most important for the study at hand, the results indicate that 3x1 para
migrantes investments share a positive relationship with civic participation and relatively more
transparent municipal governments. Given the limited nature of the data used in this section,
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these finding cannot be used to generalize about the relationship between 3x1 investments and
governance over the full period 2002-2011. However, the reader will recall that in Chapter 5 it
was found that 3x1 investments improve human development outcomes across all of
Guanajuato’s municipios and in particular rural municipios. In turn, in this chapter it is found that
human development indices correlate in a positive direction with the quality of municipal
governance for the year 2004. Given this, it can be inferred that 3x1 investments in Guanajuato
during the period 2002-2011 improved human development levels and in all likelihood
contributed to improved governance. These findings mirror Xóchitl Bada’s work, which
concludes, “HTAs have made clear inroads for increasing the accountability mechanisms vis-àvis the state authorities at the municipal and state levels” (2011:29).
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Chapter 7: Discussion
Evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable, become intolerable once
the idea of escape from them is suggested. (Alexis de Tocqueville [1835] 2000)

In his timeless masterpiece Democracy in America, author Alexis de Tocqueville suggests
that once it becomes evident to the oppressed that there is another way they will begin to take it
upon themselves to improve their lot in life. This suggestion clearly captures the experience of
many immigrants around the world today. In recent decades the number of individuals exiting
their homelands has reached unprecedented numbers. At its core, this trend is the product of an
unequal world order in which a handful of economically well-off nations control the vast
majority of the world’s resources. In this sense, relative deprivation—and not necessarily abject
poverty—pushes people to pick up and move to regions or countries with better opportunities.
Frequently, once migrants settle into their new surroundings, they begin sending money back to
their friends and family; and occasionally, these individuals return to their homelands and with
them they bring back an acute desire to improve the factors that conditioned their exit in the
first place. As this study reveals, this development is particular evident in the case of modern
Mexico.
Over the course of the last thirty years Mexico has experienced a number a fundamental
social and economic shifts. Specifically, as Graph 7.1 illustrates, in recent decades human
development indices have improved throughout the country, revealing tangible advances in the
realms of education, healthcare and employment. Poverty and inequality are hardly a thing of the
past in Mexico, but in general, Mexicans are better off today than they were three or four
decades ago. In addition, in recent decades emigration to the U.S. has fostered deep
transnational links between Mexico and the U.S. A clear example of this is found in the billions
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of dollars in migrant remittances that flow into Mexico each year. Finally, during this same time
period Mexico has experienced an unprecedented opening of the political sphere. Across the
country parties now compete for political posts in relatively transparent elections. Moreover, the
decentralization of decision making and resource allocation from the federal government to state
and municipal authorities has opened up avenues of political participation to previously excluded
groups. Taken together, these trends point towards a potential relationship between migration,
remittances, human development and democracy in modern Mexico. To be clear, these patterns
do not necessarily imply causation; however, as I have demonstrated throughout this study, at
least in the case of Guanajuato, there is far more overlap between these factors than available
research suggests.
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Graph 7.1 Migration, Remittances and Human Development in Mexico 1980-2011

1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Remittances

Migration

Source: IGENI, UN.
Note: This graph reflects the natural log of each variable.
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HDI

In the present study, as a means of evaluating the degree to which Mexican migrants
change their homelands, I have analyzed the relationship between migrant remittances,
development and political change in municipios across the state of Guanajuato, Mexico. My study
began with several basic questions: To what degree have migrants shaped development patterns
in Guanajuato? And specifically, how do migrants, if at all, influence economic development and
political change in municipios across the state? The crux of this study lies at the intersection of
these inquires, and although my analysis is limited in scope, the results outlined in Chapter 3, 4, 5
and 6 point to one overarching theme: Remittances alone do not drive long-term development.
Rather, in the long run meaningful RLD—measured by gains in health care, education and
economic growth—requires a deep and authentic partnership between economic actors,
members of civic society and local government. As the results outlined throughout this study
demonstrate, the program 3x1 para migrantes has the potential to underpin this type of
relationship. This process is illustrated in Figure 7.1, which summarizes the main findings of this
study. Positive relationships are denoted with a “+” sign, negative relationships are denoted with
a “-” sign and spurious associations are marked with a “x”. As the diagram indicates, 3x1
investments improve on the development outcomes of raw remittances. In fact, as my research
indicates, the 3x1 framework appears to have the potential to stimulate virtuous development
cycles that benefit all of the inhabitants residing within migrant-sending regions. Eventually,
additional research will help tease out the nuances of this potential. In the meantime, however,
this study makes a strong case for bringing the state back into local development initiatives,
especially in so much as they concern migrant communities.
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Source: Author.

Figure 7.1 Outline of Results
At this juncture it is important to point out that RLD in Mexico is already seen
internationally as a model to be followed. In fact, in recent years governments from Latin
American and other parts of the world have sent commissions to Mexico to learn about the 3x1
para migrantes program with the ultimate goal of instituting similar programs in their own
countries. In 2012, for example, the state of Guanajuato received a commission from the
Philippines. The goal of the commission was to learn from Guanajuato’s experience with the 3x1
program, and ultimately, create a similar a program for migrants and their families back in the
Philippines. World Bank analyst Sheryll Namingit, who travelled with the delegation, pointed out
that “when the commission returns to the Philippines we are going to apply what we have
learned in order to develop an integral program for migrants that helps promote a diverse array
of [migrant] projects” (MiMorelia.com). Given these types of exchanges, the results from this
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study are likely to have practical implications for other nations looking to foster RLD. For that
reason, in the space below I outline several general conclusions for policy makers.
Nine Lessons for Policy Makers
(1) International migration is an inherent component to the current global economy
In a world in which inequalities between rich countries and poor countries run 100 to 1
migration can no longer be seen as a passing “phase” of development. Rather, understanding the
impact that migrants have on their hometowns is fundamental to our desire to improve the
wellbeing of mankind in the 21st century. Income and wealth disparities between rich nations and
poor nations have grown over the course of the 20th century and they have held steady at the
beginning of the 21st century. As a consequence, immigration has emerged as a distinct form of
social mobility in which individuals from developing nations seek to improve their life chances
by relocating to relatively richer countries. This tendency should not be expected to dissipate
anytime soon. At present the richest countries around the globe dominate more than 80 percent
of humanity’s wealth but account for only 20 percent of its population. As long as these
structural arrangements remain, the flow of remittances from developed regions of the world to
developing nations will continue. Given this, policy makers in developing countries should have
great interest in understanding those factors that optimize the development potential of
remittances.
(2) Migrant networks are central to RLD
At least initially, the vast majority of migrants exit their country not only with a vision of
a better life for themselves but also with the hope of eventually improving the lives of those they
have left behind. The individuals and communities outlined in Chapter 3 clearly reflect this
point. Still, as this study reveals, cold cash transfers, despite the good intentions with which they
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are sent, do not necessarily guarantee meaningful development. Rather, the success or failure of
RLD appears to hinge on the presence of return migrants and the assistance of committed
government officials. In addition, for many rural communities across Guanajuato, it appears that
the catalyst of social, economic and political change is not embodied so much by the total
amount of dollars that migrants send back from the U.S. but rather by the ideas and norms that
migrants bring back to their communities. This point is extremely important because it reveals
the potential for migrants to leverage economic development at the local level while at the same
time stimulating political change. It also demonstrates that migrants remit not only monetary
goods but also social remittances in the form of political and human capital. This finding also
has novel implications for policy makers in migrant-receiving states. Specifically, the findings
outlined in this study imply that policies that facilitate the circulation of migrants would be most
likely to spur the positive effects of return migrants. In contrast, policies that reduce the
circulation of migrants between the U.S. and Mexico would be expected to inhibit the potential
for return migrants to have a positive impact on their hometown communities. Taken together,
these findings demonstrate that migrant remittances have the potential to underpin a unique
form of development in which migrants and their communities gain agency within the political
economy of their hometown regions; still, the degree to which this potential is realized depends
a great deal on policy makers in both the U.S. and Mexico.
(3) 3x1 Investments reflect a self-selection process that is related to the nature of
migration cycles
The results of this study highlight the fact that collaboration between migrants and state
officials has the potential to improve human development outcomes and foster better
governance. Still, this potential appears to be more acute in specific types of regions. As Graph
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7.2 illustrates, between 2002 and 2011 migration levels tended to be highest in municipios with
development levels below .7. In turn, 3x1 investments and household remittances in municipios
across Guanajuato were more frequent in municipios with development levels between .7 and .9.
In this sense, when and where 3x1 investments take place seems to be closely related to the
nature of migration cycles. That is, migrants generally tend to emerge from relatively less
developed municipios. Migrants generally begin sending remittances home as soon as they can but
often times they are not able to consistently send money back home until they secure stable
work wherever it is that they have settled. For most migrants it takes several years, if not
decades, before they are in a position to send large quantities of cash back to Mexico.34 In the
meantime, while migrants are establishing themselves in the U.S., hometown communities
continue to change. To be sure, there are thousands of migrants that are selected out of 3x1
projects due to the simple fact that in their absence their communities have turned into virtual
ghost towns that come to life once or twice a year when migrants return to celebrate patron saint
days. In these communities migrants seem to be aware of the fact that large investments are
futile. In turn, my analysis implies that migrants are more likely to support 3x1 projects in
municipios in which meaningful development has taken place in their absence. Overall, these
patterns do not negate the development potential of 3x1 investments; rather, they provide a
more nuanced understanding of where and under what conditions 3x1 projects emerge.

34It

is likely for this reason that the majority of individuals that I interviewed who were participating in 3x1 projects
were in their early 40s and 50s.
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Graph 7.2 Migration, Remittances and 3x1 Investments in Guanajuato, Mexico
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-Low migration
-High remittances
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Source: Author; data from SEDESOL, INEGI.

(4) The timing of 3x1 para migrantes investments is partially dictated by political
interests
The 3x1 framework allows migrants to play a hands-on role in allocating public
resources. Still, my research indicates that politicians play a clear role in dictating the timing of
3x1 investments such that more investments are made in pre-election years. These finds present
a cautionary tale that warns developing countries of the perils of decentralization within the
context of non-democratic political spaces. Ideally, 3x1 funds would be distributed based on
local demand alone. Still, this type of behavior should not come as a surprise. In most
developing countries around the world, the majority of which are far from democratic, the
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vehicle for political change is the same system that has delivered undemocratic politics for
centuries. As Marx warned, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please;
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already,
given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a
nightmare on the brains of the living” (Marx 1852). Thus, in the short run it is perhaps to be
expected that participatory development initiatives fall short of consolidating democratic norms
and practices. Still, if in the short run local governments redistribute goods such that access to
health care improves, education expands and per capita income increases, it would be expected
that over the long run the political system itself would be more likely to foster democratic
practices and norms. At the very least, a more developed citizenry—in terms of health,
education and income—is more capable of determining its own destiny.
(5) Household remittances alone drive down social and economic development.
Across the models outlined in Chapter 5, the percentage of homes receiving household
remittances had a strong negative effect on levels of HDI. Specifically, household remittances
were found to be associated with an increase in infant mortality rates and a reduction in school
attendance and literacy rates. In rural municipios the number of homes receiving remittances was
found to slightly improve per capita income but overall the percentage of homes receiving
migrant remittances had a strong negative effect on overall human development. It would be
misleading to conclude that migrant remittance adversely affect all levels of development.
Rather, household remittances greatly improve the life chances of those individuals receiving the
cash transfers. Still, while raw cash transfers may indeed improve the lives of those receiving
them in the short run, over the long run they do not appear to contribute to human
development across the wider community.
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(6) Remittances invested through the program 3x1 para migrantes have a positive effect
on human development outcomes.
As documented in Chapter 5, 3x1 investments have a positive effect on overall human
development across Guanajuato. Specifically, 3x1 investments play a role in reducing infant
mortality rates across municipios. This is particularly evident in rural municipios. In addition, 3x1
investments improve school attendance rates, and in rural municipios they correlate with higher
levels of per capita income. These findings reveal the role of 3x1 investments in improving
human development in select municipios across the state of Guanajuato. Put simply, municipios that
have participated in the 3x1 program are relatively more developed today than they were ten
years ago. Given this, one might also expect that these municipios would have relatively more
transparent and accountable governments.
(7) 3x1 investments may play a role in abating future migration.
Regression analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates a negative relationship between 3x1 investments
and the percentage of migrants living in a given municipio. That is, municipios with relatively higher
3x1 investment rates reported lower percentage of migrants in the ensuing year. This finding is
particularly important because it demonstrates that when channeled towards particular ends
remittances have the potential to not only improve development outcomes but also reduce
emigration. At the very least, these findings draw into question the U.S. government’s multibillion dollar investment in the fortification of the U.S.-Mexico border in recent years.
Moreover, they indicate that serious discussions of how to reduce migration between the U.S.
and Mexico should place more focus on how to improve community and regional development
in Mexico.
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(8) 3x1 investments share a moderately positive correlation with measures of good
governance.
As the results outlined in Chapter 6 show, in the state of Guanajuato good governance is at least
in part a product of human development. These results mirror the findings of previous research
at the national level that demonstrate that as human development begins to improve the quality
of local governance responds in kind (De Dios 2008). The results from the present study,
although limited in scope, indicate that 3x1 para migrantes investments share a positive
relationship with relatively more transparent municipal governments. Moreover, 3x1 investments
appear to encourage civic participation within municipal governments. Still, given the limited
nature of the data used in Chapter 6, these findings do not necessarily imply that 3x1
investments incite better governance over the full period 2002-2011. However, the reader will
recall that in Chapter 5 it was found that 3x1 investments improved human development
outcomes across all of Guanajuato’s municipios and in particular rural municipios. In turn, in
Chapter 6 it is found that human development indices correlate in a positive direction with the
quality of municipal governance. Given this, it can be inferred that during the period 2002-2011
3x1 investments in Guanajuato improved human development and also likely contributed to
better governance.
Taken together these eight points suggest three potential development paths, each of
which is outline in detail in Figure 7.2. The first paradigm—stagnation—suggests that more
often than not migrant remittances result in a state of economic torpor. This outcome is in part
due to the fact that in these communities as the dependency on remittances increases locals
often turn away from the state in favor of migrant support from abroad. In time, this
arrangement may bode well for the select individuals receiving remittances but it will likely have
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a negative effect on the rest of the community. In this paradigm it is expected that levels of HDI
actually fall, while civic participation and government transparency remain poor.
The second paradigm—growth—distinguishes itself from the former in so much that
here migrants play an active role in helping their communities channel remittances towards
particular ends, including investments in education and public infrastructure. Still, as political
actors, migrants and their communities often remain passive. As a consequence, while this
paradigm would likely result in higher HDI levels, measures of civic participation and
government transparency would be expected to remain the same.
Finally, the third paradigm—democratic growth—depicts a process in which migrants
and their communities actively participate in communal development initiatives, but in addition,
both parties emerge as communal leaders. This pathway is distinguished from the both of the
aforementioned paradigms by the fact that migrants and their communities actively engage in
development projects with the state. By no means does this type of interaction in and of itself
guarantee meaningful change in way of political norms and practices; however, unlike the first
two paradigms, it at the very least permits for the possibility of such change. Here it is expected
that RLD will not only underpin higher levels of HDI, but moreover, will foster civic
participation and pressure local government to be more transparent.
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Development
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→

Growth
→
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Capital Deficiencies

Expected Outcomes

Economic

Human

Political

Confronted with cash
transfers from abroad.

Families fortunate enough to
receive remittances are able
to improve human capital by
investing in private
education.

Individuals abandon the state
in favor of support from
migrants.

HDI and civic participation
decrease and government
transparency remains low.

Confronted with cash
transfers from abroad and
investments in public
infrastructure by migrants
and their communities.

Addressed at the community
level by migrants willing to
make investments in
education facilities and
public infrastructure.

Communities look towards
migrants and the state as
potential community leaders
but remain passive actors.

HDI improves but civic
participation and
government transparency
remain the same.

Confronted with cash
transfers from abroad,
investments in public
infrastructure and ample
input from migrants and
local politicians.

Addressed at the community
level by migrants and
government experts.
Investments made in
education facilities and
public infrastructure. Efforts
made to target high-need
areas.

Communities look towards
migrants, the state and
NGOs as potential
community leaders. Migrants
and their communities
emerge as active participants
in the development of their
hometowns.

Measures of HDI, civic
participation and
government transparency all
improve, setting the
foundation for more
democratic norms and
practices.

Source: Author.

Figure 7.2 Remittance-Led Development: A Model
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Further research is needed to confirm the degree to which the paradigms outlined in
Figure 7.2 hold true beyond the state of Guanajuato. Still, given the relatively large percentage of
Mexico’s total remittances captured annually by the state of Guanajuato (roughly ten percent), it
would be expected that the findings from this study would have a certain degree of external
validity. To the degree that this is true, the findings outlined in this study offer valuable
knowledge for states around the world that currently have large diaspora communities.
(9) The 3x1 Framework Depends on Policy Makers in both Mexico and the U.S.
In 2012 I met a man named Ricardo from San Luis Potosí. Ricardo currently lives in
southern Colorado, where he has been employed at a local mushroom farm for nearly a decade.
Prior to coming to the U.S. Ricardo worked for a large rural development project in San Luis
Potosí that was spearheaded by state officials and the World Bank. Through his employment
with the state, Ricardo became quite acquainted with local development projects. When he
moved to the U.S. he began sending remittances back to his friends and family members, and
not surprisingly, he began thinking of different projects that he could organize to help his small
hometown progress. In many respects he was the perfect candidate to start a HTA and begin
organizing 3x1 projects. At the top of his list was a community center similar to the one he and
his family attend in the town they live in the U.S. As he explained one evening when we were
discussing the potential project, “It’s not that people in my hometown don’t exercise. They do.
The problem is that in the wintertime the conditions are so poor outside that they fall out of the
habit because there is nowhere to do exercise indoors. Here [in the U.S.] there are beautiful
community recreation centers where one can go to stay in shape all year round. That’s what the
people need there. The importance of exercise extends throughout the community. Healthy
people go to the doctor less often and work more efficiently. In this respect, a community
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recreation center could help everyone be better off.” Ricardo’s project would be a perfect fit for
the 3x1 program. However, as a result of his status as an undocumented immigrant, he is not
eligible to register as a HTA president and thus is unable to propose 3x1 project with the
Mexican government. As a result, Ricardo’s project is unlikely to ever materialize.
The stipulation that HTA leaders be legal residents of the country in which they reside
helps ensures that the association’s members will be able to freely come and go from Mexico,
which ultimately facilitates the planning and completion of 3x1 projects proposed by the HTA.
Like most development ventures, 3x1 projects go through multiple stages and as a result HTA
members frequently make site visits in order to insure that their projects are moving forward as
planned. Due to the restricting nature of their legal status, undocumented immigrants are unable
to fulfill this basic requirement and for this reason are not permitted to lead HTAs.
Undocumented immigrants are free to contribute to the funding of 3x1 projects; still, the
inability to return home and see the fruits of their labor makes undocumented immigrants less
likely to feel vested in projects. With this in mind, the current focus of U.S. policy makers on
controlling migration through ever-stricter immigration laws and fortress-like borders has a
detrimental effect on the 3x1 program. Unfortunately, this outcome ultimately reduces the
likelihood of remittances being channeled towards meaningful development in migrant-sending
regions throughout Mexico.
A Word on Governance in a Globalized World
This study speaks to the fact that, in today’s global economy, the type and quality of
governance practiced by sovereign nations depends a great deal on international factors. In all
states, the structural conditions underpinning national economies extend beyond the immediate
control of states officials. This is particularly true for developing countries, which wield far less
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control in matters of international relations than developed countries. Still, as this study reveals,
local agency is not entirely stripped away by the forces of globalization. Rather, through
sagacious policy decisions, local actors—both within the state and autonomous from it—have
the ability to leverage transnational factors in their favor. Peter Evans describes this process well,
explaining that the state must remain autonomous from society in order to be "capable of
constructing long-term projects of social change that transcend short-term interests of specific
groups" (Evans 2004).35 In this sense, according to Evans, the state is most efficient when it is
insulated from undue external influence while at the same time being “embedded” in a
meaningful partnership with economic actors and members of civic society (Evans 1992: 181).
“Embedded autonomy,” thus, is “a concrete set of social ties which bind the state to society and
provide institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and
policies” and “a combination of internal coherence and external connectedness” (Evans 1992:
164; 176). True to Evans’ notion of “embedded-autonomy,” the 3x1 program gives the state the
ability to participate in the coordination of migrant projects while at the same time collectivizing
investments, which improves on the development effects of “raw remittances.” In this respect,
the 3x1 framework allows migrants to channel remittances towards development projects that
would be expected to have long-term impact, and in turn, migrants help state officials gauge the
needs of local communities. In practice, this virtuous cycle is unlikely to occur with every 3x1
project; however, as my study demonstrates, on average 3x1 projects improve municipal
development outcomes and they contribute to the progress of local governance. A brief
ethnographic account from the field helps demonstrate this point.

35Evans,

Peter. 2004. “Government's Role in Development: The Case of Brazil under the Workers Party.” Speech
presented at UCLA’s Department of Sociology on May 25 th, 2004, Los Angeles, California. Retrieved on March 22,
2013 (http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=11691).
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On June 4th, 2011 I sat down with Jaime Garcia, who was employed by the state
government as an architect. At the time of our conversation, Mr. Garcia worked for the state
division of public works projects located in Guanajuato, Guanajuato. Previously, Mr. Garcia had
worked in the division of government transparency and accountability. As a result of his
employment history, Mr. Garcia had become quite familiar with all levels of 3x1 projects.
According to him, municipal governments have a great deal of incentive to promote 3x1 projects
due to the fact that, in addition to migrant contributions, they bring in much needed public
works funds from the state and federal level. However, as Mr. Garcia went on to explain:
These types of projects are beneficial beyond their immediate contributions to
infrastructure because many of these rural municipios have been historically corrupt.
Traditionally, municipal presidents might spend a certain amount of their public works
budget on local development but then they might take the left over money and spend it
on the town’s patron saint day. In the worst of cases public works money would simply
disappear. In the case of 3x1 projects, migrants have changed these tendencies because
migrants oversee the projects closely, which creates an oversight mechanism that did not
exist previously. The comite de obras becomes very important because if there are any
forms of irregularities they generally take note of it. They watch how many materials
come in and they monitor their use. And if anything goes wrong they denounce the
irregularities to the state government. When I worked in transparency and accountability
I would see this and what I liked most about these groups is that they were
predominately women. This is important because the 3x1 program helps communities
break political norms and gender norms while at the same time promoting development.
Mr. Garcia’s observations clearly capture the findings of this study. In general, as he notes, the
3x1 program channels remittances towards development projects. However, in addition, the
program embeds an “oversight mechanism” into local development projects and in this manner
helps promote more transparent governance at the municipal level. Most importantly, his
observations attest to the success of the 3x1 program in achieving these goals in practice.
Migration itself is a form of agency in which a number of risk takers leave their current
social setting in the hope of improving their life chances in a foreign land. Occasionally, these
individuals return to their hometowns and claim a voice that they previously lacked. Still, even
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when armed with hard-earned cash, the agency of migrants is limited in the absence of a
dynamic state invested in the local development of migrant-sending communities. In this sense,
state-migrant cooperation has the potential to return agency to local citizens and politicians alike.
In a globalized world in which local agency seems ever fleeting, these findings have novel
implications. As they concern governance, the results outlined here suggest that state officials
would be wise to search out opportunities of joint-governance in which local citizens work
alongside state officials in determining the ultimate destination of public funds. Such
relationships appear to have the potential to return agency to local actors while at the same time
improving the state’s efficiency. As they concern remittances, the findings of this study suggest
that in developing countries, it would behoove policy makers to channel cash transfers towards
specific ends related to education, health care and economic growth. In the short run, these
types of investments have the potential to improve economic circumstances as well as local
governance. In the long run, by improving living conditions in hometown communities, RLD
has the potential to ameliorate the very factors that drive individuals to leave their homelands in
the first place. In the end, this is the only way to truly “control” migration.
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Appendix 1
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Appendix 2
3x1 Patterns in Pre-Electoral Years 2002-2011(in millions of pesos)
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3x1 per capita investments (mean) by municipio, 2002-2011

Source: SEDESOL, CONAPO.
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3x1 per capita investments (mean, migrants) by municipio, 2002-2011

Source: SEDESOL, CONAPO.
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3x1 per capita investments (mean, federal government) by municipio, 2002-2011

Source: SEDESOL, CONAPO.
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3x1 per capita investments (mean, state government) by municipio, 2002-2011

Source: SEDESOL, CONAPO.
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Appendix 7

3x1 per capita investments (mean, municipal government) by municipio, 2002-2011

Source: SEDESOL, CONAPO.
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Appendix 8
Human Development Index (HDI)
The municipal Human Development Index (HDI) is an indicator of the well-being of
the inhabitants of a particular region. In this case, the unit of analysis is the municipio. The HDI
measures progress in three basic areas of welfare, including:
(1) Health (measured by Infant Mortality Rates)
(2) Human Capital (measured by literacy rates and school attendance rates)
(3) Income (measured by GDP per capita)
In order to calculate the municipal HDI it is necessary to compose separate indices for each of
the aforementioned categories. Each individual index ranges from a value of 0 to 1 and is
calculated according to the following general formula:

After calculating the score for each of the respective dimensions, the HDI is obtained by
averaging the index scores for each individual component:
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Appendix 9

HDI by municipio, 2002-2011

Source: SEDESOL, CONAPO.
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Appendix 10

Ramo 26 per capita by municipio, 2002-2011

Source: SEDESOL, CONAPO.
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Appendix 11

Ramo 33 per capita by municipio, 2002-2011

Source: SEDESOL, CONAPO.
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Appendix 12
List of Interviews Conducted between 2009-2012
Location
Ojo de Agua,
Jerécuaro

El Timbinal

Ojo de Agua,
Huanímaro

Uriangato
San Jose de
Iturbide
SEDESHU
Gto.
DIF Gto.
Transparencia
Gto.
MIDE-AC
AM, Leon

Interviewee
Pedro Martinez
Miguel Martinez
Delagado 1 (Salvador)
Delegado 2 (Mani)
Marisol Martinez
Government Official (Sec. of Migrants)
Local Resident 1

Date of Interview
Spring 2009, Summer
2011
Summer 2011
Summer 2011
Summer 2011
Summer 2011
Summer 2011
Summer 2011
Don Ángel
Spring 2011, Summer
Mujer 1
2011
Mujer 2
Summer 2011
Mujer 3
Summer 2011
Mujer 4
Summer 2011
Mujer 5
Summer 2011
Summer 2011
Armando Solís (interview/speech)
Summer 2011
Governor of Gto Juan Manuel Oliva (speech) Summer 2011
Sec. of SEDUSHU Marquez Marquez (speech) Summer 2011
Mujer 1(Hometown Committee)
Summer 2011
Mujer 2 (Hometown Committee)
Summer 2011
Government Official (Sec. of Migrants)
Summer 2011
Government Official (Sec. of Economy)
Summer 2011
Government Official (Sec. of Migrants)
Summer 2010
Government Official (3x1 Office, Arch.)

Winter 2009

Government Official (DIF, State)
Government Official (Bureaucratic,
Transparency)
Alejandra
Anselmo
Editor
Journalist 1
Journalist 2
Journalist 3

Summer 2011, 2012
Summer 2011, 2012

Source: Author.
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Summer 2011, 2012
Summer 2011
Summer 2011
Summer 2010, 2011,
2012
Summer 2011
Summer 2011

